Iranian Progressives in Translation

Progressives Inside Iran Respond to Occupy Wall Street Movement

2012-01-09T22:10:00.000-08:00

Translator’s Note: During the past few months, progressives inside Iran have taken advantage of the Iranian government’s anti-Wall Street rhetoric to hold several forums to discuss the significance of the Occupy Wall Street Movement. Below are excerpts from two presentations which also offer different views of the nature of the current economic crisis. The first by Mohsen Hakimi, labor activist, writer and translator, was presented to the Iranian Sociological Association in Tehran. The second by Mohammad Maljoo, economist, was presented at a “Workshop on the Socio-Economic Analysis of the Occupy Wall Street Movement” at Tehran University’s School of Social Sciences. These translations were first published by Tehran Bureau on January 3, 2012. (http://to.pbs.org/yashCX)

The Occupy Wall Street Movement: Strengths and Weaknesses
Author: Mohsen Hakimi
Source: http://www.akhbar-rooz.com/article.jsp?essayId=42103
Date: December 2, 2011
Translated by Frieda Afary

…I would like to begin my presentation by citing the Occupy Wall Street Movement’s definition of itself. This description is posted on its website and acts as its manifesto:
Occupy Wall Street is a leaderless resistance movement with people of many colors, genders and political persuasions. The one thing we all have in common is that We Are The 99% that will no longer tolerate the greed and corruption of the 1%. We are using the revolutionary Arab Spring tactic to achieve our ends and encourage the use of nonviolence to maximize the safety of all participants. This movement empowers real people to create real change from the bottom up. We want to see a general assembly in every backyard, on every street corner because we don't need Wall Street and we don't need politicians to build a better society. The only solution is World Revolution. [See www.occupywallst.org]
The Strengths of the Occupy Wall Street Movement:
1. Based on the above statement, this movement can be called an anti-capitalist movement (and not merely anti-war or anti-imperialist or anti-globalization and the like) for the following reasons:
* Wall Street is the world’s most important financial trade center. Openly stating that 99% of the population do not need Wall Street or the politicians, signifies open opposition to capitalism.
* The active body of this movement mainly consists of the unemployed, women, college students and dissatisfied and protesting artists…Let me start with the unemployed. Unemployment is an effect of the capitalist system. A fundamental feature of this system is the effort to increase profit-making for the capitalist class in different ways. One of these methods which is mainly used in advanced capitalist countries such as the U.S. and Europe, is to increase the productivity of labor through the use of the latest technological and scientific achievements. However in the context of capitalism, the use of advanced technology and machinery leads to unemployment and the redundancy of workers…This system uses advanced technology to increase profit. However, in doing so, i.e. by making living workers redundant, it deprives capitalism of the real source of profit, i.e. those very same living workers. Hence, it creates a tendency in capitalism which is called “the tendential fall in the rate of profit.” The rise of crises in capitalism is the actual result of this very tendency. Whether this tendency is actualized or not, an inevitable outcome of capitalism is unemployment. In 2011, international capitalist institutions such as the International Labor Organization and the International Monetary Fund have declared that youth unemployment in the U.S. stands at 17.7%...
Women are another important pillar of this movement. Although women in the U.S. are legally equal to men, in reality they are subjected to prejudice and inequality. Women receive less pay for work equal to that of men…Another form of oppression of women in the U.S. and the West in general is violence against women…
Finally, college students are another sector of the population that has created the Occupy Wall Street Movement. One of the main reasons for the active participation of college students in this movement is their inability to pay student loans obtained from universities…
* …A unique feature of the Occupy Wall Street Movement is that it has further penetrated the depths of society. In addition to opposing finance capital and the politicians, it has turned the social problems of everyday life into another realm of the struggle against capitalism. Problems such as illness (for example AIDS or cancer), homelessness, and death resulting from illness and loneliness had been marginalized in previous movements under the leadership of parties and unions. By intervening on these issues, the Occupy Wall Street Movement seeks to challenge competition and prejudice in human relations and instead develop solidarity, cooperation and equality among people…
* …This movement has placed new sectors of the population within the ranks of the working class, sectors which were not seen as part of the working class before. This implies the acceptance of a new definition of the working class, a definition which has been buried under the debris of capitalist and specifically postmodernist or reformist or sectarian perspectives in the post-Marx period. For example, one of the perspectives propagated by postmodernist thinkers was that the industrial working class—which in their opinion constituted what Marx meant by “the proletariat”—had diminished and had been replaced by the expanded service sector. Thus, postmodernist thinkers removed non-production workers such as sales clerks, transportation workers, teachers, nurses and the like from the ranks of the working class, and gave the working class a very weak and ever diminishing identity. Rescuing Marx’s definition of workers from this debris, and confirming the fact that a worker is not only an industrial worker or a production worker but someone who has no other means of survival but selling her/his labor power to the owners of the means of production, distribution and exchange, was a turning point, a great achievement and a strong point against capitalism…
* Calling for “World Revolution” as the only solution to problems, can only be meaningful in opposition to capitalism, because capitalism is not only the problem of this or that country but a global problem…
2. …Another important strength of this movement is that it is not dominated by traditional parties and unions...For leftist parties, the main issue has not been to guide a social revolution of the working class for the abolition of the social relation of capital and through the establishment and rule of anti-capitalist councils. Rather [their goal] has been to use workers’ struggles in order to achieve political power and establish another form of capitalism i.e. state capitalism. Labor unions have not only failed to elevate workers struggles for reforms within the context of capitalism, to the level of the struggle against the system of wage labor. Labor unions themselves have turned into the main agent for the domination of reformism within the working class anti-capitalist struggle…
3. …Prior to the rise of the Occupy Wall Street Movement, the liberal opposition movement in Iran could present western liberal democracy as the promised land which Iranian workers should struggle to reach. Now this inversion of reality is hardly possible. Now even the uncritical supporters of liberal democracy have no option but to admit to the problems which capitalism has created for humanity…Now they will try to tell workers not to look for an alternative beyond capitalism and only seek the escape route within the confines of reformed capitalism…In order to prove their claim, they point to the collapse of the alternatives counterposed to capitalism up to now ( including state capitalism which has called itself “socialism” in countries such as the Soviet Union, China, Cuba, North Korea and the likes)… It will be a big mistake if labor activists in Iran counter liberal capitalism’s strategy of inversion by repeating a fatal experience of the past and presenting as an alternative to capitalism, that which has been put into practice in the name of “socialism” and “communism” and has failed disastrously…
The Weaknesses of the Occupy Wall Street Movement:
* This movement is still not organized, self-conscious and connected to a movement of employed workers …
* The Occupy Wall Street Movement still considers capital not as a social relation but as merely a financial power concentrated in banks…
* The Occupy Wall Street Movement lacks a charter, a minimal set of demands…
11 Azar 1390 (December 2, 2011)

The Deepening Crisis of Capitalism, the Intensification of Class Struggle and the Organization of an Alternative System
Author: Mohammad Maljoo
Source: http://kanoonmodafean1.blogspot.com/2011/12/blog-post_8832.html
Date: November 28, 2011
Translated by Frieda Afary

From the inception of the Occupy Wall Street Movement, three themes have found increasing resonance: The deepening crisis of capitalism, the intensification of class struggle, and the organization of an alternative system…

On the question of the transition from capitalism to communism, Orthodox Marxism had three claims concerning these very same themes:

Concerning the first theme, i.e. the deepening crisis of the capitalist system, orthodox Marxism spoke of the tendency in capitalism to sow the seeds of its own destruction. In other words, competition among individual capitalists would lead to the deskilling [of labor] and technological innovation, and therefore to laying off workers, an increase in the size of the reserve army of the unemployed, a decline in wages and ultimately moving toward the crises of overproduction on the one hand and the tendential fall in the rate of the profit on the other hand.

Concerning the second theme, i.e. the intensification of class struggle, orthodox Marxism claimed that alongside the deepening of the crises, there would be a concentration of wealth at one pole of society and a concentration of poverty at the other pole. The polarization of society would lead to the intensification of class contradictions…

Finally concerning the third theme, i.e. the organization of an alternative system, orthodox Marxism also claimed that the material conditions for the creation of communism were born in the womb of capitalism, and that the realization of a communist order would only require a final act for the takeover of power…

In addressing the first theme, i.e. the deepening crisis of capitalism, Lenin essentially did not believe in [the idea] of a final crisis of capitalism. He believed that on the verge of the twentieth century, competitive capitalism had been replaced by monopoly capitalism which had expanded itself in an uneven way around the world in the form of imperialism under the control of finance capital…

If [as Rosa Luxemburg claimed—tr.] the crisis of capitalism emanates from surplus capital or underconsumption, the capitalist system can overcome this problem in various ways through deepening the rule of the logic of capital in various geographical locations. An ever increasing commodification of social life in various societies and geographical location creates both profitable opportunities for investing the surplus capital and an effective demand for overcoming the problem of underconsumption.

David Harvey reaches this very conclusion by increasingly introducing the element of geography into the process of accumulation of capital. The capitalist system will only logically reach its final limit when everything in the exact sense of the word has been commodified. In this respect, the capitalist system has not yet reached its final limit and can logically exit the deepest crisis with pride. At the same time, any crisis, no matter how superficial, can logically be the final crisis of the capitalist system.

The key point is this: The determinant for the survival or destruction of the capitalist system is not the depth of the crisis. The determinant is to be found in the second theme, the intensification of class struggle. If the capitalist system has been able to traverse all the crises and remain unharmed up to now, the reason is to be found not in capitalism’s power but in the weakness of class struggles…

In following Lukacs, the Frankfurt School believed that instrumental reason essentially negated revolutionary subjectivity, even if the objectivity of revolution became ever more possible and urgent. Gramsci sought to develop the concept of hegemony in order to answer this question. In other words, he demonstrated how in bourgeois civil society, meanings and values are produced which lead to the spontaneous satisfaction of various sectors of society with the status quo.

Althusser spoke of ideological state apparatuses which actualized the process by which the exploited and the exploiters followed the dominant ideology. However, as Foucault says, wherever there is power, there is also resistance.

Although Gramsci and Althusser offered convincing theories concerning capitalism’s power to use ideology and politics to weaken class struggle, neither one offered a convincing theory concerning the counter-hegemonic project. It was up to Karl Polanyi to develop the counter-hegemonic project.

Polanyi showed how different classes and sectors in civil society spontaneously create a defensive counter-movement from below against the capitalist system, and defend themselves against the dangers inherent in this system. The point is the following: It is not the depth of the capitalist crisis which determines whether the final crisis of the capitalist system has arrived or not. The determinant is the balance of forces between the hegemonic and the counter-hegemonic projects. The stronger the counter-hegemonic side, the more likely the final crisis of capitalism, regardless of the depth and scope of the crisis itself. However, the moving force for strengthening the counter-hegemonic project and weakening the hegemonic project must be found in the third theme, i.e. questions about the organization of the alternative system.

Contrary to the predictions of orthodox Marxism, the material conditions for the organization of the alternative system have not yet been provided spontaneously in the womb of capitalism. If those conditions are not provided spontaneously, then two questions gain significance.

The first question concerns the nature of the alternative system. Is it the alternative of social democrats such as Joseph Stiglitz or Paul Krugman? Is it the alternative of environmentalists such as James Lovelock? Is it the alternative of anarchists such as James Scott or Noam Chomsky? Is it the alternative of autonomists such as Antonio Negri and Felix Guattari or Michael Hardt? Is it the alternative of post-developmentalists such as Arturo Escobar or Maji Rahnema? Is it the alternative of socialists such as David Harvey? Or is it the alternative of communists such as Michael Lebowitz or Michael Albert?

The second question concerns the appropriate political pathway for achieving the alternative system. Is the pathway for achieving a socialist alternative to be found in parliamentary struggles, as Eduard Bernstein claimed? Or should the capitalist state first be destroyed and a new form of state constructed, as Lenin claimed?... Reform or revolution? …The main point is the following: If the emergence of the final crisis of capitalism is not dependent on the depth of the crisis but on the strength of class struggle, the motivating force for class struggle also arises from a certain minimal level of agreement on the type of alternative system and the appropriate political method for achieving the alternative system.

7 Azar 1390 (November 28, 2011)

Free Faranak Farid: Azeri Feminist Speaks of Plight of Azeri Women in Iran

2011-09-12T12:47:00.000-07:00

On September 3, Faranak Farid, an Azeri feminist, writer, poet, translator and secretary of the First Azerbaijan Women’s Congress was arrested in Tabriz. Since then, she has been interrogated for long hours and severely beaten by agents of the Tabriz Ministry of Intelligence. Her condition is deteriorating and she needs urgent medical attention. Below are excerpts from the translation of a speech which Farid had presented to a gathering of feminists in New York City in March 2010. I have taken the liberty of revising and editing the translation.

Author: Faranak Farid
Title: Where Are You From?
Source: http://sign4change.info/spip.php?article5566 (Persian)
http://en.baybak.com/where-are-you-from-faranak-farid-azr (English Translation)
Translator: Anonymous
Translation revised and edited by Frieda Afary

“Where are you from?” Is ethnicity an important factor in women’s struggle for their rights? When I was studying English in Middle School, this question seemed to me an interesting one. I would imagine myself living abroad and answering the question proudly. But this innocent picture was blemished as I came to face different types of discrimination.

As a woman I grew up in an environment in which different types of discrimination existed. These forms of discrimination have a cumulative effect. They shape you, break you, reshape you, mold you, break that mold and create a new mold for you. Finally, you no longer know who you really are…

In order to reach a correct understanding of ethnic discrimination as a factor which holds women back in their struggle to achieve their rights, we need to look at the subject as a whole. Iran is a country with a population of over 70 million with a variety of cultures, languages, ethnicities and religions. It is said that ethnicities constitute 65% of this population. [This figure has been disputed. Other estimates range from 35% to 50%] All are dominated by the language and culture of a minority.

The enforcement of this policy began 85 years ago before and in conjunction with the rise of the Pahlavi Dynasty. It now continues. Azeris who constitute one third of the population [this figure has been disputed], as well as other ethnicities such as the Lurs, the Kurds, the Arabs, the Balulchis, the Gilakis, the Mazandaranis, the Turkmen and the Ashayer[formerly nomadic pastoralists] such as the Qashqai and the Bakhtiari, are the aforementioned majority who have been denied their economic, social, civil, cultural and political right and have been marginalized.

Ethnicities whose language is not Persian, do not even have the right to be educated in their mother tongue. There is only one official language for all the ethnic groups. As a result of not having this basic right, women who belong to these ethnic groups can only minimally express themselves in society. Or these women forgo using their mother tongue in order to free themselves from further discrimination.

Given these circumstances, it is clear that these women face more complex challenges in achieving their human rights both as women in a patriarchal society and as marginalized ethnic groups. In this environment, gender discrimination creates greater limitations for them in accessing economic, political-social, legal resources and the media.

For example, in my hometown Tabriz, gender inequalities such as not having the right to divorce, have led to an increase in the number of women who have killed their spouse and landed in prison.

In addition to sexual discrimination, other discriminatory factors such as poverty, living in rural areas, and being a member of an oppressed ethnic group etc., can help us comprehend the many barriers that these women face.

Consider the case of Raheleh, from one of Azerbaijan’s villages. She was forced to get married at age fourteen. Like many other women, she was subjected to various types of brutality such as beatings, rape by her husband, and other inhuman acts. These very brutal and disrespectful acts turned her into a murderer. Raheleh was subsequently executed. Her public defender had told her that she must “defend” herself. However, she really didn’t know the meaning of the word “defend” in Persian.

…Among religious groups, religion as a factor leads to greater inequality and deprivation for them. The tensions that are brought about in combating inequality, injustice and deep-rooted prejudices, result in women’s toleration of greater violence in conflict zones.

The suicide rate among women [who belong to ethnic groups] is now four and a half times the suicide rate among men…However, self-immolation which is the most horrible form of suicide is more common among the Kurds and the Lurs. Honor killings are also very common. However, its agents are often not prosecuted.

Female genital mutilation is one of the lesser known problems faced by women among some ethnic groups in some regions. Women’s rights activists in poor and backward areas such as Sistan and Baluchistan also report the following: Girls who are still considered children are forced to marry old men in exchange for money; Some marriages are not even officially registered; Drug addiction exists. Similar to the Arab regions of Khuzistan, the lack of basics such as hygiene and clean drinking water is one of the main problems which women face.

Emigration from ethnic regions has been prevalent and still continues especially among men who leave in search of work. The negative consequences have especially affected women and families. The deepening gap between the central areas of the country such as Tehran with a population of 15 million, and the rest of the country, has led to tensions and a lack of mutual understanding.

Race, ethnicity, gender, language and culture, social class, religion, place of residence, disability, etc. are factors which create inequality and discrimination. Often, women confront most of these forms of discrimination. Under complicated circumstances arising from these inequalities, women lose their self-confidence and feel overwhelmed.

It is not only the powers that be which suppress ethnic groups. Most intellectuals also do not pay attention to their problems. Hence, paying attention to ethnic discrimination both at the national and the regional level is an urgent need.
On the one hand, women’s rights activists in these areas are labeled “political activists” and “separatists.” On the other hand, women who belong to national consciousness movements that exist in these regions are kept away from decision-making roles, by some of the authoritarian men who are active in these movements.

However, given the above mentioned circumstances, women’s rights activists in Azerbaijan are just as determined as women activists in other parts of the country, to achieve their human rights. During the past fifteen years, and in continuity with the past, they have used every opportunity to promote the movement of women to achieve their rights and to create opportunities for activity. They have turned to writing to express themselves. They especially engage in reading and writing in their mother tongue. Their participation has increased in all aspects of social life and in social activities. They continue to insist on their rights, just as they insist on other basic human rights. They are not willing to forgo any of these rights.
Thank you.
Faranak Farid
March 12, 2010

The State of Labor in Iran’s Oil and Petrochemical Industry

2011-06-07T12:48:00.000-07:00

Translator’s note: On May 24, a massive explosion and fire at a newly inaugurated oil refinery in Abadan led to the deaths and injuries of an unknown number of workers. The explosion, caused by technical problems, occurred during a facility inauguration ceremony that had prompted President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad to boast of Iran's growing capacity to refine oil. According to Hamid Reza Katouzian, head of the Energy Commission of the Majles, Iran's parliament, "experts had forewarned that the Abadan refinery was not ready to be inaugurated."
The explosion underscored once again the lack of safe working conditions in Iran's oil and petrochemical industry. In addition, recent labor strikes have challenged the industry's reliance on temporary contracts for its labor force. In March, 1,800 contract workers at the Tabriz Petrochemical Complex demanded that they be hired directly in order to receive the benefits and job security provisions to which permanent employees are entitled. In April, 1,500 striking workers at the Imam Khomeini Port Petrochemical Complex located in Khuzestan near the Gulf made similar demands.
Most recently, factional conflicts within the Majles over control of the income generated from oil production have led to leadership changes in the Oil Ministry. First, Ahmadinejad dismissed the oil minister and appointed himself "caretaker for the Oil Ministry." When parliament deputies and the Guardian Council called this act illegal, he appointed one of his allies, Mohammad Ali Abadi, as the new temporary "caretaker." Below are excerpts from a recent interview with Iranian economist Mohammad Maljoo in which he addresses the state of labor in the oil industry. It was published in the May 2011 issue of the Tehran-based journal Mehrnameh. This translation was originally published by Tehran Bureau on June 5, 2011. http://to.pbs.org/iqcYcl

Author: Mohmmad Maljoo
Source: http://www.akhbar-rooz.com/article.jsp?essayId=37715
Date: May 2011
Translated by Frieda Afary

Mehrnameh: In the years after the Iran-Iraq War, how did the method used for resolving the problem of [the low rate of] accumulation of capital, affect the abilities of the labor force?

Maljoo: In order to be precise, I will focus solely on the labor force in the oil industry… In the period after the Iran-Iraq War, and under the administrations known as “Reconstruction and Reform” [those, respectively, of Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani and Mohammad Khatami], one of the most important components of the effort to increase the rate of accumulation of capital was the cheapening of labor power. Within the oil industry, the realization of this goal was made possible in four phases.

The first phase consisted of the “clericalization” process, a plan to raise the wages and benefits of workers to the level of office workers. Hence, promotions for oil industry workers were facilitated under the presidency of Hashemi Rafsanjani. Workers were allowed to be promoted to office worker status without changing their job description. At the same time, a variety of cash and non-cash benefits for workers were cut. These benefits were kept for office workers. The majority of workers filled out the new employment forms and were turned into office workers while maintaining their old job description.

The workers who were aware and did not succumb to this arrangement were legally entitled to protest in face of the financial difficulties which had gripped them. However, they could not do so because they were now a minority. These workers either had to voluntarily resign in exchange for receiving their severance pay, or join the ranks of the office workers. The majority of them opted for the severance pay. Ultimately, the fate of the majority of the workers who had become office workers was the same [as those who had been terminated with severance pay]. However, this happened through a different route.

As a rule, office workers in the oil industry are in some ways considered managers. Unlike workers who follow the regulations of the Labor Ministry, office workers follow the regulations of the Oil Ministry. Hence they do not have the right to strike or the right to form labor unions. The “clericalization” project of the oil industry in fact legally deprived the workers who had now become office workers from any right to protest or complain to the Labor Ministry.

Although the workers who had now become office workers were many, they had no right to protest when their clerk classification benefits were gradually eliminated over the course of two years and when they faced financial pressures imposed by their managers. This sector of the labor force only had two choices: Early retirement or termination with severance pay.

The second phase [of the plan to increase the rate of accumulation of capital] was put on the agenda concomitant with the clericalization process. This phase consisted of throwing an avalanche of outsourcing projects on the oil industry. By creating contract- work agreements, the National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC) avoided its responsibility for defending the rights of office workers.

The method was as follows: NIOC would ask for bids from contractors. The contractor whose bid was accepted would sign a contract with NIOC and receive funds from it. NIOC would then introduce its personnel to the contractor. Ultimately, all services such as payment of wages, insurance, benefits, etc. were put in the hands of the contractor. NIOC had rid itself of its responsibility toward workers.

However, during the years after the Iran-Iraq War, the level of production in the oil and gas industry was more or less increasing, and required hiring a new cadre of skilled workers. The third phase addressed this need. The mushrooming of contractors which provided human resources was in fact responding to this need. However, it is interesting to note that the bulk of the labor force hired by these contractors, consisted of the personnel who had retired early or had been terminated with severance pay.

The distinguishing feature of the type of employment offered by contractors was the temporary character of the employment contracts. Whether the agreement was a contract which employed workers for a little less than one year, or a temporary agreement which employed workers for one to six months, the common feature of all these employment agreements was that they deprived workers of job protection.

The fourth phase consisted of preparing the legal basis for such contracts, a legal basis which the 1990 Labor Code had provided years ago. According to the second amendment of Article Seven of the Labor Code, “If the nature of the work is continuous, and if no length of time is stated in the contract, the contract shall be considered permanent.” Another way of stating the above is that if the nature of the work is continuous, the employer can determine a set amount of time in his/her contract with workers, and employ them on a temporary basis in types of work that are continuous. The Labor Code not only legitimized temporary contracts, but also legally facilitated the expulsion of workers who had temporary contracts.

It is difficult to estimate the absolute and relative size of the temporary labor force in the oil industry in the years after the Iran-Iraq War. Depending on the industry sector and the geographical location, the size fluctuates between 60 and 90 percent of the workforce.

Please note that the plan to turn the labor force into a temporary labor force, did not only lead to a lowering of all wages. It also gravely affected the other components which determine the conditions of labor and the subsistence level of the labor force. These components include housing, the employment process, the length of the working day, the annual vacation time, job security, workplace safety, the extent to which benefits authorized by the Labor Code were applied or excluded.

In the years after the Iran-Iraq war, the mushrooming of contractors which provided personnel, the extended outsourcing as well as the massive increase in temporary workers, and hence the cheapening of the labor force, have led to a decline in job security and a decline in the individual and collective bargaining power of the labor force. Hiring temporary contract workers allows employers to circumvent labor laws and pay workers the lowest salaries. The temporary character of labor and the lack of job security, decreases solidarity among workers, especially given the continuously high unemployment rate. . .

This translation was originally published by Tehran Bureau on June 5, 2011
http://to.pbs.org/iqcYcl

Thoughts on the Plan for Targeted Monetary Subsidies

2011-06-07T12:34:00.000-07:00

Translator’s note: Last March, The Tehran-based Center for the Defense of Labor Rights held a roundtable at which various left-wing Iranian economists and labor activists commented on the Plan for Targeted Monetary Subsidies. Below are excerpts from comments made by Mohsen Hakimi, labor activist and translator of Georg Lukacs’s Young Hegel.

Author: Mohsen Hakimi
Source: http://www.akhbar-rooz.com/article.jsp?essayId=36814
Date: January 28, 2011
Translated by Frieda Afary

. . . Attempting to explain the introduction or elimination of subsidies on the basis of the needs of global organizations such as the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund and the World Trade Organization which represent capital, still does not display an anti-capitalist approach. In my opinion, the necessity for introducing or eliminating subsidies in Iran is far more connected to the capital relation inside Iran than the needs of the above mentioned organizations.

The philosophy underlying the existence of the subsidies is to keep the labor force cheap for the extraction of ever more profit. The government distributes part of the wealth which workers have created (gross domestic product) among the producers in order for them to produce workers’ means of consumption at a lower cost of production. In this way, workers will reproduce their labor power by subsisting on cheaper commodities, and the price of labor power will remain low.

The impression might be created that the elimination of the subsidies (which is the main goal of the Plan for Targeted Monetary Subsidies) will lead to a rise in the price of labor power. . . However what distinguishes the elimination of subsidies at this juncture is an increase in the prices of workers’ means of consumption without an increase in the price of labor. For example, the price of petroleum which was sold at 10 cents per liter was raised to 40 cents per liter and then 70 cents per liter.

The prices of staple commodities have risen without an increase in wages. It is obvious that the meager sums paid as cash subsidies (which may not continue in the future) will not make up for the increase in the prices of commodities in any way. These cash subsidies cannot be considered an increase in wages. Therefore, the essence of the Plan for Targeted Monetary Subsidies is nothing but an intensification of the exploitation of the working class for the purpose of preventing the collapse of Iran’s crisis-ridden capitalist society. . .

One of the manifestations of crisis in capitalism is the problem of budget deficits. I will explain this problem on the basis of the Law of the Tendential Fall in the Rate of Profit. I consider the government a capitalist, that is society’s largest capitalist. If we accept this assumption, the tendential fall in the rate of profit for the government means that on the one hand the government will invest; on the other hand, the profit generated by this investment will not be enough to make the accumulation of capital possible. . .

One of the reasons for eliminating the subsidies in Iran was to make up for the budget deficit by intensifying the exploitation of labor. In this way, the government’s income will be increased. If you remember, Ahmadinejad first announced that the government needs to generate 40 billion dollars in income from the Plan for Targeted Monetary Subsidies. The parliament halved this amount and reduced it to 20 billion dollars. . . The parliament was telling the government to increase prices at a lower speed.

Regardless of the conflict between the government and the parliament on this issue, both sides had no doubt that the final aim of this plan was to increase the government’s income. What does this mean? It means that a worker who received let’s say 80 dollars in subsidies through the subsidies on fuel and other staple commodities such as bread, cooking oil and rice, now receives half this amount. The $80 dollars will be reduced to $40. The other $40 will go to the government’s coffers. In the absence of a struggle for increased wages, this reality signifies nothing but increased pressure on the working class.

As far as the history of this plan is concerned, I think it is correct to argue that the administration of Hashemi Rafsanjani and Khatami raised this plan before Ahmadinejad’s administration supported it...

In conclusion, I would like to raise another issue. Sometimes our critique of the neo-liberal discussions of structural adjustments, may create the false impression that we are defending a statist economy in our opposition to the private sector. I do not believe that a statist economy is in the interest of the working class or that we should defend state capitalism in opposition to neo-liberal privatization.

In societies like ours where the government is itself the biggest capitalist, it is obvious that the government can never do anything in the interest of the workers. In societies which once advocated the welfare state, the government now steals from the workers to give to the capitalists, in order to save capitalism from crisis. Look at the United States, the birthplace of neo-liberalism and of economists such as Milton Friedman. During the 2008 crisis, we saw how the government stuffed the mouths of the banks and private corporations with billions of dollars to prevent them from collapsing and to help them recover from the crisis. The fact that a faction of ungrateful capitalists accuses the Obama administration of being “socialist”, does not prevent this administration from selflessly paying to preserve capitalism in the U.S.

January 28, 2011

Iranian Intellectuals Censure Regime's Nuclear Policy

2011-03-30T20:22:00.000-07:00

Translator's note: The following call was issued by a group of Iranian intellectuals and activists on March 18, 2011.

Call for Active Opposition to the Nuclear Policy of the Islamic Republic of Iran
Date: March 18, 2011
Source: http://www.akhbar-rooz.com/article.jsp?essayId=36757

Fukushima completed the warning that was issued by Chernobyl. After Chernobyl, any trust in the ability of technology and the technicians to control the radioactive giant was lost. Fukushima further destroyed any trust in the ability to forecast earthquakes and other factors that turn nuclear power stations into ticking time bombs.

Everywhere, conscientious and responsible minds are demanding a serious review of nuclear projects. The Islamic Republic on the other hand, acts as if the news of the Fukushima catastrophe does not pertain to us. They act as if Bushehr and other nuclear power centers in Iran are completely safe. They claim that Bushehr does not face the threat of an earthquake.

At the same time, the recent earthquake and tsunami in Japan proved that the optimistic calculations that laid the basis for selecting the locations of nuclear power stations were not trustworthy. In fact, the Bushehr Nuclear Power Station is located near several known faults which pose a very serious earthquake threat. If realistic calculations are made of the basis of safety arrangements at a power station like Bushehr, the cost of rebuilding it would be so great as to make it unjustifiable whatever the demagoguery.

The recent unfortunate events in Japan and the debates that are taking place on a global scale concerning the dangers of nuclear technology provide new motivation for criticizing the nuclear policy of the Islamic Republic in Iran and exposing its undemocratic and dangerous foundations.

From its early years, the Islamic Republic turned to nuclear projects. These projects lacked transparency, were economically unjustifiable, and created tensions in the region and in the world. Not only is this nuclear policy not a choice made by the people, it also conflicts with fundamental needs by incurring huge costs. Furthermore, by creating crises on the international scene, it conflicts with our national interest.

The nuclear policy of the Islamic Republic is economically unjustifiable since Iran has rich oil and gas reserves. Furthermore, we live in an epoch when clean forms of energy such as solar and wind [are accessible through] safe, cutting-edge technologies. Turning to clean technologies is the best and the safest way for economic development. It serves the environment and the needs of future generations.

Just in the past few days, the International Atomic Energy Agency once again announced that it cannot guarantee the civilian nature of the nuclear projects of the Islamic Republic. The lack of transparency of the projects, their economic indefensibility, and the documents made available to the agency have cast serious doubt on the regime's claim that it is pursuing only the peaceful use of nuclear energy.

Instead of turning to a policy of transparency, the regime engages in further cover-ups and adventurism. In so doing, it imposes great economic and political losses on the nation. This policy strengthens the role of the military in Iran's economy and politics. It grants massive profits to those sectors of the market that have monopolized specific import channels. The nuclear policy of the Islamic Republic leads to intensified repression and further injustice. It has intensified the nuclear race in the region, a race that is against the interests of the people of the region and against peaceful coexistence.

The Islamic Republic's destructive nuclear policy has perverted the talents of specialists and researchers and has prevented the use of these forces for positive scientific and technological endeavors. The regime's justification of its nuclear policy has led to demagoguery, of which a main aspect is opposition to a growing environmental consciousness critical of nuclear technology in our epoch.

In his recent interview with a Spanish television station, Ahmadinejad, the president of the regime, claimed that the safety standards at Bushehr conform with international standards. Hence there is no reason for concern. He also claimed that there is no repression in Iran. These claims are two of a kind: They are both lies.

We, the undersigned, call on all the aware citizens of Iran to oppose the nuclear policy of the Islamic Republic in a more serious way and to criticize the shortcomings of the opposition forces in this realm. The Islamic Republic's cult of uranium is a pillar of the cult of the Guardianship of the Jurisprudent. A regime that [figuratively] bans the word "right" from its dictionary and metes out imprisonment and torture to those demanding their rights, uses the slogan "undeniable right" [to nuclear power] for the purpose of deception.

No right is greater than freedom. If the idea of using nuclear technology is deemed correct, the decision concerning its use should be made in a free environment. The media should be free to write about the defects and concerns. Independent specialists should have the ability to exert supervision over nuclear centers and report to the people concerning the dangers that they pose.

The specialists of the regime are not trustworthy. The level of awareness of the president of the Islamic Republic can be gauged by his famous comment about the production of nuclear energy in kitchens. The rest [of the regime's officials] are of the same kind. Their real area of specialization is conspiracy, interrogation, torture, and the plunder of the nation's wealth.

The regime loudly announces: "Nuclear energy is our undeniable right!" The real content of this slogan is not a defense of independence. Rather it implies the regime's sole right to take risks with the nation's future, economy, environment, and human resources.

We counter this slogan with the right to freedom. When this right exists, real independence can be experienced, peaceful coexistence with all nations can be pursued, and the interests and safety of the people as well as the exigencies of environmental protection can be considered when using any technology in a transparent and controllable manner.

We ask all to support this call for active opposition to the nuclear policy of the Islamic Republic.

Yusef Ardalan, Dariyush Ashouri, Jalal Ijadi, Farimah Ijadi, Marzieh Bakhsizadeh, Mehran Barati, Sohrab Behdad, Kamran Behnia, Turaj Parsi, Shahrnoush Parsipour, Nasser Pakdaman, Babak Takhti, Nayereh Tohidi, Mehdi Jami, Jahanshah Javid, Ghodsi Hejazi, Nassim Khaksar, Mehdi Khalaji, Hamid Dabashi, Mehrdad Darvishpour, Saeed Rahnema, Siamand Zandi, Arash Sobhani, Chahla Chafiq, Mahboubeh Abbasgholizadeh, Shahram Ghanbari, Abdi Kalantari, Akbar Ganji, Sohrab Mobasheri, Majid Mohammadi, Mehran Mostafavi, Hassan Makaremi, Shokuh Mirzadegi, Anvar Mirsatari, Reza Nassehi, Farhad Nomani, Esmail Nooriala, Mohammad Reza Nikfar.

This translation was originally published by Tehran Bureau on March 29, 2011.
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/tehranbureau/2011/03/opinion-iranian-intellectuals-censure-regimes-nuclear-policy.html

Iranians Draw Lessons from Middle Eastern Uprisings

2011-03-27T21:51:00.000-07:00

Just when the Green Movement seemed to have been defeated by the brutal repression of the Iranian regime, the mass uprisings in the Arab World gave it new life. This resurgence of the Green Movement is evident not only in recent street protests in Tehran and other major Iranian cities on February 14, February 20, March 1 and March 8, but also in a variety of articles by activists and thinkers who are reflecting on the lessons of the Middle Eastern uprisings (References are provided at the end of this article).

In my reading of many of these articles, I have come across three main issues: 1. The need to raise economic demands alongside political demands; 2. The need to go beyond calling for reform and put revolution on the agenda; 3. Warnings about the internal dangers after a movement successfully overthrows a dictator.

I. Defining Social Justice as Economic and Political Justice

Mehrdad Darvishpour, Kaveh Ehsani, Arash Zarforush, Farhad Khosrow Khavar, Saeed Peyvandi, Mohsen Motaghi and M. Cheshmeh have all emphasized the ways in which the uprisings in Tunisia and Egypt involved an alliance of unemployed educated youth with dissatisfied workers and the urban poor. Darvishpour writes:

"In the Green Movement, the question of economic difficulties and the situation of the poor received less attention. . . which meant that the poor and the working class did not have a proper presence in this movement. This in turn weakened the movement. Many of the educated youth who started the Green Movement represented a sector of the population which lacked job opportunities or a clear future. Economic difficulties had an important role in their revolt. In Egypt and Tunisia however, the issue of poverty and economic demands were so obvious as to lead many to call their movement a ‘Bread and Butter Revolution.’"

Arash Zehforush writes: “The discussion of democracy and freedom can only have an impact on social classes and strata when it is directly related to their situation and the production and distribution of wealth in society. Otherwise the discussion of democracy and freedom will turn into an abstract and ineffective discourse and will lead to disillusionment among the masses.”

Although the above commentators demand that social justice be made the motto of the Green Movement, they view themselves as different from each other in terms of economic alternatives. Some argue for one or another form of free-market capitalism and attribute poverty and unemployment solely to the existence of politically corrupt and closed systems. Some who do challenge free-market capitalism, offer state-controlled capitalism as an alternative. Some oppose both free-market and state-controlled capitalism.

II. Putting Revolution on the Agenda of the Green Movement

M. Cheshmeh, Arash Zehforush, Amin Sorkhabi and Parisa Sa’ed have singled out the ways in which the uprisings in Tunisia and Egypt put the question of revolution on the agenda. Amin Sorkhabi writes: “In light of the developments and events that have begun with Tunisia as the starting point, it seems that the era of the revolutions of color has come to an end. Theoreticians need to think about theorizing a new model for revolutions or socio-political changes.”

M. Cheshmeh adds:

"The defeat of the Second of Khordad Movement [Reference to the reformist movement which began with Mohammad Khatami’s election in 1997] and the experience of the June 2009 presidential election which led to the rise of the Green Movement in Iran, have weakened the tendencies which advocate reform within the context of the existing regime and the constitution. The revolutions in Tunisia and Egypt can put the last nail in the coffin of this paralyzing tendency within Iran’s political movement. . . The occurrence of a revolution however, does not guarantee its ultimate success. As we saw, the domination of religious reaction and the immaturity of the politicos and intellectuals during the 1979 Iranian Revolution, threw Iran out of the frying pan and into the fire. However, in comparison with other processes, revolution is the only strategy that can shake the foundations of society to the point of either overthrowing dictatorial and ideological regimes or weakening them to clear the path for a transition to democracy. At the same time, revolution should not be considered a one-time blow and an easily reachable and ephemeral goal. Instead, it has to be viewed as a process with a variety of stages. The victory or defeat of any revolutionary process depends not only on the objective situation but also on whether the revolution has a progressive, democratic and humanist outlook and leadership. . . "

This sober view concerning the serious mistakes made in 1979 and the need to view revolution as a thoughtful and constructive process, reveals the maturity of the new generation of Iranian youth. It is this soberness that has also compelled more experienced Iranian thinkers and activists to warn about the dangers of using the term revolution lightly.

III. Need to Distinguish between Uprising and Revolution

Mashallah Razmi writes: “Hosni Mubarak resigned. However much remains unclear about the future. The army is popular among the masses. However, will the army remain a guarantor of the reforms or will it take over power, or will it take on a role such as that of the army in Turkey?” Manuchehr Salehi also warns that “In Egypt, the half-way revolution has once again put the army fully in charge of the country.”

Saeed Rahnema disagrees with those who have rushed to call the uprising in Egypt a revolution. In an article originally written in English and also distributed widely in Persian translation, he states:

"While with their admirable courage and perseverance the Egyptian people have achieved a sort of mass-induced coup d’etat, toppling a corrupt dictator, the US-backed army and the dominant classes have so far succeeded in aborting the revolution. The mere fact that the army, the Muslim Brotherhood, and the dominant classes will remain as major players in the post-Mubarak regime, suggests that the chances for establishing a democratic system - the main aspiration of those who poured into the streets - are not very promising. The appointment by the military junta of an Islamist to oversee the rushed constitutional amendment may well be an indication of what is ahead."

The above stated concerns as well as the forcefulness with which the Middle Eastern uprisings are continuing to place the problems of mass poverty, unemployment, sexism and prejudice on the scene, have reinvigorated the Green Movement. It remains to be seen how this movement will develop in Iran and how it will continue to express its solidarity with the uprisings in the Middle East. For now however, we need to heed Rahnema’s analysis of the difficulties which prevent an immediate Egyptian style uprising in Iran:

"Many have compared the revolts in Egypt to the Iranian revolt of 2009 against Ahmadinejad’s electoral coup, and hope for similar results. However, the situation in Iran at present is very different. The Egyptian regime was headed by a single dictator and that dictator was in turn dependent on a foreign power. The clerical/military oligarchy in Iran, with its intricate network of religious, repressive and economic institutions and multiple military and intelligence systems, is highly complex and also independent from any foreign power. It is a fascist-type system that still has millions on the payroll of the state and parastatal organizations, including religious foundations. It has also shown on numerous occasions that it does not hesitate to use extreme brutality against its opposition. In the long run, its fate will not be different from those of other dictatorships and authoritarian regimes in the Middle East or elsewhere, but the Iranian people unfortunately have a much more difficult fight ahead of them."

Frieda Afary
March 24, 2011

References:

Cheshmeh, M 2011. ‘Enqelab-e Mesr va Opozision-e iran’ , Akhbar-e Rooz, 13 Februrary. Available at
http://www.akhbar-rooz.com/article.jsp?essayId=35616

Darvishpur, Mehrdaad 2011. ‘Dars-ha va Payamadha-ye Khizesh-e Tunes va Mesr Baraye Jonbesh-e Sabz va Demokrasi dar Iran’, Akhabr-e Rooz, 7 Februrary. Available at
http://www.akhbar-rooz.com/article.jsp?essayId=35437

Ehsani, Kaveh 2011. ‘Tafavotha-ye Ejtemai-ye Jonbesh-e Mesr va Jonbesh-e Sabz’, Khodnevis,31 January. Available at www.khodnevis.org

Khademi, Mahmud 2011. ‘25 Bahman, Payani va Aqazi No baraye Jonbesh-e Mardom-e Iran’, Akhabar-e Rooz , 10 Mars. Available at
http://akhbar-rooz.com/article.jsp?essayId=36533

Khosrow-Khavar, Farhad, Saeed Peyvandi and Mohsen Motaghi 2011. ‘Iran Cheguneh be ‘Enqelab-e Yas-e’ Tunes Minegarad?’, Iran Emrooz, 5 February. Available at
http://www.iran-emrooz.net/index.php?/politic/more/26701/

Rahnema, Saeed 2011. ‘Egypt: Lessons from Iran’, Open Democracy, 17 Februrary.
Available at http://www.opendemocracy.net/saeed-rahnema/egypt-lessons-from-iran

Razmi, Mashallah 2011. ‘Enqelabha-ye Post Islami dar Khavar-e Miyaneh’, Akhbar-e Rooz, 14 February. Available at
http://www.akhbar-rooz.com/article.jsp?essayId=35645

Sa’ed, Parisa 2011. ‘Hazine-ye Bozorg-e Jonbesh-e Sabz’, Akhbar-e Rooz, 13 February. Available at
http://www.akhbar-rooz.com/article.jsp?essayId=35615

Salehi, Manuchehr 2011. ‘Tofirha va Hamguniha-ye Enqelab-e Iran va Nimeh Enqelab-e Sarzaminha-ye Arabi’, Akhbar-e Rooz, 8 March. Available at
http://www.akhbar-rooz.com/article.jsp?essayId=36464

Sorkhabi, Amin 2011. ‘Anatomi-ye Se Model-e Enqelabi: Iran 88, Mesr 89 va Iran 89’, Akbar-e Rooz, 20 Februrary. Available at
http://www.akhbar-rooz.com/printfriendly.jsp?essayId=35895&news=true

Zehforush, Arash 2011. ‘Zarurat-e Ruykardi Eqtesadi beh Jonbesh-e Sabz va Tahavolat-e Ejtemai-ye Khavar-e Miyaneh’, Akhbar-e Rooz, 8 March. Available at
http://www.akhbar-rooz.com/article.jsp?essayId=36483

Iranian Philosopher Comments on Boycotting Philosophy Congress in Tehran

2010-11-15T19:34:00.000-08:00

Translator’s Note: On November 10, the United Nations Educatioanl, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) cancelled plans to hold its annual Congress for World Philosophy Day in Tehran. The Iranian government now claims that it will hold the event without UNESCO sponsorship. This congress which was scheduled to be held on November 21 and 22, had been boycotted by a number of international philosophy scholars, including Jurgen Habermas. In addition, a group of Iranian philosophy scholars inside Iran and abroad had issued a Persian language “Call for Boycotting the Show Congress for World Philosophy in Tehran.” (http://news.gooya.com/politics/archives/2010/10/112308.php). Below are excerpts from an interview with Mohammad Reza Nikfar, an Iranian philosopher in Germany who was one of the signatories of this statement. This interview was conducted by Hossein Azarnoush of Radio Zamaneh on October 31, 2010. This translation was published by Tehran Bureau on November 14, 2010.

Philosophy Is Not a Police Officer or Interrogator: A Conversation between Hossein Azarnoush and Mohammad Reza Nikfar about the first Congress for World Philosophy Day in Iran

Source: http://zamaaneh.com/idea/2010/10/post_839.html
Translated by Frieda Afary

RZ: Dr. Nikfar, This year, the Congress for World Philosophy Day is being held in Iran for the first time. Three statements have been issued so far to protest the convening of this congress. Why are Iranian intellectuals and philosophy graduates opposed to holding the congress in Iran?

MN: Imagine if those who condemned Socrates to death, also established an academy of philosophy. Such an act would have been a bitter, satirical and shameful spectacle. That is the situation we face today. Those who have forced important thinkers out of Iran, those who have murdered, tortured and imprisoned many university students and professors, are holding a philosophy congress. Interestingly enough, the teaching of philosophy along with other fields in the humanities have been suspended at the universities. There is a strong effort to give philosophy an Islamic foundation.

What could be a greater affront to philosophy than a government’s effort to set the foundation, direction and framework for it and expect it to become the ideological police officer and interrogator of other fields of study?

Philosophy in our time is critical thought. Its role is to examine and evaluate the following: what we know, what is correct conduct, what is our human condition, how we articulate ourselves and our world, and what barriers stand in the way of socialization and dialogue…

Our first criticism is naturally directed at the power whose function is to suppress the truth. Philosophy questions everything. We are dealing with a regime whose leader claims that he is not accountable to the earthly world but to another place.

Philosophy as questioning stands in opposition to this regime. Philosophy is about doubt: doubting everything, including everything considered holy. This holy regime which ultimately tries to use torture in prison to force its holiness on the doubting mind, is the enemy of philosophy.

Philosophy is wonder about the work of the world. From this vantage point, the Iranian regime is interesting for philosophy. How can so much shamelessness, deception and self-righteousness become synthesized? This is an interesting philosophical question. There needs to be a congress to discuss this subject.

RZ: One of the central issues of the congress is Islamic philosophy. If, as you correctly point out, philosophy is based on doubt, and jurisprudence is based on servitude and obedience, can we speak of “Islamic philosophy” as a synthesis of these two? In principle, is it correct to use the expression “Islamic philosophy?”

MN: First, concerning the expression:

Islam is the name for an occurrence which once took place in Arabia. This event, along with the characters involved in it, can be and must be examined independent of its aftermath.

Islam is the name of a religion. A religion which for whatever reason represents a great mass of people, is something that transcends its original occurrence.

Finally, Islam is the name of a glorious culture or civilization which has been greatly influenced by that religion and the consequential events which have taken place in its name.

Islamic philosophy is a cultural occurrence and a cultural current which is Islamic in the third sense stated above. Its likes can be found in the world of Christianity and Judaism or in India.

A philosopher qua philosopher is not concerned with jurisprudence. Ibn Rushd [Averroes, 1126-1198 C.E.] had studied jurisprudence. However, his Imam and leader was not a jurisprudent who had founded a school of thought, but rather Aristotle. In a work entitled Fasl al-Maqal [On the Harmony of Religions and Philosophy] which he called the final word in the discussion on the relationship of religion to philosophy, he distinguished between the discourse of religion and the discourse of philosophy. The role of philosophy was rationalism, questioning and arguing. Religion, in contrast, was a discourse on the level of popular opinion.

The role of a philosopher who makes such a distinction is not to create a synthesis but to discern divisions. Ibn Rushd is the most discriminating philosopher of the world of Islam.

Another philosopher on a par with Ibn Rushd is Muhammad Ibn Zakariya al-Razi [865-925 C.E.] His works have been destroyed by the jurisprudents to prevent us from having access to them. He is not a Muslim philosopher. However, had his works survived, they would have been placed within the framework of Islamic Philosophy, which for the historian of philosophy, characterizes not a faith content but a period and a diverse culture.

The main accomplishment of Al-Farabi [872-950 C.E.] and Ibn Sina [Avicenna, 980-1037 C.E. ] was also not the creation of a synthesis. If a synthesis was created here and there, it was a synthesis of Greek philosophy with an understanding of God and creation and the relationship of God to the world and the subject of prophecy.

In any case for the Islamic philosophers, the issue was not jurisprudence per se. In fact, if that were the issue, and if they had theorized about this subject, perhaps we would have been better off.

If you read Ibn Sina’s The Cure, you will see that in many cases, whenever he articulated a view, he concluded with critiquing the views of others. But who were these others? They were Greek philosophers whom Aristotle had also critiqued. In works such as The Cure, Islam and the real theoretical currents of the environment in which the book was written, were not really present. Nevertheless, such a work can be recognized as a work from the world of Islam.

Islamic philosophy is the philosophy of an age which has come to an end. If we consider Ibn Rushd’s death (1198 CE) to be the foundation, we are eight centuries distant from it. In its totality, this philosophical current belongs in a museum. It is significant from the standpoint of cultural studies and not for the sake of its philosophical content.

In order to understand the philosophical content of medieval Islamic philosophy, one must study the new philosophy. Without Kant, we cannot extract much from Ibn Sina. . We will learn some expressions and classifications which will be of no use and with which we cannot know our current place in the world. However, with the aid of the new philosophy, we can find things here and there , which can appear attractive and relevant on the basis of a new interpretational background.

A living philosophy has to be relevant. We can no longer really relate intellectually to Aristotle’s Physics. His description of nature is important. However, the work as a whole is only useful for a historian of science. Aristotle’s Organon can still be read. However, more and better logical information can be gathered if we read newer books. The Metaphysics is interesting. The most interesting however are the Nicomachean Ethics and the Politics which are still directly relevant to our situation. For instance, you will not find a single important book in defense of democracy which has ignored Aristotle’s very thought-provoking critique of democracy.

We can find a set of relevant works and pieces among the writings of Islamic philosophers. For instance, the discussion of the nature of reason, or the relationship of body and soul in the works of Ibn Sina and Ibn Rushd can be relevant to current debates. However, this subject is not something that the seminary of jurisprudence can tackle. . .

RZ: To what extent have you received support for the call to boycott the congress, of which you are a signatory.

MN: The response has been great. Friends who are in touch with Iran say that the statement has received support from university students in the field of philosophy and other fields of the humanities, as well as independent scholars. These friends say that they have received e-mail messages from many university students who have expressed an interest in signing the statement with their own names and profiles.

The statement has also received much support abroad, as far as I know. Most major media have covered it. Many Iranian students and professors have added their names to the list of original signatories. International professors are also aware of this call.

The Iranian regime knows that international guests are aware [of this boycott]. That is why the official site for the congress does not include the list of international speakers. For the first time in the history of the Congress of World Philosophy Day, the names of some of the guests have been withheld until the last moment. Such a gathering does not deserve to be called a “congress of philosophy.”

October 31, 2010

This translation was published by Tehran Bureau on November 14,2010.
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/tehranbureau/2010/11/iranian-philosopher-comments-on-boycotting-philosophy-congress-in-iran.html

Where Did Iran’s Islamic Economy Come From and Where Did it Go?

2010-10-23T12:34:00.000-07:00

Translator’s Note: Below are excerpts from an interview conducted with Dr. Sohrab Behdad. He is a professor of economics at Denison University, Ohio, and co-author with Farhad Nomani, of Class and Labor in Iran: Did the Revolution Matter? (Syracuse University Press, 2006). The interview was conducted in Persian by Reza Talebi and was published on the website of Radio Zamaneh (Amsterdam, Netherlands) on August 14 and 17, 2010. This translation was published by Tehran Bureau on October 23, 2010.

***************************************************************************
Where Did the Islamic Economy Come From and Where Did it Go?
Source:
http://zamaaneh.com/special/2010/08/post_1330.html
http://zamaaneh.com/special/2010/08/post_1334.html

Translated by Frieda Afary

RZ: What was the economic orientation of the [1979]Iranian Revolution, considering that slogans in defense of the oppressed were given at that stage? Was the Islamic economy, in the beginning of the revolution, more socialist or liberal?

SB: It would be better to examine this events by starting from the early 1970s. At that time, there was no talk of an Islamic economy or the “oppressed”. There was talk of toilers, workers, the rural population, the dispossessed and the urban slum dwellers who were formerly part of the rural population and had escaped the poverty of the countryside to face the misery of urban slums. There were mainly two theoretical standpoints for explaining the economic-social situation: Marxist perspectives and those of Shariati and his followers.

During these years, the “nationalists” were asleep and did not have much to say. After the revolution, most became “religious-nationalist,” first nationalist and then mostly religious.

Although there were differences among Marxists, they demanded some type of socialist revolution. Regardless of whether they saw the “main contradiction” as imperialism or capitalism, their theoretical direction was ultimately socialism.

The other main force however was constituted by Shariati and his theoretical followers. Shariati provided a theoretical and ideological framework for the religious intellectuals who were intimidated by the Marxist theories of Left intellectuals. This framework put religious intellectuals on par with their Marxist competitors.

While Marxists relied on historical materialism and the class struggle to explain historical developments, the followers of Shariati based themselves on Shariati’s philosophy of history. They believed that “on the basis of a scientific determinism, from the beginning of human existence, . . . there has been a dialectical contradiction. . . between two antagonistic and contradictory elements . . . which has been ubiquitous and has shaped history.” * This was the contradiction between the followers of Abel and the followers of Cain. “Cain, the property owner, killed Abel. From that point on, the system of private property emerged.” According to Shariati, this was the beginning of the liberation movement in the history of human civilization, a movement for the emancipation of the freeborn human from the yoke of property and property owners.
In Islamology, Shariati writes that “Abel has survived historically and is not dead” and the movement continues.

While Marxists ultimately aimed for establishing a proletarian state, the followers of Shariati aimed for a “monotheistic classless economy.” For Shariati, just as for Marxists, it was considered a given, that in the age of imperialism, capitalism could not be the pathway to overcoming misery and underdevelopment in underdeveloped countries.

RZ: Given this state of affairs, what was the economic orientation after the revolution?

SB: With such a set of ideas, Iran was moving in the direction of the 1979 Revolution
without being aware of it. The dominant theories, Marxist and Islamic (Shariati) were both radical and leftist. Both Marxists and the followers of Shariati aimed at overthrowing capitalism. With the rise of the revolutionary movement, opposition to “dependent capitalism” became the dominant theme of the slogans and demands of the revolution. If you examine the leaflets from the months of January and February of 1979, and the speeches given during the first two years after the revolution, you will see that all, whether Left or non-Left, Marxist or Islamic, followers of Shariati or otherwise, (with the exception of the nationalists) were aimed at overthrowing “dependent capitalism.” The common slogan for all was “Down with the dependent capitalist.”

All political groups were determined to free Iran from the influence of imperialism and the evils of “leech-natured capitalists,” who were considered to be the main enemies of the people and the revolution. Therefore, there is no doubt that in the beginning of the revolution, the general economic plan was the negation of capitalism with a type of indeterminate socialist direction . . .

The Islamic Republic had neither a clear understanding of how to combat imperialism-- other than to rant and make faces at it--nor an alternative to capitalism. There were slogans about nationalization, confiscation, forming councils and expropriating agricultural land, urban houses and locations.

RZ: Were these actions planned?

SB: These were all spontaneous actions that were proposed and executed in the heat of the revolution. Some of these actions were inevitable. Factories whose owners had left them with heavy debts and empty warehouses, banks which had given their cash reserves as booty to capitalists and heads of the regime, were all left bankrupt and ownerless.

The government “nationalized” them and took them over. On the other hand, formal and informal confiscations were taking place throughout Iran. In the meantime, some landless peasants came to own land, slum dwellers of Zoorabads [“squatters’ ghettos”] outside city limits built huts made of brick without permits and received water and electricity, and became Islamshahrs [Cities of Islam].

It was clear that rival groups inside and outside the government who were competing to prove their revolutionary appearance were determined not to be outdone in terms of expropriations, confiscations and redistribution. When the revolutionary dust settled, it became clear that in those passionate days of revolution, there were those who were not combating either capitalism or imperialism. They were only after collecting and seizing choice property (booty).

The following were the two sides of the economic formation that appeared:

On one side there were the “oppressed” who continued to earn their daily bread through a piece of land in the countryside or as workers in the city or the countryside. In the meantime, the size of the army of the unemployed increased. Factories which were left idle and without raw materials and ownerless could not maintain their own workers, much less employ youth who had just entered the job market. These new entrants in the job market and those who had become unemployed turned to “freelancing,” i.e. anything from transporting people in exchange for a fee, to driving trucks or running small stands and street vending. Under these circumstances, the number of those in the working class decreased and the army of street vendors and illegal cabbies increased. In addition, many very small enterprises were established in which no more than one or two people worked.

On the other side, the booty had landed in the hands of a few very large enterprises (most important of all the foundations) which took over the largest economic firms. These giant oligopolies had not only economic power but also political power, since they were part of the government, and unlike other departments of the government, were not accountable.

Farhad Nomani and I have examined these issues in detail in the book, Class and Labor in Iran.

RZ: So there was no economic policy in effect?

SB: Up until then, meaning the first one or two years after the revolution, there was no economic policy in effect. There was a scuffle over determining the economic direction. There was nothing but what was written in the constitution. . . . Populist views with mass appeal were offered, such as aid for creating cooperatives to hire unemployed high school graduates. But there was no general policy. Under these circumstances, production was declining, and the economic situation was worsening.

Once the [Iran-Iraq] War [1980-1988] began and the economic sanctions went into effect, the Islamic Republic adopted a dual policy. On the one hand, the state sought to guarantee property rights, restart the economy and increase production. On the other hand, it sought to increase subsidies, ration and distribute staple commodities, ration raw materials and foreign currency, and control prices. These measures prevented the per capita consumption from dropping down as much as the decline of the gross national product. This is a policy that governments follow as much as possible in order to prevent increasing dissatisfaction with the burden of war, high prices and shortage of commodities. This dual policy was followed throughout the incumbency of Mir-Hossein Mousavi as prime minister [October 1981-August 1989].

These quotas and rations provided a great advantage for those close to the political establishment. They were able to acquire huge sums through rent-seeking activities. If collecting booty in large para-governmental enterprises was the first stage of the “primitive accumulation” of capital in the post-revolutionary economic crisis, then, rent- seeking and the acquisition of special privileges were the next stage. In this way the two massive economic poles of Iran reshaped themselves after the revolution, albeit more massively than the previous era.

The giant monstrosity of the oligopolies favored by the government cast its shadow on the landscape of Iran’s broken down economy, an economy which had several hundred thousand very small economic enterprises, each of which had less than two employees on the average.

RZ: Is the above compatible with “Islmaic economics?” It has been said that the economic theory of the post-revolutionary era was “Islamic economics.” Please explain when this theory arrived on the scene, where it came from, what it achieved and what its fate was.

SB: Islamic economics was a new discourse which entered Iran around the time of the 1979 Revolution. However, the discussion of Islamic economics had started in the early twentieth century in India and by Muslims. With the victory of the Indian independence movement in 1947 which led to the partition of India and the formation of Pakistan as a Muslim state, the discussion of Islamic economics gained prominence.

In the 1940s and 1950s, there were heated debates about Islamic economics and its particulars. One of its most important theorists was Abu Ala Maududi, the founder of Pakistan’s Jamaat-e Islami. In 1941, prior to the creation of Pakistan, Maududi had presented his views on Islamic economics in a famous speech.

Maududi had a very conservative view concerning the economic system. While he rejected capitalist and socialist systems, he uncritically accepted all the foundations and relations of capitalism, and even landlordism (Zamindari). However, there were others like Muhammad Iqbal, the prominent poet, or Khalifa Abdul Hakim, who demanded egalitarian social revolution, from an Islamic standpoint.

In the 1940s and 1950s this discussion spread to Egypt and to a limited extent to Iraq, Malaysia and Indonesia. However, in Iran, there was no talk of Islamic economics until the climactic days of the revolutionary movement. Aside from issues related to the revolution, this subject is worthy of attention from an epistemological perspective . . .

It is remarkable that Islamic intellectuals in Iran were ignorant of the discussions of Islamic economics which were taking place in a neighboring country with an Islamic state. Even if they did know about this discussion, they did not attempt to present the discourse on Islamic economics. And if they did, they were not successful in extending that discourse to Islamist circles. The Islamists were attending Shariati’s sermons in droves and were hearing about Fanon and Marx. Shariati never spoke of Islamic economics.

In Iran, before the revolution, we did not have an Islamic economy or Islamic economists. . . Examine the Islamic publications in Iran before the revolution, to see if you will find even one that contains an article about the convening of the first international conference [on Islamic economics] in Mecca in 1976. One can ask why the theological seminaries [of Qum] and the Islamists had no relation to issues raised about Islamic economics in the Islamic world.

The point is that in Iran, the revolution came first, became Islamic, and then brought about an Islamic economy which had very little to do with the Islamic world. The discourse on an Islamic economy began with Bani Sadr’s discussions and the publication of the book, Iqtisad-e Tawhidi [Monotheistic Economics] only a few weeks before the victory of the revolution in February 1979. From that point on began the debates and arguments among the Islamists.

RZ: The book, Iqtisad-e Ma [Our Economics] was published before the revolution, wasn’t it?

SB: Yes, you are right. Iqtisad-e Ma which examines the school of economics in Islam, is the translation of Iqtisaduna by Mohammad Baqir al-Sadr, an Iraqi theologian. It was published in Arabic in 1961. Its Persian translation was published in two volumes. The first volume, translated by Mohammad Kazem Mousavi Bojnurdi was published in 1972 by the Islamic Press. The second volume, translated by Abdul Ali Espahbodi was published by the same publisher in 1979. However, previously, Islam and Property by Seyed Mahmud Taleqani was published in 1965.

Elsewhere, I have examined the economic theories of these two books in great detail. Here, I will suffice it to say that prior to the revolution, these two books had not been successful in starting a discourse on Islamic economics.

The intellectual milieu before the revolution was such that Marxists aimed for socialism. The supporters of Shariati saw themselves on the pathway to achieving the classless monotheistic society.

Taleqani and Sadr expected very little of Islamic economics, so much so that in a footnote, [Bojnurdi]the translator of the first volume of Iqtisad-e Ma, took issue with Sadr for defending capitalism. Bojnurdi wrote: “It needs to be pointed out that we do not approve of the views of the author which implicitly defend capitalism (and surely he did not mean to do so)”.(p. 244) On another page, this very same translator added the following in a footnote: : “Capitalist property is illegitimate. The means of production which capitalists have gained by pillaging, robbing and exploiting the people, belong to the real producers. It seems that the author has erred in considering that a commonality of views about private property exists between the anti-human capitalist system and the just system of Islamic economics. . . “(p. 235)

These notes by the translator reveal the ideological orientation of the time, and explain why those who opposed the regime did not favor these books and their Islamic economics. It was only after the revolution that these two books, and specifically, Iqtisad-e Ma gained fame. . .

RZ: What finally happened to the Islamic economy?

SB: During the first few years of the revolution, one or two other works on Islamic economics were published. The most important was Conceptions of Property, Capital and Labor from the Standpoint of Islam, written by Habibollah Peyman. It was published around 1979. (The date of publication is not stated in the copy that I have). Peyman relied on Islamic epistemology and jurisprudence to argue that, based on the principle of ownership by God, the separation of workers from the means of production, a separation which is the basis of capitalism, is not permissible in Islam. (I do not know if Peyman still believes in these views). Therefore, all the natural resources should be under the control of the workers in order for them to benefit from their creative labor power.

Furthermore, Peyman argued that the means of production represented the achievements of human civilization, and no one had the right to monopolize them. Thus, Peyman considered the accumulation of capital to be un-Islamic, and rejected it. The conclusion of Peyman’s argument was that all should have the right to use the means of production and utilize natural resources. In that way, no one would have to sell his or her labor power, and the condition for the exploitation of the worker by the capitalist would not be created. Peyman next reached the following important conclusion: In modern society, which has large industrial and trade enterprises, those enterprises should be held as cooperatives under the ownership of the people.

Peyman’s critique of capitalism, and the plan which he proposed for the ideal Islamic society, was attractive to the religious youth who felt estranged from secular tendencies. Peyman’s interpretation of the Islamic economy was a religious manifestation of an intellectual current which had taken shape years before the revolution and which Shariati had sought to link with Islam. . .

The above views as a whole represented the dominant thought of the time of the formation of the Islamic Republic. The constitution was also written and ratified on the basis of this trend.

However, this was not the only Islamic theoretical framework in Iranian society. The method of thought and interpretation of Islam which called for the establishment of the rule of the oppressed, faced severe opposition from the owners of capital (bazaris) and prominent theologians of the time. . .

The confrontation began over legislation for urban land distribution and continued in some important ways with agricultural land distribution (Peasants had considered that confirmed and had expropriated and distributed the land prior to any discussions in the legislature), the nationalization of foreign trade, and labor laws. One after the other, legislation ratified by the parliament was being rejected by the Council of Guardians.

At this point, legislation for land distribution was temporarily ratified on a much smaller scale than was originally proposed. After a few years of quarreling between the parliament and the Council of Guardians over the Labor Law, the Council for Expediency was created. This council ultimately ratified the Labor Law. The real argument was over the extent and limits of private property rights.

The ideological and political direction of the revolution called for rejecting large property ownership and limiting rights to property and capital. However, the confrontation on this question took place within the framework of Islamic jurisprudence which approves of private property and respects its boundaries despite all the arguments about “ownership by God.” On this basis, return on capital (profit) is also acceptable, just like murahaba (an accepted method of financing a debt in Islamic Shari’a) and muzaraba (partnership between labor and the owner of capital). Therefore, from the standpoint of jurisprudence, land distribution legislation (legitimate expropriation) or imposition of limits on the rights of capital in labor contracts (the Labor Law) could not be acceptable.

In the Fall of 1985, “The Office of Cooperation Between the Theological Seminary and the University” headed by Mohammad-Taqi Mesbah-Yazdi, at the Qum Theological Seminary, published the results of its jurisprudential research concerning Islamic economics, under the title, An Introduction to Islamic Economics. According to this interpretation, Islamic economics does not necessarily aim at providing social equilibrium and preventing the concentration of wealth. Rather, like neo-classical economics, it examines the trade-off between economic growth and social justice, and considers the former preferable to the latter.

Based on the views of the scholars of the Qum Theological Seminary, the profit motive was justified and compatible with Islamic Sharia Law. The outcome of the free market was also considered logical and fair. This point of view in fact did not distinguish between neo-classical economics in its pure form (such as that of Milton Friedman) and Islamic economics. From this point of view, economics was economics. It could not be considered Islamic or non-Islamic. It was the cultural-political system that was Islamic!

With the intensification of the war [Iran-Iraq War, 1980-1988], and its rising cost, the intensification of the economic embargo, and most importantly the decline in the price of oil in the world market from around $30 per barrel in 1979 to less than $6 per barrel in 1987, maintaining the status quo became increasingly difficult. The foreign exchange reserves from the beginning of the revolution had been used up. As Hashami Rafsanjani revealed years later in a Friday sermon, the country’s foreign debt had reached billions of dollars. Up to that point, the economic policy of the Islamic Republic mainly consisted of providing for the cost of the war and preventing a massive decline in public consumption through the system of rationing.

As the gravity of the situation increased, the rations decreased and the lines increased. At the same time, the number of martyrs from the war increased daily. The open market for commodities and raw materials gouged people. Of course it created a large profit for its perpetrators. There was little stamina left for continuing the war and little possibility for finding the utopia of Islamic economics. By 1989 when the war had ended, the project to establish an Islamic economy was for all intents and purposes considered closed, and there was no longer any talk of the rule of the oppressed. . .

*See “A Disputed Utopia: Islamic Economics in Revolutionary Iran,” by Sohrab Behdad. Comparative Studies in Society and History: An International Quarterly. Vol. 36, no. 4 (October 1994).

This translation was published by Tehran Bureau on October 23, 2010
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/tehranbureau/2010/10/where-did-irans-islamic-economy-come-from-and-where-did-it-go.html

Letter from Iranian Political Prisoners to Brazilian President Lula da Silva

2010-08-25T19:02:00.000-07:00

Translator’s Note: Five Iranian political prisoners including Mansour Osanloo, the leader of the Tehran Bus Workers Union and Isa Saharkhiz, a reformist journalist have called on president Lula da Silva to exert pressure on the Iranian government to release all political prisoners. Although a translated version of this letter has been published on the Internet, its substance strays in several respects from the original. I am providing my own translation for the sake of accuracy.

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Letter from Iranian Political Prisoners to President Lula da Silva
Source: http://www.akhbar-rooz.com/news.jsp?essayId=31779
Translated by Frieda Afary

Honorable President Da Silva:

We the signatories and endorsers of this letter know that you have traversed a difficult road to democracy -- from the grassroots level of union struggles to the level of the nationwide Brazilian workers' federations and the arena of global politics -- with the support of the votes of the democratic and freedom-loving people of Brazil.

As a group of union and syndicate activists, political activists, and activists promoting various creeds, we have been incarcerated in the prisons of the Islamic Republic solely for having performed our union and professional duties and for our votes and opinions.

We are aware that you have defended the rights of an Iranian woman and mother [Sakineh Mohammadi Ashtiani, sentenced to death, originally by stoning] and were even prepared to offer her asylum. Having witnessed your humanitarian attitude, we were compelled to ask of you the following: In order to become better acquainted with the Iranian authorities who present themselves as your friends, ask them to take measures to observe our human rights and freedom. Although their attitude and response to [the demand] for the release of the aforementioned woman already gives you and the world a flavor of what these gentlemen consider to be respect for human rights.

Your Excellency Da Silva, as a part of the labor-intellectual representatives of various unions and professions, we ask the following of you, a member of various labor unions and federations and one of the leaders of the major nations of the world, and specifically of Latin America with its famed record of seeking freedom and justice. Ask the Iranian authorities who present themselves as your friends to free all union, labor, and political prisoners and prisoners promoting various creeds. By making such a friendly demand, you will gain a better understanding of these authorities.

In conclusion, we send you and the people of Brazil our best wishes for further success.

Long live the international solidarity of toilers and freedom fighters.

Mansour Osanloo
Heshmatollah Tabarzadi
Rasoul Bodaghi
Reza Rafie
Isa Saharkhiz

August 23, 2010
This translation was originally published by Tehran Bureau
http://to.pbs.org/aUGnw5

Appeals to Iran’s Hunger Strikers

2010-08-09T12:53:00.000-07:00

Translator’s Note: For the past two weeks, 17 political prisoners in Tehran’s notorious Evin Prison have been on a hunger strike to protest constant abuse, solitary confinement, lack of phone call rights and family visits, lack of access to medical care, books and newspapers. So far, only one hunger striker, photojournalist Babak Bordbar has been released. The remaining hunger strikers include student activist Majid Tavakoli and young human rights activist Koohyar Goodarzi. In addition to protests by the families of these prisoners, a group of political prisoners including Mansour Ossanloo of the Tehran Bus Workers Union and Issa Saharkhiz, a reformist journalist have issued an open letter to urge the strikers to end their hunger strike. The letter states: “the democracy-seeking Green Movement needs capable forces and prolific youth like you to build a free Iran.” The “Green Convergence of the Women’s Movement of Iran,” has urged the strikers to end their strike in order to “achieve their ideals in full health.” Reformist leaders, Mir-Hossein Mousavi and Mehdi Karroubi have also expressed their support for the demands of the hunger strikers and have urged them to end their strike. Below are excerpts from an appeal by a young woman political prisoner at Evin prison. Her letter was originally published by the Rahana News Agency.

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Let Us Not Give Up Our Only Right by Choice
by Mahdiyeh Golroo
Source: http://www.rhairan.us/archives/21681
Translated by Frieda Afary
. . . What can I say about those who refuse to tolerate a cesspool-like existence? Indifference is not part of their creed. This is the story of those who are tired of panegyrics, slander, superficial kindness, eloquent feasts, stereotypical happiness, pretensions of boldness, threadbare eloquence, equality without justice, frugality bursting with prodigality, and flamboyant ignorance.

. . . Now, although I am only a few steps away from them [hunger strikers], I am the most distant and the least informed. I know these loved ones have no energy to walk, talk or listen. They are suffering somewhere near me behind these same bars. But they are patiently resisting, without cries of pain or beseeching.

. . . My only hope is for you to remain healthy. My only wish is that you respect our only right by choice, that is to remain alive. Remain alive and see the bright days that are ahead and are impatiently awaiting the results of our efforts.

. . . During these not so distant years, so many prisoners in Evin prison’s cells have given up their lives for their goal. But how long shall we adorn the whip handles of dictatorships and executioners? Foresight is the responsibility of those who are wise.

To live is to do miracles
Otherwise birth is nothing but the memory of a fruitless pain
Let us not simply cover our noses
This harmful stench is not the world
It is an infection, an injustice

Mahdiyeh Golroo
Women’s Section of Evin Prison
August 3, 2010

This translation was originally published by Tehran Bureau on August 9, 2010
http://to.pbs.org/aRsymY

The Green Movement and the Working Class

2010-07-12T16:24:00.000-07:00

Translator's Note: Sohrab Behdad is the coauthor with Farhad Nomani of Class and Labor in Iran: Did the Revolution Matter? (Syracuse University Press, 2006). Below is the translation of an interview with him conducted by Ms. Mahindokht Mesbah of the Persian Language Deutsche Welle Radio on June 16, 2010. This translation was published by Tehran Bureau(http://to.pbs.org/bxvLSd)on July 11,2010.*

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The Green Movement and its Claim to Transcend Class
Source: http://www.dw-world.de/dw/article/0,,5685730,00.html
Translated by Frieda Afary

Deutsche Welle: The subject of our interview is the place of the working class in the Iranian protest movement known as the Green Movement. It seems that workers and laborers have not participated in the protests of the past year, at least not under their own independent banner. It seems that they have been potential, but not actual, participants in the movement. Do you concur with this view?

Sohrab Behdad: To some extent. However, one has to ask how workers can be discerned among the ranks of the protestors. It seems that the distinguishing marks being applied are obsolete. We have to acknowledge that the image of the Iranian working class is no longer the traditional one. Many are educated and young. Their attire and demeanor are no different from those of the middle class. The traditional image of a worker is that of a person who wears a greasy outfit and has a gaunt face.

Another issue is the lack of labor slogans within the Green Movement. The reason for this lack is that the protests have revolved around the right to vote, elections, human rights, and freedom. It is not true that workers have not participated in these spontaneous movements.

The next issue is that working class demands do not have the possibility of being directly manifested in the society. On the one hand, the present political situation has limited workers through suppressing their organizations. On the other hand, the leaders of the Green Movement have not yet expressed a strong interest in raising their issues.

The very fact that the question has been raised and is being asked by you reveals the fact of workers' presence in the movement. It is not true that there has been a lack of participation by workers per se. However, it is clear that labor issues have not found an organic expression in the slogans of the Green Movement.

DW: Some say that the labor movement in Iran has always been secular and that it has not joined the Green Movement because the Green Movement's leading figures are straddling the fence between religion and secularism.

SB: This is not true. The Green Movement is essentially secular. The issue is that Iranian society is in search of democracy and social justice. However the movement has not gone beyond the democracy-seeking stage so far. Its leadership has paid less attention to the question of social justice.

DW: Do you think the continuation of the Green Movement will enable it to represent labor issues after it has passed through the current political demands?

SB: That is inevitable. The Green Movement cannot succeed unless it raises social justice demands, which include workers' demands at the center. During the Khatami era, Reformists failed because they did not take the demand for social justice seriously, and did not make efforts to organize social forces. When there were disturbances in Islamshahr [a working-class city near Tehran], Reformist newspapers paid them no attention. Reformists better have learned from these experiences.

DW: You referred to the reform period. Some labor representatives say that the disappointment of workers with the eight years of reform has made them indifferent to the comings and goings of this or that [leader], and that the workers do not wish to pay a heavy price without getting results.

SB: I question the identity of these representatives and the validity of their statements. On May 1 this year, ten workers' organizations issued a statement. In addition to specific labor demands, they demanded the abolition of the death penalty and the abolition of discriminatory laws against women. These are the slogans of the Green Movement.

DW: I'm glad that you mentioned slogans that go beyond class. Some say that the Green Movement does not have a class origin, and hence it is incorrect for it to raise the demands of this or that sector or class.

SB: This statement can be simultaneously correct and demagogical. To speak of going beyond class is like saying "hameh ba ham" ["All together!" -- a slogan of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini's ]. It signifies doing away with the demand for social justice. It violates social justice.

DW: Another view is that the income gap and the economic and social status gap between the middle class and workers is narrowing on a daily basis, and that a kind of proletarianization is evident in this [middle] class.

SB: Precisely! This has taken place in Iranian society during the past 30 years. This very issue reveals that social justice is also very important to the middle class. Iranian office workers are in fact laborers who have become white collar. The issue of social justice is very important to them as well. That is why it needs to be addressed.

For the Green Movement to say that it is opposed to corruption will not bring about the realization of social justice. Throughout the world, corruption exists and punishment for it also exists. The movement has to raise specific demands that are relevant to changing the living and working conditions of the laborers.

DW: Many also say that if workers join the movement and a general strike takes place, the movement will be complete. How objective is this view, which takes its example from the last months of the Pahlavi regime? After 30 years of repression and the use of force, do the proper context and means for a general strike by workers exist in our society?

SB: A large portion of Iran's workers work for the government, the Pasdaran [Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps], and the foundations. In Mr. Karroubi's words, we cannot speak of freedom for workers in a society in which the employers are the Pasdaran. We need to speak in terms of the existing reality in Iran. At this time, the possibility and context [for a general strike] do not exist for the working class.

What we need to realize is that if the current economic situation worsens, and the "plan for targeted monetary subsidies" is enforced, the buying power of millions will decrease. This will have repercussions.

DW: Is it possible to predict what will happen? If the situation worsens, will there be wider protests with a stronger message from the people?

SB: The social dynamic cannot be predicted so easily. In the above case, protests will certainly increase. There will be greater dissatisfaction. However, it will not necessarily lead to violence and riots. We cannot predict the form that the dissatisfaction and protest will take. The form of social protests depends on the character of organizations, concerted actions, and the maturity of the leaders and representatives of the social currents.

* For another important analysis of the Green Movement and Iranian labor struggles, see "The Green Movement Awaits an Invisible Hand" by Dr. Mohammad Maljoo (http://www.merip.org/mero/mero062610.html). An earlier interview with Sohrab Behdad concerning his book Class and Labor in Iran can be found at http://iranianvoicesintranslation.blogspot.com/2010/02/class-and-labor-in-iran-interview-with.html

Message from Five Independent Iranian Labor Unions

2010-07-09T20:12:00.000-07:00

Five independent Iranian labor unions sent a message of solidarity to the second World Congress of the International Trade Union Confederation held in Vancouver BC, Canada from June 21 to June 25, 2010. The message describes the Iranian government's relentless attacks on independent labor union leaders and activists. The text of the message is being reprinted from Iran Labor Report.

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Message of Solidarity to the General Assembly of the International Trade Union Confederation (ITUC)
Source: http://iranlaborreport.com/?p=952
Persian source: http://www.iran-chabar.de/article.jsp?essayId=30528
Translator Unknown

We send plentiful greetings to our friends and colleagues participating in the International Trade Union Confederation (ITUC) General Assembly. Friends, we are extremely distressed that no representative of the Iranian labour movement is present among you to demonstrate the solidarity of Iranian workers with your General Assembly, and to inform you of the day-to-day issues of today’s Iranian labour movement. Nevertheless, know that despite the distance between us, we see ourselves by your side and wish for a most productive and victorious week for you and for the global labour movement.

Comrades and colleagues, for nearly a decade now, you have come to our aid with your strong support, and have been intimately involved in our problems and struggles. We nevertheless wish to inform you that the Iranian labour movement is enduring one of its darkest times ever.

Throughout its lifespan, the Iranian government has not only completely disregarded its commitments to international labour conventions and basic workers rights, but in light of the political situation in Iran during the past year, the government has paved the way for fiercely attacking even the most basic workers rights, and to strike against the few existing Iranian labor organizations with ever increasing intensity.

Our colleagues Mr. Saeed Torabian and Mr. Reza Shahabi were captured at home and at their workplace, in front of their families, in broad daylight and without presentation of any warrants, on completely fallacious charges. It has been two weeks that their families and colleagues have absolutely no information about their fate or condition. Also within the past two weeks, two other labor activists, Mr. Alireza Akhavan and Mr. Behnam Ibrahim, were captured and transported to an unknown location. Messrs. Mansour Osanloo and Ibrahim Madadi have spent the last three years in prison because they organized a labour union. Not only have they had no respite or liberty throughout these past three years, but they have also been denied medical attention while being detained in the most dangerous and deplorable prisons.

Members of the Haft Tapeh Sugarcane Factory Syndicate have not only been thrown in prison for labour related activity, but have also been fired from their jobs. The execution of Mr. Farzad Kamangar, and the other baseless detainments, sentences of prison time and whip lashing for the very few Iranian labour union activists, has created extremely troublesome conditions for them, and for any potential basic labour union activities. Not only educators themselves, but their relatives and loved ones have suffered as a result of these problems. Many of them are in prison or on their way to prison.

Friends and colleagues, this year we witnessed in the ILO’s annual meeting that Iran’s government was not only not reproached more than previous years, but actually received a “bonus” by being removed from the ILO violators list. We know very well that you make every possible effort at your disposal to see that the Iranian labour movement is not sacrificed to governmental political and economic turbulence [Persian expression used here is "zad va band" which can be translated as conspiratorial deals--FA]

We hereby recognize your current efforts in support of the Iranian labour movement with utmost gratitude, but respectfully request and expect that you continue your support with redoubled intensity and effort. We wish for you to take greater steps towards driving back the horrendous conditions imposed upon Iranian workers.

To obtain their basic rights, workers have no other recourse but the expression of class solidarity. More so than ever before, we reaffirm our reliance on international workers solidarity. We hereby shake your hand in concordance, and send our warmest regards and our greatest solidarity to you.

Syndicate of Workers of Tehran and Suburbs Bus Company (Vahed)
Syndicate of Workers of Haft Tapeh Sugarcane Company
Union of Free Workers of Iran
Committee for Re-Certification of the Mechanics and Steelworkers Syndicate
Association of Electrical and Steel Workers Kermanshah

The Kurds and the Green Movement

2010-06-07T14:18:00.000-07:00

Translator’s note: On May 9, five political prisoners were executed by the Islamic Republic of Iran. Four of these prisoners were Kurds, including the young teacher, poet and writer, Farzad Kamangar, and a young woman, Shirin Alamhouli. Following these executions, a general strike took place in Iranian Kurdistan on May 13. Mir-Hossein Mousavi, Mehdi Karroubi and many activists of the Green Movement also condemned the executions. Three months prior to the May 9 executions, Abdullah Mohtadi, secretary general of the Kurdish Komala Party, had issued a statement aimed at forging solidarity between the Kurds and the Green movement. Large translated excerpts follow. My glosses are interpolated in square brackets. This translation was originally published by Tehran Bureau on June 7.
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/tehranbureau/2010/06/the-kurds-and-the-green-movement.html
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The Kurds and the Green Movement
Author: Abdullah Mohtadi
Source: http://www.komala.org/farsi/km/etl-f/2010/100126AbaM.htm
Translated by Frieda Afary

The Kurdish people have never called for violence to solve social and political problems. Today, more than ever, they refuse such solutions. Let’s not forget that the good will of the Kurds and their belief in dialog and peaceful solutions have time and again cost them the lives of their leaders.

Dr. Abdul Rahman Ghassemlou, a famous Kurdish leader, lost his life while he was engaged in negotiations. Why? Because the “negotiators” of the Islamic Republic suddenly turned out to be terrorists. They personally murdered him and his accompanying negotiating team in the heart of Europe. [Reference to the assassination of the leader of the Democratic Party of Iranian Kurdistan, and two other Kurdish delegates in Vienna on July 13, 1989.]

We demand a free and democratic civil society in which social and political problems are resolved through freely conducted discussions in the media, in society and ultimately through the ballot box. We demand a tolerant and pluralist society in which religious, linguistic, cultural and philosophical diversity is not a pretext for prejudice, repression and deprivation but the source for the richness and beauty of our country.

In particular, I would like to address the young generation of our country, the awakened generation which is courageously standing up to dictatorship, the generation which is soberly inspecting the imposed presuppositions of the past several decades. I would like to share some realities about Kurdistan with them.

One of the most obvious lies of the Islamic Republic concerns Kurdistan and the Kurdish people. These lies must be questioned and re-examined by you. The generation which has tested the lies and malicious propaganda of this regime must know that the Kurds have been bombarded by the regime’s propaganda for the past 30 years.

During the past 30 years, the Kurds have faced the dictatorship and brutal suppression which you face today in the streets and detention centers. The justice-seeking, freedom-loving and humanitarian demands which you have today, have been theirs as well.

A regime which has branded you as “enemies of God” because of your demands, has declared the people of Kurdistan to be “enemies of God” for the past 30 years. [This designation] has been used as a pretext for imprisoning and torturing Kurds or putting them in front of execution squads without any recourse.

Do you know how many young Kurdish women were raped in the “luminous era” of the Islamic Republic? They were raped by the “unknown soldiers of the Mahdi” in order to not be sent to paradise as virgins. Do you know how many were executed or hanged without any court of justice or due process?

Kurdistan was decimated. Families lost loved ones. Imprisonment, exile and deportation became the norm. Parties that had roots in the history, struggles and hearts of the Kurdish nation were remunerated with the bullet or the scaffold.
The real reason for the siege of Kurdistan and its demolition with tanks was not any violence or beheadings committed by the Kurds, or any Kurdish collaboration with foreigners, or any other outright lie fabricated by the regime. It was the fact that the Kurdish people did not participate in the referendum on the Islamic Republic. [A referendum on creating an Islamic Republic was held in Iran on March 29-30, 1979. The people were offered a simple yes or no vote on the formation of an Islamic Republic]. The reason for their non-participation was that the Kurdish movement and its political organizations were secular and democracy-seeking. They were not willing to be subsumed by a monopolizing fundamentalist political Islam.
In the beginning of the revolution, when not only the clergy but today’s religious revisionists were smitten by the government of religion , Shaikh Izz al-Din Husayni, the vanguard of religious revisionism in Kurdistan and the religious and spiritual leader of the Kurdish people, openly called for the separation of religion from state. He defended democracy, the rights of dissidents and equal rights for women. Did you know that?
Did you know that we took a position against the hoopla over the takeover of the U.S. Embassy at the very time it occurred, and called it a weapon for leading the dissidents astray and subsequently suppressing them? [In November 1979, a group of Ayatollah Khomeini’s followers took over the U.S. Embassy in Tehran and held 52 American staff members hostage until January 1981. Many progressive critics of the regime supported the hostage taking as an “anti-imperialist” act. The regime used the embassy takeover to divert attention from growing domestic repression.]
Did you know that there was no compulsory veiling and no Hezbollah organizing in the free Kurdistan? Political and cultural organizations mushroomed everywhere. There was press freedom, and guaranteed security for all. Did you know that back then, Kurdistan had turned into a haven for freedom seekers from every corner of Iran?

Yes indeed, those wielding power and wealth in the Islamic Republic, hold a grudge against Kurdistan for the above reasons. They could not tolerate the presence of freedom in Kurdistan. That is why they have been crushing Kurdistan with bullets and fire since August 17, 1979.

Do not believe the lies of the Islamic Republic concerning the people of Kurdistan. The lies of the rulers and the regime’s media are not limited to the past six months. For the past 30 years, we have been suffering not only from direct violence and suppression but also from the weight of a mountain of false and divisive accusations. Discard the predominant superstitions concerning the Kurds. Update your views on the people of Kurdistan and their demands.

Let me add that we have never capitulated during these dark decades. We have not genuflected but we have also never resorted to blind and terrorist tit for tats. We have kept our moral high ground vis-à-vis the enemies of freedom. Today’s young generation needs to know that in Kurdistan, young people have lost their lives, but they did not capitulate. Many defiant heads were beheaded. The picture of the mass executions of Kurds, a picture which won the most prestigious award for best photo of the year, did not only prove the brutality of the soldiers of the Guardianship of the Jurisprudent. It also made everlasting, the image of the pride and honorable resistance of the people of Kurdistan. [Reference to the picture of a firing squad in Kurdistan in August 1979, taken by Iranian photographer Jahangir Razmi. It won an anonymous Pulitzer Prize in 1980.]

Today’s young generation in Kurdistan fully believes in the popular political and civil struggle, and is ready to join hands with you for our common freedom. Let us comprehend each other better in order to forge a stronger unity of youth throughout Iran for freedom and prosperity.

The demands of the Kurdish people in the past few decades have not been unknown, ambiguous, unusual or unjust. During the first few years after the revolution, these demands were presented to the delegations of the Islamic Republic by representative councils of the Kurdish nation.

The people of Kurdistan do not demand special rights or benefits for themselves. They do not demand separation from Iran. Their demands are not outside the common framework of contemporary democratic regimes and recognized standards of human rights. The people of Kurdistan rightly demand that the effective leaders and political and cultural figures of the Green Movement and the practical activists of the movement, approve and support the demands of the people of Kurdistan, and in so doing allay their rather legitimate fears.

A new understanding of the history of the past 30 years is being shaped in many areas, and former false and misleading interpretations have been replaced by objective and clear interpretations. It is expected that writers who are effective in shaping public discourse, will further explore and discuss the conditions of the people of Kurdistan and what has happened to them.

Once again, I would like to express my solidarity with the democracy-seeking movement of the people of Iran and support the minimum demands of the movement, i.e. free elections, as well as immediate demands such as stopping executions and brutality, freeing all political prisoners and prisoners promoting various belief systems, freedom of speech, assembly, and association, as preconditions for a truly free election. I would like to warn against the danger of conciliation aimed at silencing the movement and the loud voices of the people who demand changing the political system of the country.

Once again, I would like to emphasize that the Kurdish people have suffered the most from dictatorship. They stand to gain much from the democratization of Iran. Therefore, any achievement of the popular movement against dictatorship will be warmly supported by them.

In conclusion, I consider it necessary to list the following as my understanding of the minimum demands of the people of Kurdistan. I hope that under the present circumstances, these demands will become the basis for unity within the popular justice-seeking movement in Kurdistan.

1. The annulment of execution orders, and in general, an end to political executions in Kurdistan. Freedom for all political prisoners and prisoners promoting various belief systems.

2. The dismantling of the repressive environment in Kurdistan. An end to the brutality of the military, security and police forces. An end to arbitrary arrests and any type of torture and abuse in prison. An end to arbitrary harassment, intrusions and searches conducted by government agents in Kurdistan. An end to the irresponsible shootings of civilians by the police.

3. Freedom of speech, publication, press, association, assembly.

4. Freedom for civil organizations such as trade unions and organizations of workers, teachers, university students, high school students, and non-governmental organizations.

5. Freedom for independent women’s organizations in Kurdistan, and organizations that strive for women’s equal rights. Freedom to choose one’s clothing.

6. Complete freedom for political activity in Kurdistan, including unconditional freedom for activities of Kurdish political parties.

January 25, 2010

Statement by A Group of Azeri Activists & Intellectuals Concerning the Green Movement

2010-04-15T20:57:00.000-07:00

Translator’s Note: During the past few months, several online articles in Persian have attempted to analyze the participation, or lack thereof, by Iran’s Azeris in the Green Movement. Some have criticized the Azeri desire for autonomy as “pan-Turkist.” Others have criticized the leaders of the Green Movement for not working to safeguard the Azeris’ cultural and linguistic heritage. Some who are critical of the Azeris’ pursuit of autonomy point out that Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei, leading reformist opponent Mir Hossein Mousavi, and many other prominent Iranian politicians, theologians, and secular intellectuals over the past century have been Azeris. A large portion of Iran’s Azeri population of approximately 15 million, however, do not believe that their right to preserve their culture and mother tongue have been honored by Iran’s current leaders. On April 2, 2010, a gathering of 10,000 Azeris near Lake Urmia, located between the provinces of West Azerbaijan and East Azerbaijan, protested the government’s lack of attention to the drying out of the lake. The protesters also demanded the preservation of Azerbaijan’s cultural heritage. Over 100 were arrested. Earlier, on February 21, a group of Azeri activists and intellectuals chose International Mother Language Day to issue a statement that addressed the Green Movement. Below is the full statement without the names of the signatories. My glosses are interpolated in square brackets. This translation was originally published by Tehran Bureau on April 15, 2010.

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Our Standards Concerning the Democracy-Seeking Process and the Green Movement

Source: http://azdemokrasi.wordpress.com/2010/03/30/%d8%ad%d8%a7%d9%85%db%8c%d8%a7%d9%86-%d8%ac%d8%af%db%8c%d8%af-170-%d8%a7%d9%85%d8%b6%d8%a7%db%8c-%d8%ac%d8%af%db%8c%d8%af-%d8%a8%db%8c%d8%a7%d9%86%db%8c%d9%87-%d9%85%d8%b9%db%8c%d8%a7%d8%b1%d9%87/

Translated by Frieda Afary

February 21, 2010

Eight months have passed since the start of the anti-dictatorial movement in Iran. This movement, which began by protesting the results of the presidential election, now promises fundamental changes in our society’s political life by giving voice to demands for democracy and freedom...

Although this new, rising movement has been able to take advantage of means such as the Internet and satellites...to introduce itself to the world at large, it has not been able to establish itself as a nationwide movement inside Iran. Thus, so far, the burden of this movement has fallen on the backs of the urban middle class in Central Iran. Its geographical scope has been limited to Tehran and, at most, several other cities. The meaningful silence of Azerbaijan (which is famed for being the vanguard in important political developments in modern Iranian history) is a clear example of this.

The following has to be pointed out: The low level of national consciousness and the superficial understanding of the concepts of freedom and democracy among activists in prior nationwide movements made it possible to create a simple unity of the people. This time, however, the intensification of discriminatory policies, the effects of ethnic oppression on the economic face of Azerbaijan, and the passage of two decades since the new national democratic movement of Azerbaijan have greatly increased the level of consciousness. So much so that any coordination or new unity is conditionally based upon the satisfaction of the minimum demands of the people of Azerbaijan and the preservation of and respect for their independent national actions.

During the past few months, we have seen statements from leaders, intellectuals, and political organizations in defense of the [Green] Movement. All of these statements share the call for democracy, human rights, secularism, free elections, free speech, a free press, free flow of information, and nonviolence...

However, we cannot speak of democracy without specifying its form in Iran’s multiethnic society. We cannot speak of free speech while we remain silent about the freedom to speak one’s language (which is the prerequisite for any freedom of speech), or while we occasionally make use of a literature promoting ancient [Persia] and totalitarianism, a literature rooted in tendencies opposed to human rights and democracy. [The above] constitute some of the defects and contradictions that will ultimately lead to a rash government and limit the benefits of a temporary democracy to Central Iran.

Therefore, while we welcome this valuable movement toward democracy, we the undersigned declare that in our opinion, the political future of the country will have a proper basis for growth and sustainable development if the following principles and issues are enforced and safeguarded. If the leaders of organizations and parties that support democracy pay attention to the following standards, we have no doubt that the basis for greater coordination and harmony among the people can be created.

1. Amending or rewriting the constitution based on the recognition of the collective and individual rights of the Turks and other nationalities.

2. Guaranteeing the sustainability of democracy in Azerbaijan and other national entities through the formation and defense of state legislatures, civil society institutions, workers’ unions, a free press, and state-based parties.

3. Recognizing the Turkish language through the use of the mother tongue as the language of instruction at schools and universities, and the dedication of a nationwide radio and television network to this language...

4. Guaranteeing equal rights to women in all arenas, and recognizing independent women’s organizations in Azerbaijan and other national entities.

5. Condemning all expressions of inhumane violence, whether contempt, discrimination, or torture (physical or emotional). Abolishing prison sentences for dissidents, participants in civil society, and political activists and promoters of all creeds.* Categorically abolishing the death penalty.

6. Safeguarding the participation of Iranian nationalities in the central government, commensurate with their population size.

7. Cultural detoxification via the correction of textbooks and programs on the Voice and Face of Iran [Iran’s radio and television network] that currently promote the superiority of a particular ethnic group and religion over others.

8. Recognition of freedom of thought and religion. Safeguarding equal rights for religious minorities and recognizing their independent organizations in the national entities.

9. Amending all laws that are contrary to the content of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, its conventions, and supplements.

10. Decentralization and the abolition of all symbols of discrimination. The creation of equal economic, social, cultural, and political conditions through allowing the people of Azerbaijan and other national entities to manage their own affairs.

*Based on Daryoush Ashouri’s suggestion, I have translated fa’alin-e aqidati as “promoters of all creeds.”

Feminist Political Scientist, Fatemeh Sadeghi, Condemns “Temporary Marriage” as Exploitation

2010-03-22T21:44:00.000-07:00

Translator’s note: Fatemeh Sadeghi has a PhD in political science and has taught at the Islamic Azad University of Karaj near Tehran. Soon after the publication of her controversial article “Why We Say No to the Compulsory Hijab” [http://iranianvoicesintranslation.blogspot.com/2009/07/fatemeh-sadghi-is-assistant-professor.html] in May 2008, she was suspended from her teaching post at the university. Below are extended excerpts from an article which she recently published in Alborz, a site devoted to a critique of political economy. In this article, she critiques both conservatives and Religious Revisionists who defend the practice of temporary marriage. To find English equivalents for certain terms, I consulted the glossaries in Shahla Haeri’s Law of Desire: Temporary Marriage in Shi’i Iran (Syracuse University Press, 1989) and Janet Afary’s Sexual Politics in Modern Iran (Cambridge University Press, 2009). Following Daryoush Ashouri’s advice, I have translated the term no-andishan-e dini as Religious Revisionists. My glosses are interpolated in square brackets. This translation was originally published by Tehran Bureau on March 15, 2010 (http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/tehranbureau/2010/03/temporary-marriage-and-the-economy-of-pleasure.html).

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“Temporary Marriage” and the Economy of Pleasure
By Fatemeh Sadeghi
Source: http://www.alborznet.ir/Fa/ViewDetail.aspx?T=2&ID=275
Translated by Frieda Afary
In Iran, “temporary marriage,” which was originally called sigheh [a renewable contract of marriage for a defined duration] or mut’a, [Arabic term for a temporary marriage] has long been one of the challenging aspects of the culture of Ithnā‘ashariyyah' Shi’ism in contrast to other branches of Islam, whether Sunni or Shi’i. [Ithnā‘ashariyyah', or Twelver, Shi’is believe in twelve divinely ordained leaders, or imams]

During the first decade after the [1979] revolution, problems such as young people’s sexual needs and delayed marriages due to economic difficulties prompted some officials to renew and promote “temporary marriage” as a solution for the problems of the youth. At that time, this issue prompted opposition from many women. They expressed their views in journals such as Zan-e Rooz [Today’s Woman] and Zanan [Women] and the newspaper Salam. Many of these women considered the revival of the custom to be harmful to women and their rights in society.

During the past few years, the ninth government [Ahmadinejad’s first administration, 2005-2009] and the seventh and eighth parliaments have turned the revival of this custom and its promotion as “temporary marriage” into one of the foundations of their sexual politics. The government and the parliament went so far as to ratify the new family law bill despite women’s strong opposition. This bill gives legal justification to conditional polygamy, including multiple [permanent] wives and sigheh. It no longer even requires permission from the first wife.

The opponents of the practice of sigheh, as well as its supporters, have criticized it from a variety of perspectives, both intra-religious and extra-religious. Here, I do not intend to engage in a critique of the defenders of sigheh in the manner of scientific articles and from a specific perspective. More than anything, my goal is to raise questions related to this topic in our society today. Therefore, I will make use of different perspectives without directly citing them.

First, it needs to be said that the use of the expression “temporary marriage” for sigheh is in fact new. More than anything, this expression has been used to sanctify the custom. Based on jurisprudential views that defend this custom, the goal of sigheh or mut’a is only sexual pleasure. The philosophy of marriage, however, goes beyond sexual pleasure. In the beginning of this article, I put temporary marriage in quotation marks, in order to emphasize this point. In the rest of this article as well, I will continue to use the term “sigheh” instead of temporary marriage.

In summing up the views that defend sigheh, several attitudes can be discerned. Some defend sigheh from the vantage point of men’s sexual rights, and some defend it from the vantage point of women’s sexual rights. The latter view has defenders in Iran as well as other Muslim countries. The recent statement of a Saudi Arabian woman who asks why women cannot have multiple husbands if men can have multiple wives attests to this point. After summing up the viewpoints inside Iran, three distinct attitudes can be discerned:

First, traditional Twelver Shi’i jurisprudents defend this custom and believe that Islam has designated certain rights for men in the Qur’an, one of which is mut’a or sigheh. Basing their position on certain verses and interpretations, they believe that the prophet [Muhammad] considered this custom permissible for men.

The second group consists of some Religious Revisionists who claim that “temporary marriage” can even be interpreted in such a way as to observe women’s sexual rights.

The third group consists of some members of the political elite. Many statesmen and members of the current parliament fall into this group.

Each of these attitudes is based on different foundations. Therefore, in order to offer a critique, I will base myself on the very foundations upon which these viewpoints rest. Nevertheless, given that all of these views reach a common conclusion, I will end by critiquing the general attitude that pervades these viewpoints. I shall begin with the first viewpoint.

Traditional Jurisprudence and Sigheh
Based on the assessments of some traditional Twelver Shi’i jurisprudents, sigheh is permissible based on religious teachings. This viewpoint is rare among Muslims. Not only the majority of Muslims [Sunnis] but also the many branches of Shi’ism, with the exception of the Twelvers, are opposed to it. Even among Twelver jurisprudents, there is no agreement on whether this custom is considered marriage or mut’a. Therefore, many of them do not consider it permissible...

First, if sigheh is considered marriage, then the conditions of marriage need to apply to it. In other words, based on the text of the Qur’an, polygamy has been limited to four wives, provided that all are treated equally. Therefore, if sigheh is a type of marriage, it cannot be unlimited. However, if sigheh is not considered a type of marriage, what will become of all the verses and interpretations [of the Qur’an] that speak of piety and self-restraint. It seems that both situations produce contradictions that traditional jurisprudents cannot explain.

Of course other criticisms are also in order here. For instance, concerning why traditional jurisprudence gives men more rights than women. Traditional jurisprudents have no clear and convincing answers about the patriarchal discourse of jurisprudence. Instead they turn to identity statements. Some argue that men have a God-given and innate right to be favored over and to have more rights than women. Others argue that women are bearers of men’s sperm and [sexual exclusivity] is necessary to determine paternity.

Both of these answers are problematic. Concerning the jurisprudents’ patriarchal defense of men, the following critique has been issued: If Islam is supposed to speak to all human beings in all times and all places, how can it be patriarchal and presume the innate or legal superiority of men over women? And if it is true that men have greater God-given rights than women, how can we explain the verses stating that women and men are made out of the same act of creation and are equal? The argument offered by traditional jurisprudence concerning bearing a man’s sperm also seems invalid. Today, technology can determine paternity.

Aside from these issues, it seems that the Achilles’ heel of traditional jurisprudence in its defense of polygamy consists of its lack of concern for ethics. If religion is to be reduced to a set of rites in which the believers (men) find a variety of ways to make permissible the satisfaction of their libido, then the question is the following: What place do ethical attitudes have in religious law and jurisprudence?

Religious Revisionism and Women’s Sexual Rights
As the second group of defenders of sigheh, Religious Revisionists attempted to respond to some of the misgivings that traditional jurisprudence has not been able to resolve. In the opinion of some Religious Revisionists, sigheh is permissible. They believe that a dynamic jurisprudence and exegesis can turn sigheh into a progressive policy. This group believes that sigheh is one of the most progressive principles of Islam and addresses needs that other religions have ignored. According to some of these thinkers, based on this practice, even women will benefit from sexual rights that tradition has taken away from them. Others go even further and interpret [Islam’s] commandments as a type of sexual freedom for women and men.

Some Religious Revisionists believe that tradition and common law have denied sexual rights to unmarried women. Therefore, sigheh is considered one of the solutions that would allow women to also benefit from these rights. On the other hand, according to the views held by some of these thinkers, limitations that derive from sigheh, including the ‘idda requirement [waiting period for a woman after divorce or husband’s death] can be overcome through the use of technology.

First, according to many Religious Revisionists who defend this practice, Islamic jurisprudence, if based on exegesis that takes into consideration contmeporary problems, can offer progressive solutions to society’s ills. However, experience and knowledge have still not proved that jurisprudence is essentially capable of solving social problems.

On the other hand, those Religious Revisionists who defend sigheh mostly ignore the legal, social, and cultural aspects of the policy. In our society, women are not equal to men from a legal or social standpoint. The legal system and common law do not consider them equal to men. In such a society, the additional sexual rights for which Religious Revisionists give sigheh credit are more formal than real.

For example, in our society many women agree to become sighehs mostly because of distress due to economic pressures and the inability to provide their own means of subsistence. When a woman becomes a man’s sigheh under such circumstances, she is in essence engaging in a fundamentally unequal exchange. It is her distress over providing her means of subsistence that forces her to agree to become a sigheh. On the other hand, given the disagreeable character of sigheh in our culture, many of these women are compelled to keep the relationship a secret from neighbors and family members. It is even worse when an unwanted child results from the relationship.

Therefore we can say that what is being interpreted as women’s sexual rights is, more than anything, an unequal and unreliable relationship in which women agree to be subjected to sexual exploitation because they lack economic rights and a sense of security.

So long as women are not considered legally equal to men and do not receive the economic benefits and legal rights that men enjoy, so long as they are not backed by the law and the government, sexual rights are reduced to a useless appendage from which only men benefit. On the other hand, even if we consider that not all the women who agree to become sighehs are economically impoverished, the problem of the decline in social status associated with sigheh remains. A practice that is mostly judged negatively by society cannot simply be repackaged and forcibly sold.

Furthermore, the approach of the Religious Revisionists, similar to the first approach, leaves the questions regarding foundational ethics unanswered.

The Principle of Pleasure in Politics
The third group of defenders of sigheh are statesmen who not only consider the practice as the solution to the “problems of the youth” but also encourage it among their co-thinkers and colleagues in a way that reveals the intervention of the principle of pleasure in politics. They write laws and ratify amendments to promote the practice. In contrast to the first two groups, it seems that the statesmen’s defense of the practice is based on a different set of principles and foundations. The conservatives’ approach in other areas reveals that their goal is not in any way a defense of women’s rights. Furthermore, considering the pressures to which young people have been subjected during recent years, and considering the violation of their rights by the statesmen, one can hardly attribute the statesmen’s defense of sigheh and polygamy to addressing the problems of the youth. It seems that their aim is on the one hand the granting of a privilege to their fellow men, and on the other hand the humiliation of women.

Based on the above, the customer-centered approach of the current ruling establishment cannot be simply explained as the granting of economic privileges to their supporters and the possible trickle-down effect among the economically disadvantaged masses. The customer-centered approach includes the granting of privileges in the economy of pleasure. Specifically, we need to consider the fact that a large portion of managers, ministers, statesmen, members of parliament, heads of security forces, etc. have turned sexual wealth into a way of life and expect their representatives in the polity to leave them unrestrained both in the realm of the economy and the realm of the economy of pleasure.

The strong efforts made by political institutions to ratify the family law bill and promote polygamy seem to be tied to similar efforts in the arena of economic privileges and redistribution for the purpose of preserving the interests of the ruling establishment. This assumption mostly arises from the fact that women from a variety of social classes, groups, and beliefs, surveyed in many studies of women performed over the past few years, have strongly opposed the principle of polygamy. They have continued to demand that the government limit the practice and defend women whose rights are violated through polygamy. The persistent efforts of the supporters of sigheh to ignore women’s demands cannot be attributed to a lack of awareness...

Final Observations

Most women in our society have long been opposed to sigheh and polygamy. They have only accepted the practice out of distress and necessity. Among families, traditional as well as modern, religious as well as secular, and among women as well as men, sigheh has always been associated with shame and regarded as a stigma. It seems that this will continue to be the case in the future. Opposition to the practice has been reflected clearly in various studies that have been conducted during the past few years by governmental institutions and independent researchers...

In other words, public opinion in our society considers sigheh to be an unethical behavior that falls under the category of the economy of pleasure. Although some practice it, sigheh is not considered sanctifiable. Therefore, defense of the practice of sigheh, under any justification or basis, represents an undemocratic and patriarchal attitude contemptuous of the demands of the majority of Iranian women and the ethical judgment of society...

If we subscribe to the arguments presented in defense of sigheh and ultimately base ourselves on the economy of pleasure, then we can revive any obsolete practice and make it palatable, using aesthetic and even beautiful feminist justifications and modern rationalizations, in order to make women believe that the only path to emancipation is through the Harem. If that is the case, then why not revive slavery in order to free all of humanity from the misery that it suffers on a daily basis for the sake of being free?

January 9, 2010

Shadi Sadr Dedicates Her Award to Imprisoned Women's Rights Activist

2010-03-11T17:08:00.000-08:00

Iranian Feminist attorney and human rights activist, Shadi Sadr has decided to dedicate her Women of Courage Award to Shiva Nazar Ahari, an imprisoned women's rights activist. Sadr chose not to travel to Washington D.C. on Wednesday March 10 to receive the award from U.S. Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton. Instead she sent a recorded message to be braodcast at the awards ceremony. The U.S. Department of State decided not to broadcast Sadr's message during the ceremony. Below is the full English text of her message, which was published on the website of Women Living Under Muslim Laws.

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Shadi Sadr's Speech for the International Women of Courage Award Ceremony
Source: http://www.wluml.org/node/6042
March 9, 2010

I am honored to be selected as one of the ten recipients of the International Women of Courage Award, which I consider as yet another opportunity for me, and other human rights activists, to bring to the international community’s attention the efforts of Iranian women on a global level. This award also enables me to publicize the systematic human rights abuses in Iran, particularly the crackdown on civil society activists in the aftermath of the 2009 presidential elections.

This Award, as is evident by its title, is given every year to women all across the globe that have illustrated exceptional courage in defense of women’s rights, social justice and human rights. For this exact reason I would like to dedicate my award to Shiva Nazar Ahari, a young activist that is currently imprisoned in Iran for her women’s rights and human rights activism. I dedicate this award to her since I believe her courage has been exceptional and deserving of worldwide recognition.

Shiva, who since her youth has been an influential activist, founded the Committee of Human Rights Reporters, a university student group that provides important and objective reports concerning human rights abuses in Iran. She has also been actively involved in the women’s rights movement, never for a moment ceasing her efforts on behalf of human rights and democracy.

Unfortunately, shortly after the elections, Shiva was arrested and kept for months in solitary confinement and subjected to extreme interrogations. After spending more than 100 days in prison, Shiva was released on a $200,000 bail for only three, brief months. Shiva, who had re-started her activism immediately upon her release from prison, was arrested once more in December 2009 along with other members of the Committee of Human Rights Reporters. Since her arrest, the authorities have placed her under extreme pressure in order to make her confess to the crime of ‘acting as an enemy of God’, which carries the death penalty under state law. They kept her for a long period in a cage-like cell so small that she could barely move her limbs. Despite such extreme torture, Shiva has not, even today, accepted that her peaceful activism in promotion of Women’s rights and democracy are acts of terrorism, and consequently has faced even more abusive treatments.

Shiva, one of the world’s most courageous women, who herself worked tirelessly in defense of the rights of political prisoners, is herself in a small prison cell, and deprived of having even a pen and paper or meeting with a lawyer, and is kept blind-folded.

To be honest, since the Iranian regime declares that all human rights activists and civil activists are spies and puppets for the West, particularly the United States, I initially worried that to dedicate this award to Shiva alone might increase the pressure and hostility of her interrogators and the judicial forces and make matters worse for her.

However, I eventually arrived at the conclusion that the Iranian government will still accuse all activists of being spies, similar to the way they accused me of selling myself to America for receiving this award (calling me a “servant of the United States”), so that it really makes little difference. As Shiva is not with us and cannot attend this award ceremony, I will also refrain from attending with the hope that my absence will turn the attention of the international community to her dire situation. I would like to request that you all take any measures available to you to help to free Shiva along with other human rights activists and journalists in Iranian prisons.

Thank you.

A Response to Danny Postel’s Call for Critical Solidarity with Iran

2010-03-11T16:57:00.000-08:00

Danny Postel’s “The Specter Haunting Iran” is a welcome call for “critical solidarity” with the Iranian democratic opposition movement. Unlike those on the Left who have been wary of characterizing the current democratic movement in Iran as a progressive phenomenon, Postel has supported this movement as a completely new and progressive phenomenon or what he calls “a deep-seated shift in the consciousness of millions of Iranians in their ways of seeing and perceiving their political reality.” . . . Given Danny Postel’s grasp of the “deep shift in consciousness” that has taken place in Iran, I am surprised to see him offer Hugo Chavez’s Bolivarian economic experiment as an alternative . . .

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By Frieda Afary
Source: Tehran Bureau
February 24, 2010
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/tehranbureau/2010/02/a-response-to-postels-call-for-critical-solidarity-with-iran.html

Danny Postel’s “The Specter Haunting Iran” is a welcome call for “critical solidarity” with the Iranian democratic opposition movement. Unlike those on the Left who have been wary of characterizing the current democratic movement in Iran as a progressive phenomenon, Postel has supported this movement as a completely new and progressive phenomenon or what he calls “a deep-seated shift in the consciousness of millions of Iranians in their ways of seeing and perceiving their political reality.” In his previous writings, he has also attempted to demonstrate that the non-violent and pluralistic features of this movement are related to the deep interest in philosophy, and specifically rationalist philosophy, that has emerged in Iran during the past 20 years.

I would add that the feminist movement in Iran which has offered thoughtful and courageous arguments on women’s rights and the issue of sexuality, is also a manifestation of the philosophical awakening that has characterized Iranian society. Readers who have had the opportunity to read Fatemeh Sadeghi’s “Why We Say No to the Compulsory Hijab” (http://iranianvoicesintranslation.blogspot.com/2009/07/fatemeh-sadghi-is-assistant-professor.html) or Shadi Sadr’s recent challenge to Ayatollah Karroubi (http://iranianvoicesintranslation.blogspot.com/2010/01/feminist-attorney-shadi-sadr-critiques.html) will know that Sadeghi and Sadr are not only activists but also deep thinkers and theorists.

There is no doubt that poverty and economic inequality is a major concern of the mostly young participants in the current opposition movement. Iran’s university students, of whom sixty percent are women, face unemployment or poverty wages that pay less than $250 per month and offer no benefits. According to the World Bank and the Iranian government, the absolute poverty line has been set at $2 per day per person, which means that a minimum of $240 per month is needed to support a family of four. In fact, according to the Centarl Bank of Iran, the general poverty line for a family of four in 2006 was no less than $400 per month. The newspaper Sarmayeh (Capital) has admitted that the poverty line in Tehran is $800 per month for a family of four.

The question of alternatives to economic inequality and specifically alternatives to capitalism however have not been theorized by the Green movement. Whereas the Islamist movement of Ayatollah Khomeini and Ali Shariati’s brand of Islamic socialism in the 1970s used the promise of economic justice to gain adherents, the leaders of the Green Movement, Karroubi and Mousavi advocate one or another form of market capitalism.

In face of this reality, I appreciate the following statement from Danny Postel:

I want to suggest to Iran's Greens that they take a close look at the cases of Eastern Europe and South Africa. The democratic movements that by and large formed the post-Communist governments of the former Warsaw Pact countries faced a similar situation -- different from Iran in many regards, to be sure, but similar in the crucial respect that their focus was political in nature and their platform consisted mainly of democratic principles and negative liberties. It was presumed that these were the most pressing matters and that economic issues would get worked out in due course. But what happened? To make a long story short, shock capitalism happened, and it brought the kinds of dislocations, dispossessions, and disfigurations that are its global trademarks. Because the democratic-movements-turned-governments hadn't given much thought to questions of economic structure or policy, they were unprepared to respond to the convulsions induced by neoliberalization.

In fact, Iranians have already experienced “the convulsions induced by neoliberalization.” Ahmadinejad’s government has recently approved a plan for “targeted monetary subsidies” which will gradually phase out existing government subsidies on basic food items and petroleum. In addition to having banned independent trade unions, the Iranian government has been promoting the two-tier wage system which has practically meant that a large percentage of Iran’s workers are contract workers without any benefits.

Mohommad Maljoo, an Iran-based professor of economics, has also addressed these questions in a recent interview in which he refutes “trickle down economics” and argues that the accumulation of capital will not necessarily improve the conditions of the lower classes. (http://iranianvoicesintranslation.blogspot.com/2010/02/is-there-labor-movement-in-iran.html).

Given Danny Postel’s grasp of the “deep shift in consciousness” that has taken place in Iran, I am surprised to see him offer Hugo Chavez’s Bolivarian economic experiment as an alternative in order to take the terms of the economic discussion beyond capitalism.

First, Postel admits that Hugo Chavez has been a strong supporter of Ahmadinejad and Khamenei. Although Postel limits Chavez’s support to the political realm, in fact Chavez’s involvement with the Iranian regime is deeply economic. The Iranian regime has made large investments in Venezuela. Chavez in turn has been providing the current government with petroleum to reduce the impact of the western governments’ sanctions on Iran. The separation made by Postel between Chavez’s political practice and his economic practice is indeed not true.

Furthermore, Iranian labor activists have attempted to make a distinction between Chavez and the Venezuelan labor movement by issuing statements in which they appealed to Venezuelan workers to support them in their struggle against the current regime. In January 2007, on the occasion of Ahmadinejad's trip to Venezuela to meet with his friend, Chavez, the Bus Workers’ Union sent an open letter to the Venezuelan Workers Syndicate and demanded that they confront Ahmadinejad and defend Iranian workers (www.peiknet.com, 1/17/07).

Not only would I argue that Chavez’s political and economic support for the current repressive government of Iran flow from his economic views. I would further argue that Chavez’s economic views, examined in isolation, do not offer much more than a state- controlled version of capitalism. Indeed, the very article which Postel cites as evidence of the achievements of Chavez’s economic programs, offers important critiques of the glaring contradictions in Chavez’s brand of socialism. Below are two passages from this article, “Venezuela’s Cooperative Revolution,” by Betsy Bowman and Bob Stone:

Zaida works seven hours a day, five days a week, and is paid $117 a month, the uniform income all employees voted for themselves. This is much less than the minimum salary, officially set at $188 a month. This was "so we can pay back our [government start-up] loan," she explained. Venezuela Avanza cooperativistas have a monthly general assembly to decide policy. As in most producer co-ops, they are not paid a salary, but an advance on profits. Workers paying themselves less than the minimum wage in order to make payments to the state was, Zaida acknowledged, a bad situation. "We hope our working conditions will improve with time," she said. . .

And even if all of the country's current cooperativization programs succeed, will that struggle—and it will be a struggle—result in socialism? . . . the history of co-ops from the Amana colonies of Iowa to the Mondragón Cooperative Corporation in the Basque country shows that even when they start out with a community-service mandate, individual co-ops, or even networks of co-ops, tend to defensively re-internalize capitalist self-seeking and become indistinguishable from their competitors when made to compete alone against an array of capitalist firms in a capitalist economy.

As this article indicates, workers’ self-management, in the context of a capitalist world can simply not transcend capitalism. I would add that that the combination of a massive oil income, state supervision and worker’s self-management for capitalist profit sharing can also not be posed as an alternative to capitalism.

While most members of the global Left continue to offer uncritical support for the political and or economic programs of Chavez, there are a growing number of youth associated with the new Left in Iran who do not see Chavez’s programs as an alternative but are also interested in developing alternatives that can transcend capitalism.

Unlike the period preceding and immediately after the 1979 Revolution when the vast majority of the Iranian Left consisted of the pro-Soviet Tudeh Party or the Maoist advocates of guerrilla warfare, there is now a growing new Left in Iran that challenges the old Left’s legacy of support for the former Soviet Union or Communist China under Mao. This new Left is completely aware of the collaboration of the pro-Soviet Tudeh with Ayatollah Khomeini in 1979 in the name of anti-imperialism. It welcomes critiques of Stalinist and Stalinist-Maoist brands of thinking. It has welcomed new translations of Marx’s 1844 Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts as well as Marx’s Capital. (See the English translation of Hassan Mortazavi’s preface to the new Persian translation of Marx’s Capital volume I. (http://iranianvoicesintranslation.blogspot.com/2009/07/translators-preface-to-new-persian.html). It is fascinated by discussions on G.W.F. Hegel’s Phenomenology of Mind. This new generation of youth is also the product of the deep interest in philosophy that has characterized Iran during the past two decades. It is challenging the economic and ideological views of the old Left which continues to exist but cannot offer new ideas.

After the Ashura protests, the Iranian government accused the democractic opposition movement of having been instigated by “enemies of God and Marxists.” This statement was indeed surprising even to Iranian socialists who did not think that their influence had been widespread. Since then, many of those associated with the new Left have been arrested. These thinker-activists include Omid Montazeri, a 24-year-old law student, journalist and writer for the online youth journal, Sarpich, who was forced to “confess” during show trials after the December 27 Ashura demonstrations. Omid Mehregan, editor of the online journal Rokhdad and co-translator with Morad Farhadpour of Theodor Adorno’s Dialectic of Enlightenment was released on February 19. Many others remain in prison.

I agree with Danny Postel’s call for a critical solidarity that is based on addressing economic alternatives to capitalism. Those who are interested in this call can begin with defending the members of the Iranian new Left who are languishing in prison. We need to hear their views and learn from their experiences and questions in order to engage in critical solidarity with the Iranian democratic opposition movement.

Is There a Labor Movement in Iran? An Interview with Mohammad Maljoo

2010-02-10T14:11:00.000-08:00

Translator’s Note: Dr. Mohammad Maljoo is an Iran-based researcher and lecturer who specializes in political economy. On February 6, 2010, Mahindokht Mesbah of the Persian language Deutsche Welle Radio conducted an interview with him. Translated excerpts follow.

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Labor Actions: Three Decades of Ebb and Flow
Source: http://www.dw-world.de/dw/article/0,,5216251,00.html
Translated by Frieda Afary

February 6, 2010
DW: Our discussion concerns the ebbs and flows of the labor movement in Iran during the past 31 years. First, let’s address the movement itself and then its ebbs and flows. Can we essentially speak of a labor movement in Iran?

MM: I think the phrase, labor actions, would be a more appropriate title for our discussion today. A movement has its own definitions, organizations and leaders. It is difficult to speak of a labor movement during the rule of the Islamic Republic. The working class, has had actions here and there. These actions can be divided into different periods. It is difficult for me to speak of a labor movement.

DW: Let’s start by reviewing these periods. What were the specific features of the first decade [after the 1979 Revolution—tr] given the utopian air of the immediate post- revolutionary period, the war [Iran-Iraq War 1980-1988—tr], and the establishment of the House of Labor and Islamic labor councils?

MM: In order to answer your questions, I will skip the first two years after the revolution. I will start from the time when the leftist organizations which defended the working class were destroyed by the ruling forces in a variety of ways and were practically eliminated from the political scene.

The formation of workers’ councils after the revolution, made the Islamic Republic realize that the working class had been guided and assisted by various political leftist groups in demanding its rights. These demands naturally created problems for the ruling political establishment. Therefore, the Islamic labor councils were formed to confront these difficulties. These councils were practically tools for the ruling political system to control the working class or to control labor activists.

During the reign of the governments for which Mir-Hossein Mousavi was prime minister [1981-1989 –tr], the independent and semi-independent workers’ councils which had been formed during the honeymoon of the revolution, were completely destroyed. During these same ten years, we saw serious developments on the political scene. With the expropriation or escape of the bourgeoisie, which had risen under the system of monarchy, this class was replaced by another newly rising class. This newly rising class which became well established in the 1990, did not create any improvements in the condition of the working class to advance the workers’ welfare or rights. During the sixteen year period of the governments of Mr. Hashemi Rafsanjani [1989-1997—tr] and Mr. Khatami [1997-2005—tr], despite the ups and downs, the dominant economic outlook was concerned with advancing the upper economic class formed in the 1980s. This outlook set the rules of the game in such a way as to allow for the accumulation of capital by the new class. Only through the “trickling down effect” would other social classes including the working class and the poor benefit.

DW: Was the political logic of the second period, different from the first period? How did the labor councils or the remaining organizations operate during this period?

MM: These two periods are parts of a larger puzzle. During the first period, independent workers’ organizations were eliminated and suppressed on the basis of the claim that they were tools of leftist groups. This period was characterized by property expropriations, and the granting of privileges and monopolies on import and export. This trend was intensified with the end of the war. During the second period, no organization even existed for the government to confront. During this period, Islamic councils remained and had a monopoly on labor organizations. In addition to the pressures imposed by the rulers, the Islamic councils would not allow any other organization to grow.

During the 1990s, the upper class which had risen during the first decade after the revolution, was able to provide the finance capital, the human capital and the increasing knowledge of the global world that allowed it to develop. The strategy of this class was also to promote the accumulation of capital as the only way to benefit the lower classes.

DW: What was the outcome of this situation among wage laborers, workers and toilers? Did they accept these terms? Were they not demanding their rights or labor laws?

MM: Yes they did. That is why I say that we should speak of labor actions and not a labor movement. At that time, communication and the flow of information was not as speedy as today. As a result, the information we have from this period is limited. Strikes and protests mostly spread through word of mouth.

Labor actions during this period were often controlled by the Islamic councils and the House of Labor. The key point is that the majority of the protests during the 1990s were over bread and butter issues and did not challenge the political system and the capitalist class. The actions concerned unpaid wages, the shortening of the working day, etc.

DW: How did the labor laws after the revolution benefit the workers?

MM: During the first decade, there was no labor law. There were drafts about which different groups had various views. These drafts which were shuffled back and forth in the thick of political battles between the parliament, the Council of Guardians and the government, only became law in 1991 with the mediation of the Expediency Council. This is the law that is enforced today.

This law has granted some benefits to the working class and toilers. It has placed some restrictions on the summary dismissals of workers. The degree of actual enforcement of this law, and the degree to which it has restricted employers in the actual power relations, is a matter of debate. On the other hand, by banning independent workers’ organizations, this law, has given privileges to the established political system. This law does not recognize workers’ right to collective action and collective bargaining. Chapter six of this law has been consistently under attack by labor activists, writers, economists, etc. during the past eighteen years. Only previously existing Islamic councils that exist under the umbrella of the House of Labor, have come to terms with this law.

DW: Let’s return to your periodization by decades. Tell us about the specific features of the third decade.

MM: This period begins with Mr. Ahmadinejad [Ahmadinejad became president in June 2005—tr]. Despite his popular election slogans, his policies represented a type of class reconfiguration. Ahmadinejad and his ninth cabinet were determined to elevate those loyal and committed to the government, who were in the middle layers of the power and wealth pyramid.

The ninth government’s effort to change the class configuration of society, did not benefit the bourgeoisie that was formed in the 1980s and 1990s. The [ninth government’s –tr] goal was to displace the technocrats associated with parties such as Participation, Kargozaran, the Mujahedeen of the Islamic Revolution, and other reformists organizations, and to replace them with newly emerging classes and sectors dependent on the ninth government.

DW: Did the ninth government attempt to buy off the toilers in order to strengthen its own front?

MM: No, the ninth government at best allowed the lower classes to participate in the reproduction of economic wealth in limited and ineffective ways. This limited distribution only included the sectors that were anticipated to vote for and support this government.

Proof for my statement can be found in the amendment to the labor law which was proposed by the Ministry of Labor during the second year of the ninth government. This amendment has been going through various channels and is being ratified without public knowledge. As in the past, chapter six of the labor law does not give workers the right to create their independent organizations. . .

DW: Despite the increase in lay offs, unemployment, inflation and costs, why are we not hearing anything from the masses of workers? Why aren’t the workers exerting themselves?

MM: But they are exerting themselves! According to research done by Dr. Bashirieh, there have been labor actions. There have been factory protests, strikes, petitions etc. The masses of workers have exerted themselves. However, prior to the historical juncture marked by June 12, 2009 [the date of the fraudulent presidential election which set off the current wave of mass protests—tr] these exertions were fragmented and not under the umbrella of any national organization. In fact, we can say that although labor actions have not taken the form of a movement, they have been a problem for the ninth government.

DW: Can we expect new labor actions in the post-June 12, 2009 period?

MM: A new period started after June 12. However, the outlook is still not clear in labor discussions or in many other arenas. A unique feature of this period is that labor actions are more prominently placed on the agenda than in the past. Among workers, there is a potential for coordination with the civil rights protest movement.

. . . The plan to impose targeted monetary subsidies [to phase out existing subsidies on basic goods and gas—tr], or the ratification of the amendment to the labor law, can link labor actions to the recent movement and the middle class. In this context, the formation of various workers organizations is within sight. Of course this is a possibility.

The current political movement has created a division within the ruling political class. This gives an opportunity to the dissatisfied to express themselves. The working class has an opportunity. In this context, the possibility of the transformation of labor actions into a national movement in the coming months or in the coming two or three years is likely. . .

DW: Let’s speak about the visible networks. Why are the existing workers’ organizations present in the service and non-industrial fields? Examples are the Syndicate of Vahed Bus Drivers, the [Haft Tapeh--tr] Sugar Cane Workers Syndicate, the Syndicate of Khabbaz workers, etc. Why don’t these organizations exist in heavy industry?

MM: There are two possible reasons. In heavy industry, the government is the employer. The possibility of bankruptcy, delayed payments, or financial problems is less likely in these enterprises, because the government supports them. Less pressure on workers reduces the interest in organization. The other reason is that, the small sector of the aristocracy of labor that may exist in Iran’s economy, is employed in heavy industry. There is also more governmental control over large enterprises. . . . Another barrier is the Islamic labor council which continuously seeks influence. Don’t forget that, in addition to governmental mistreatment, severe pressure has been placed on the Vahed Bus Drivers Syndicate by the Islamic labor council. . .

DW: In order to sum up this discussion, let’s recall the determinant role of labor strikes in achieving victory in the [1979] Revolution and the determinant role of the oil workers in bringing the Pahlavi regime down to its knees.

MM: In order to respond to your question, I will refer you to unpublished research done by Dr. Ahmad Ashraf, to which I have had access. Based on this research, the working class and workers’ organizations in Iran embarked the ship of the revolution on its last stop. In contrast to what is commonly believed by many leftist intellectuals and especially intellectuals abroad, the working class was not the vanguard of the revolution. The group that embarked the ship of the revolution on its last stop, did not constitute all sectors of the working class. It was only the industrial working class. However, as the researchers state, once this group embarked the ship, it became the determinant in the victory of the revolution. . . .

Class and Labor in Iran: An Interview with Sohrab Behdad

2010-02-10T14:03:00.000-08:00

Translator’s Note: Sohrab Behdad and Farhad Nomani are the co-authors of Class and Labor in Iran: Did the Revolution Matter? (Syracuse University Press, 2006). Recently, Alborz, an Iran based site devoted to a critique of political economy, conducted an interview with Sohrab Behdad about the new Persian translation of this book. The interview was conducted by Kaveh Mozafari and Aidin Akhavan. Excerpts follow:

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Class and Labor in Iran after the 1979 Revolution
Source: http://www.alborznet.ir/Fa/ViewDetail.aspx?T=2&ID=265
Translated by Frieda Afary
Edited by Sohrab Behdad
. . .
Alborz: In your book, you refer to the economic crisis of the mid 1980s, the pressures of the war with Iraq and ultimately the death of the system’s charisma, as factors which led to the reversal of the process of involution and the beginning of deinvolution. [See pages 34-35 of Class and Labor in Iran where involution is described as a degeneration of market capitalism and deinvolution is described as a reconstruction of market capitalism—tr] Please say more about this transformation. What were the main forces which led to this change, and what forces opposed this change?

SB: Structural involution goes hand in hand with increasing poverty because it is highly inefficient. Despite the economic involution, during the first four years of the revolution, the income from the oil export(and the large reserve income from export which had remained from the years prior to the revolution) prevented Iran’s economy from collapsing. During these years, the rise in the price of oil and the rise in imports which resulted from it, prevented a massive decline in consumption and paid for the costly war with Iraq. However, this period did not last long. In 1985, the price of crude oil declined in the world market (from $30 per barrel in 1980 to $6 per barrel in 1985).
Iran’s oil income is its umbilical cord. From 1986 onward, the pressures of economic chaos and war increased. . . .The Islamic Republic had to change course. It accepted a cease-fire with Iraq. The project to “Islamicize the economy” was shut down. The call for creating a government of the oppressed was forgotten.

The period of economic liberalism was officially started when Hasehmi Rafsanjani was elected president in 1989. However, the matter was not so simple as taking sides with or against economic liberalism which led to economic deinvolution and the reconstruction of capitalism. Many of those who bore the burden of “economic moderation” [economic liberalism—tr] were the ones who had been forced to pay for the war and the structural involution. They were fed up. Workers lose their jobs during periods of economic crisis. They suffer a decline in their real income during periods of combating crises.

Alborz: The concept of “political functionaries, which you discuss in your book is very important in Iranian society. It demands more discussion. You refer to the traditional petty bourgeoisie, especially the bazaaris [merchants –tr] as the backbone of the government (political functionaries ) at the beginning of the revolution. How have the interests and social position of the political functionaries changed during the past 30 years? Do they still represent the interests of the petty bourgeoisies? What is their relationship to the Islamic Bonyads [foundations—tr] ? [ Hasn’t the increase in the power of the foundations led to a change in their class position? [On p. 37 of Class and Labor in Iran, the Islamic foundations are described in the following manner: “Ayatollah Khomeini chose to keep the confiscated properties as “public” entities and not as state enterprises. As such they were similar to religious endowments (waqf), not subject to state audit and control and only under the disposal of the Imam. Thus they became quasi or para-statal enterprises. They are often referred to as Bonyads”—tr] . . .

SB: Yes, the traditional petty bourgeoisie formed the backbone of the government. They (and their kin) took over the institutions of the state, the police, the management of governmental enterprises, revolutionary courts, and prisons. They became Revolutionary Guards, members of parliament, chief executive officers or ministers. One of the unique features of the Iranian Revolution was that the traditional petty bourgeoisie gained the levers of political power. This in turn clearly affected the political orientation and policies of the Islamic Republic during the first decade after the revolution.

However, the traditional petty bourgeoisie has not taken a vow to remain so. Many who had gained governmental power in this massive political-economic shift, did their best to take personal advantage of their status, even as they pretended to be pious and revolutionary. Without any fear of political danger, they became engaged in rent-seeking activities to grab a large chunk of the accumulated capital.

This group established a powerful network of large and powerful capitalists who were associated with governmental bureaucracy, the Bonyads, governmental enterprises, or belonged to a clique of influential clerics or clerics’ sons.

Clearly, they changed their class position. Furthermore, after the changes in 1989 and the election of Hashemi Rafsanjani to the presidency, the Islamic Republic was openly interested in the reconstruction of the capitalist economy of Iran. There was no longer the slogan of “down with dependent capitalism ” or any reference to “the rule of the oppressed .” The World Bank and the International Monetary Fund which were previously called the representatives of the “Great Satan,” were now consulted. Foreign investment became a wise policy, and “bloodsucking capitalists” became “job creators.”
. . .

Alborz: From your theoretical perspectives, the deinvolutionary trend began in the 1990s. As you describe, during this period, the employment opportunities for women and especially skilled women increased. You predict that in the coming years, the increase in women’s economic participation and the rise in the number of women seeking employment will be one of the main challenges. At the same time, the government is pursuing plans that push women back to being homemakers, wives and ultimately accepting traditional roles. Under these circumstances, how do you analyze the contradiction between these two processes?

SB: Standing in the way of women’s free and equal participation in Iran’s economic, political and social life is like standing in the way of sunrise. Those with political insight should have learned this fact from the 30 year experience of the Islamic Republic. During these three decades, Iranian women did not sit back. Wherever they could, they tried to take steps forward despite the numerous limitations. Clearly, the Islamic Republic has had to step back in some areas.

The first decade after the revolution was the most difficult for employed women. Many women were forced to leave their jobs and take refuge at home. As a result, the rate of women’s employment declined.

From the beginning of the second decade, the needs of the capitalist labor market during the period of deinvolution, along with increasing pressure from women for regaining their lost rights, created a wider field for women’s participation. Up to 1996, the year which ended our study, the rate of women’s economic participation and employment continued to increase. Our prediction was that this trend would continue.

Our preliminary investigations, reflected in an upcoming article, reveal that during the decade from 1996 to 2006, the rate of women’s economic participation has increased. However, their unemployment rate has also increased. Nevertheless, despite all the efforts to force women back into the home, the average marriage age and the fertility rate have decreased. The impressive gains made by women in higher education and the acquisition of scientific and technical skills, have made it increasingly difficult to prevent women’s free participation in the economy.

However, it is one thing to discuss the degree of women’s participation in the labor market, and another to address the nature of that participation. We have examined women’s labor based on social classes. In other words, which women have been able to move forward under these difficult circumstances, and in what areas have they been able to move forward? Which women have been marginalized? . . .We have devoted a long chapter of our book to the marginalization of women’s work . . .

Alborz: Based on the latest data in your book which refer to the year 1996, the working class constitutes 31% of the employed labor force. You say that a large portion of the working class is employed in construction, and mostly consists of unskilled workers. Please say more about the status of the working class. Is the Iranian working class fragmented ? How will the status of the working class be affected by the continuation of the trend toward deinvolution? Under these circumstances, how will the formation of workers organizations be affected?

SB: Yes, in 1996, only 31% (4.5 million) of Iran’s employed labor force consisted of laborers (working class). Among those, 69% were employed in the private sector, and the rest were in the public sector. Clearly the percentage of the working class in the employed labor force decreased from 40% in 1976 to 25% in 1986. After 1986, the increase in the number of working class members within the employed labor force, was a result of the economic deinvolution.

As we predicted in our book, the trend toward the proletarianization of the labor force (the move from petty bourgeois to wage laborer status) was slow in the decade 1986-1996. It only increased to the extent that the employed labor force increased.
A large percentage of the working class are unskilled. Furthermore, a large percentage of them work in very small enterprises. In 1996, the wage laborer to capitalist ratio was not even one to six.

Although there are a notable number of large capitalist enterprises, many capitalist firms in Iran employ only one or two wage laborers (so that the the average ratio of wage laborers in the private sector to capitalists would become only 6 to 1). As a result, not only is the working class fragmented, the capitalist class is even more fragmented.

On the other hand, the petty bourgeoisie which constituted 32% of the employed labor force in 1976 (99% of them were the traditional petty bourgeoisie), had increased to 40% of the employed labor force in 1986 (99% of them were the traditional petty bourgeoisie).

During the period of economic deinvolutin, the petty bourgeoisie partially lost its place and constituted 36% of the employed labor force. By 1996, five percent of them were the modern petty bourgeoisie. . .

Alborz: What is your evaluation of the current class structure of Iranian society? Is the class composition the same as that calculated for the year 1996? What has changed? How has the position of the working class changed, given your prediction that the entrance of the baby boom generation into the labor market will increase the size of the working class?

SB: Statistics from the three decades after the revolution show that during the first decade of the post-revolutionary economic crisis, important changes took place in Iran’s class composition. These changes are clearly visible in the 1986 census. This is part of the structural involution discussed earlier.

During the first decade after the revolution, we witnessed the growth of the petty bourgeoisie, the peasantization of agriculture, the deproletarianization of labor, and an increase in the number of political functionaries. Furthermore, the labor force became more traditional and more masculine (defeminization of labor). From the end of the 1980s, economic liberalization under Hashemi Rafsanjani and Khatami slowly (although timidly) pushed Iran’s economy toward the reconstruction of its capitalism.

The statistics show that the class composition of the labor force is moving toward its pre-revolutionary state. Although the working class has increased in number, it is still very fragmented. Many are unskilled and work in small firms. What I say about the working class in a way also applies to the capitalist class. They are also fragmented. They own small firms and work in traditional fields. Their situation is often not very different from the traditional petty bourgeoisie.

Although the large enterprises are few, the number of workers employed by them, especially in several large cities, is considerable. Many of these workers work for government enterprises such as the oil industry or public transportation, or are employed by enterprises owned by the Bonyads. We should also add that alongside the rise in the number of the unemployed who are mostly young and educated, the literacy rate among workers has increased. A considerable portion of the traditional petty bourgeoisie also consists of unemployed workers awaiting wage labor. They have become peddlers and have set up stands, but are in fact waiting to become wage laborers. . .

This interview was conducted in May 2009. It was published on December 24, 2009

Feminist Attorney, Shadi Sadr, Critiques Mehdi Karroubi’s Five-Point Plan

2010-01-22T17:19:00.001-08:00

Translator’s Note: On January 11, 2010, Mehdi Karroubi, one of the two reformist presidential candidates who have challenged the fraudulent June 2009 Iranian election, issued a statement in which he offered five ways for the Islamic Republic to exit the “current extensive crisis.” The next day, Shadi Sadr, feminist attorney and human rights activist, issued a critique which focused on the first point of Karroubi’s five-point plan. Large excerpts of this critique follow. For translations of other statements by Shadi Sadr, please see www.iranianvoicesintranslation.blogspot.com

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On the Meaninglessness of Forgiveness: A Critique of Mehdi Karroubi’s Five-Point Plan
Author: Shadi Sadr
Source: http://www.emruznews.com/ShowItem.aspx?ID=27395&p=1
Translated by Frieda Afary
January 12, 2010

. . . The call for investigating human rights violations and identifying their agents and perpetrators, which became a focal demand of the new people’s movement after the expose of the murders, tortures and rapes, has been completely ignored in Mousavi’s statement. [Reference to a statement and five-point plan issued by reformist opposition leader, Mir-Hossein Mousavi on January 1, 2010—tr]. Karroubi however, devotes the first point of his five-point plan to this subject.

According to Karroubi, the first solution is for “the oppressors to confess and repent and demand forgiveness from the people.” Employing the language and discourse used by Elm al-Hadi, the Friday Prayer Imam of the city of Mashhad, who calls the leaders of the revolt, “enemies of God,”(1) Karroubi asks those who have been oppressing the people, to repent. He considers repentance by the oppressors to be the first way to restore peace in the country. He writes: “Those who must repent are not the ones who offered martyrs for the realization of their right to vote. Those who must repent are the perpetrators of the acts of cruelty committed on Ashura Day and the events after the election [Ashura is a Shi’a day of mourning which was turned into a massive anti-government protest on December 27, 2009--tr]. Those who must repent are the ones who have put our country’s wealth up for auction, used other people’s money to give generous donations, and left the people in a state of poverty. Those who must repent are the ones who endorsed incompetent people, rejected competent individuals, deprived people of the right to choose, issued permits to change the votes of the people, and answered their protest with bullets. Those who must repent are the ones who deprived university students of an education and placed uneducated people in positions of authority. Repentance by the oppressors is the first way to restore peace in the country and console those who have lost loved ones. The people of Iran are not too demanding. They can forgive those who repent and confess to their crimes. However, they will not forget their oppressive acts. No one is interested in taking revenge. Revenge is not a remedy for the acts of cruelty already committed” (2).

Although Karroubi addresses the issue of “acts of cruelty” committed against the people, his analysis and especially the solution he offers, demand serious criticism . I will try to address some of these issues below:

1. Mr. Karroubi must certainly know better than I do, that “repentance” is a religious act which concerns the human being’s relationship to God. The “servant [of God—tr]” returns remorsefully to his God (3). Those who oppress the people however, must above all be answerable to the people who have been oppressed by them. Furthermore, suppose some oppressors confess to the fact that they have beaten innumerable victims, or tortured five people directly, or were involved in the murder of someone, or witnessed or ordered or committed rape. Now after committing all these acts which by any legal definition constitute crimes, they have repented and expect the people to forgive them.

First, what guarantee is there that the act of repentance has been thorough and exact? Secondly, what guarantee is there that the repentant individual will not break his/her vow? More importantly, what difference is there between forgiveness or lack of forgiveness when the lack of independent mechanisms for enforcing justice, allows all oppressive institutions or agents and perpetrators of human right violations, to continue to stay in power and remain in the position of not needing forgiveness or not having any concern about the lack of forgiveness on behalf of the victims. Forgiveness only means something when lack of forgiveness has meaning. In the absence of guarantees for enforcement, we can call repentance and forgiveness meaningless.

Another question remains: How can Mr. Karroubi be so sure that “the people of Iran” will forgive the repentant ones who have confessed to their crimes? Has he interviewed each and every one of the victims of brutality, torture, imprisonment and rape, and the relatives of those murdered in the streets and prisons? Is his general rule, backed by a comprehensive judicial investigation? Or is it simply that a “guardian jurisprudent” uses his political position as the owner of his “peasants” lives, property and honor, to represent the people’s demands without having asked them about their demands.

For example, would Neda Agha- Soltan’s mother or Sohrab Aarabi’s mother , forgive the agents and perpetrators of the crimes of their children, if they simply confess and repent? [ Neda Agha-Soltan who has become a symbol of the Iranian democratic opposition movement is known to most readers as a young female philosophy student who was shot dead by government forces at a mass protest following the fraudulent June 2009 election. Sohrab Aarabi was a young male student activist who was also killed by government forces in June 2009—tr.] If the mothers are willing to forgive, is the confession and repentance of the rapists whose names and faces are not known by their victims, an adequate permit for the rapists to walk safely and freely in the same streets that they have made unsafe for many others?

2. In the introduction to this statement, Karroubi writes: “Anyone who has dishonored Ashura is to be condemned. Clearly, those who commit such a crime should be investigated by a competent court. The offenders must be punished in accordance with the country’s laws.” However, Mr. Karroubi who believes in putting the violators of Ashura on trial, writes the following when it comes to those who have been victims of oppression: “No one is interested in revenge, and revenge will not remedy previous crimes committed against the people.” Just like that, he substitutes “revenge”-- a tribal method for restoring justice-- for punishment, a modern institution accepted by all human rights based systems. He does not even recognize the right of the victims to justice within the framework of the existing laws.

The following question arises: Does Mr. Karroubi distinguish between someone who hits or injures someone else in a brawl, and someone who injures a number of people at a demonstration? Is there a difference between a criminal who kills his creditor with a knife, and an oppressor who shoots demonstrators? If both of these actions are legally considered “assault” and “murder,” then why is it that members of the first group, i.e. common criminals, receive prison sentences and punishments in kind or the obligation to pay blood money, but oppressors do not? Enforcing punishment which is considered praiseworthy when applied to common criminals, turns into revenge which is considered abominable when applied to the oppressors In my opinion, there is a fundamental difference between these two groups of criminals. The first group consist of common people who have common motivations and often commit crimes accidentally or out of desperation. However they are judged and punished ruthlessly and without any sympathy. The second group consist of professional criminals who consciously and systematically violate basic human rights, and receive political, economic and social benefits as a result. Precisely for this reason, they should be more heavily punished than the first group.

Labeling the demand for the enforcement of justice, as “revenge seeking” or “extremism” constitutes a type of false reasoning that will have dangerous consequences. These consequences were not taken seriously when Taghi Rahmani, a nationalist-religious political activist published a note to the Mournful Mothers (4). [Reference to a group of mothers of opposition activists and political prisoners who have been holding weekly vigils at a park in Tehran. For more information in English, see http://mothersoflaleh.blogspot.com/ --tr.] The mothers had demanded “punishment for the perpetrators and agents of the murder and torture of their children.” . . . By equating the demand for justice and just trials, with brutality, Rahmani suppresses that demand and calls on the Mournful Mothers to “compromise” in order to end the violence. Now, once again, the suppression of this popular demand manifests itself in writing in Karroubi’s statement.

3. When many political and civil rights activists such as Karroubi and Taghi Rahmani, refer to revenge and the continuation of brutality, they seem to have in mind, the existing criminal justice system which is based on punishment in kind, i.e. a life for a life and an eye for an eye. This system is rooted in individual or tribal revenge-seeking. Based on this definition, the demand for justice, trials and punishment for the agents and perpetrators of human rights violations, is defined within the framework of the existing system which consists of execution, torture and amputation of body parts. Based on this inverted definition, the demand for justice leads to more crime, torture and brutality, and therefore, is to be condemned.

However, a look at similar experiences in other countries reveals that responding to continuous and systematic human rights violations, by establishing a justice-seeking process, is a pre-requisite for the realization of democracy and the only guarantee for stopping the cycle of violence. The following are all processes that have been tested and can lead a society to peace and non-violence: a social discourse concerning justice-seeking; the formation of truth-finding commissions to gain collective awareness of the reality of murder, rape and torture, and its effects on victims, their family and society; the establishment of open and public courts with objective standards for judgment.

Without these processes, “compromise,” “pardon” and “reconciliation” will only mean “covering over” and “obfuscation.” Even worse, this type of forgiveness or pardon, will never lead to reconciliation, because the oppressors will feel confident that they will be immune from search and punishment, regardless of the degree to which they violate the rights of the people and continue committing acts of brutality.

South Africa is one of the best and most vibrant examples of a national reconciliation process . . .Although we have not had this grand experience, we have learned from other nations. The responsibility of civil society activists is to learn from the successful experiences as well as defeats of other countries, in order to not let made-up interpretations of non-violence, render the people’s movement sterile. On the contrary, all of us have to do our best to prepare society for the following: Hearing the truth, however bitter; reconstructing collective-historic memory, however difficult; traversing the process of guaranteeing the prevention of systematic human rights abuses, however long. More than anything, we need to look at the mirror on a daily basis and stare ourselves in the eye and say: The demand for compromise and pardon from a mother who does not know where her child is buried or how she/he was killed, is in reality another act of suppression. Let us not forget that suppression and brutality are not only defined by truncheons that hurt the body.

1. www.farsnews.net/newstext.php?nn=8810091487
2. http://sahamnew.org/?p=226
3. Alameh Tabataba’i Al-Mizan fi tafsiri'l-Qur'an. Volume 4, p. 379.
4. http://www.autnews.de/node/4176

Statement by the Office for the Consolidation of Unity on the Large-Scale Arrests of University Students in Iran

2010-01-05T13:25:00.000-08:00

Translator’s note: The mass arrests of opposition activists during and after the December 27, 2009 protests, have included police attacks on university campuses in Tehran and Mashhad. In response, students at these universities have boycotted classes. Below are excerpts from a statement issued by the Office for the Consolidation of Unity, Iran’s largest student organization. A detailed article about the students currently in detention or serving prison terms is available in Persian on the website of Amir Kabir University Students(www.autnews.de/node/5688). For background information in English, see Farnaz Fassihi’s “Regime Wages a Quiet War on ‘Star Students’ of Iran” in the Wall Street Journal (http://online.wsj.com/article/SB126222013953111071.html)

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Murder, Beatings and Detentions Represent the Logic of Dictatorship
Source: http://www.autnews.de/node/5693
Translated by Frieda Afary
December 31, 2009

The university is an innocent land. One day it is attacked in the name of dictatorship. Another day, it is attacked in the name of religion. Revenge is being taken on the university because of its vibrant, consciousness-raising element.

Throughout Iran’s contemporary history, the university has been the most convenient location for military campaigns by representatives of dictatorship. The painful events of January 1961, July 1999, and the recurring attacks on university campuses in the catastrophic aftermath of the election this year, all confirm the tragic tale of the innocence of the university.[In January 1961, Shah Muhammad Reza Pahlavi’s army attacked Tehran University following a student strike. In July 1999, student protesters at Tehran University were brutally attacked by government forces—tr]

The bitter and painful news of brutal attacks on university students in Mashhad [a large city located in Northeastern Iran—tr], the large-scale arrests of university students around the country, and the arrests of journalists and political activists, can only reveal that the establishment is unstable and descending toward death.

In order to defend the powers that be, some are using the name of religion to target university campuses. In the name of Hossein, they are performing Yazid-like acts in Iran’s Karbala. [ Hossein was the grandson of prophet Muhammad. He was killed by the Umayyad Calif, Yazid, in Karbala, Iraq in 680 C.E.—tr] These acts represent the last nails in the coffin of this dictatorship. The statement, “If you are not with us, you are against us,” represents the dictatorial logic of Pharaoh and Yazid.

These are questions which we are putting to the conscience of our nation, a nation which is mourning the brutal murders of its children during the Ashura commemoration [December 27, 2009—tr].

The arrest of Ms. Bahareh Hedayat, the brave and honest spokesperson for the Office for the Consolidation of Unity, the living conscience of an independent and critical university, and the earlier arrest of Mehdi Arabshahi, national organizer for this student organization, mark the continuation of lawlessness and injustice.

Some hold the illusion that continuing the murders, arrests and threats can turn the expose of dictatorship into historical amnesia. The fact is that the element of consciousness-raising has already multiplied among millions of Iranians. Let the dictators know that the struggle for freedom will continue to the end. The story is reaching its end. . .

Public Relations,
Office for the Consolidation of Unity
December 31, 2009

The December 27, 2009 Protest and its Aftermath

2010-01-05T13:14:00.000-08:00

Translator’s note: On December 27, 2009, the democratic opposition movement’s commemoration of Ashura, a Shia day of mourning, turned into street-by-street battles in Tehran. Hundreds of thousands, including whole families, used stones, bricks and trash can fires to fight the heavily armed anti-riot police and guards. Over five hundred were arrested, 38 were killed and hundreds were injured. Since then over 2000 opposition activists have been arrested. Some have been charged as “enemies of God,” and face execution. The government also orchestrated a large counter-march in Tehran on December 30. Below are two brief assessments of the December 27 and the December 30 events. The first is by a young student who expresses the deep determination to challenge the regime’s brutality. The other is by a journalist and blogger who reveals that the government’s forces cannot be underestimated. For more information on the mass arrests of opposition activists, please see the English language website of the Committee of Human Rights Reporters ( http://www.schrr.net/index-en.php) and the website of the International Campaign for Human Rights in Iran (http://www.iranhumanrights.org/)

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I Detest Death
Author: Kamyab Giveh Key
Source: http://www.autnews.de/node/5694
Translated by Frieda Afary

December 31, 2009

. . . For a long time, university students have been the vanguard of resistance to the oppressive government. Now however, the people are fed up. Regardless of their job or age, they do not think silence is permissible any longer. During the recent demonstrations, we saw whole families participating in the protests. Those who saw this passion as a barrier to their dictatorial and totalitarian behavior, broke any restraint and created a bloody Ashura.

How can a government which claims to be Islamic, slaughter people during the month of Muharram? [In the Islamic calendar, Muharram is considered a sacred month in which fighting is prohibited –tr] . . .

After massacring our countrymen and women, the government once again assigned its media establishment to communicate the old scenario. This threadbare scenario which attributes all events to troublemakers, the U.S., Britain and their agents, is no longer considered believable by the people.

The government gathered all its communication strength to exaggerate its orchestrated demonstration on Wednesday [December 30, 2009 –tr]. It devoted more than 60 hours of television and radio programs to advertising its call for participation in this march. They forced all government office workers to participate. Even the Department of Science, Research and Technology issued a memorandum to order the universities to do everything necessary to facilitate the participation of all professors and students. They “recruited” high school students to perform acts in front of their cameras. They even brought people from other cities to Tehran . . .

These dictators consider themselves God’s representatives on earth. So much so that they even announce a deadline for those who wish to recant. They have carried shamelessness to such extremes that they encourage people to become informants. . .

The spirit of resistance to oppression gained by our people, no longer allows them to be silent in the face of injustice, murder and rape. . .

A Good Demonstration
Author: Arman Amiri
Source: http://divanesara2.blogspot.com/2009/12/blog-post_8491.html
Translated by Frieda Afary

December 30, 2009

I observed today’s gathering completely. . . It was a crowd of several hundred thousand (I reckon that 300,000 would be realistic) I have no doubt that it was one of the largest gatherings of the regime supporters. I cannot make a judgment as to where this crowd had come from. Here I would simply like to express several observations:

1. They were severely insulting Mousavi and then Khatami. However, their eyes glared with hatred only when they spoke of Hashemi Rafsanjani. . . They weren’t insulting Karroubi. They mainly made fun of him.

2. I have never liked to issue an undifferentiated judgment about a crowd. However, this time I will do so because my judgment is more realistic than ever. This crowd was “rootless.” Don’t take this as an insult. I’m not referring to a stigma but a painful condition. I saw many rootless slum dwellers. Many were still poor. Many others had thrived economically thanks to government subsidies and rent-seeking. However, from a cultural point of view, they were rootless. They did not believe in anything. On the surface, they were religious. However, upon the first encounter, you realized that they were not religious or traditional. They used truly “vulgar” language. Their behavior was shameless or obscene.

I have lived among traditional and religious families. They would never act in such a way. [Those in this crowd –tr] were wearing chadors or had beards but were lewd, and did not feel ashamed of laughing out loud during the commemoration of the death of Imam Hossein. They would be willing to trample on each other’s dead bodies in order to grab a bottle of milk or juice or a muffin. . .

3. The speaker became enraged at the participants and screamed, “Be quiet. I am making an argument.” That was very interesting to me. He was really trying to make an argument. They were really making an effort to base themselves on the statistics of the jurisprudents of the Council of Experts from twenty years ago, in order to prove that Khamenei was suitable for leadership. The speaker was definitely not trying to simply instigate people and use their excitement. It seemed to me that they have understood well that immediate excitement is no longer effective. The foundations of the regime are truly shaky. It needs “argumentation.” . . .

Marginal Observations:

. . . There were plenty of torn pictures of Khomeini, Khamenei, Chamran, Hemmat and Bakeri in the gutters and on the street. As the poet says: “No one gave a damn.”
[Mustafa Chamran was a former commander of Revolutionary Guards or Pasdaran, and a Defense Minister. Mohammad Ibrahim Hemmat and Hamid Bakeri were army commanders. All were killed during the Iran-Iraq War --tr]

Statement by Homosexual Students at Iran’s Universities

2009-12-24T20:26:00.000-08:00

Translator’s note: The formation of the new organization, “Homosexual Students at Iran’s Universities” is a courageous act. Below are large excerpts from a statement which this organization issued on the occasion of Students’ Day. For more information about queer organizing in Iran, please see “Twelve Men Face Execution for Sodomy in Iran” by Doug Ireland, published in Gay City News (http://gaycitynews.com/articles/2009/12/11/gay_city_news/news/doc4b2109624f65c652502853.txt). Please also contact Hossein Alizadeh, Middle East and North Africa Program Coordinator at International Gay and Lesbian Human Rights Commission (www.iglhrc.org).

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Statement by Homosexual Students at Iran’s Universities
Source: http://www.schrr.net/spip.php?article7232
Translated by Frieda Afary

December 6, 2009

This year’s commemoration of December 7, significantly differs in nature from previous years. This December 7 is being shaped anew, not as necessitated by the calendar, but as necessitated by conditions that have set the stage for protest movements.

We cannot stop still or go backward. We cannot commemorate this event in a routine way. Just as we gave new political meaning to Qods Day, and appropriated November 3, so our preservation of December 7 as a commemoration which belongs to the student movement, denudes this day of its official title in order to make it an event once again. [Qods day refers to September 18, a day designated by Ayatollah Khomeini as Jerusalem Day. November 3, refers to the anniversary of the take over of the U.S. Embassy in Tehran. This year, the Green Movement transformed both events into protests against the government and in defense of democracy and human rights –tr].

After five decades, the rise of a revolution, and the emergence of a people’s movement, December 7, the symbol of protest against a regime backed by the July 1953 coup, now confronts the June 12, 2009 coup [The July 1953 CIA-sponsored coup deposed the democratically elected government of prime minister Mohammad Mosaddeq, and returned Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi to power—tr] This year, the distinguishing factor is that the forces of the people are intertwined in the context of these [December 7] protests. Students are no longer starry-eyed in their socio-political struggle. Prior to the people’s protest against dictatorship and lawlessness under the Islamic Republic, students might have felt isolated in their opposition to dictatorship. Now, however, the student movement takes place in the context of a society which demands an end to dictatorship, and is untainted by superficiality and narrow-mindedness.

Due to the depth of social perception in the student body, and an extensive grasp of human rights and civil rights, student demands are now linked to women’s demands on the one hand and workers’ demands on the other. This dual link has been achieved not only on the basis of theoretical knowledge but also on the basis of practical experience.

On the other hand, the student movement includes the demands of homosexuals. These demands represent a transgression of deeply rooted cultural boundaries which impede social tolerance.

The presence of minorities within the student body, limits the possibility of monopolization. . . . Students who may have different names, are part of the people. Their multiple presence on a variety of fronts continues to shake the weak foundation of the regime and challenges its security. The student movement is not green throughout. It also includes other colors. However, the breadth of the instinctual drive for equality among the people of the Green Movement, has compelled other colors to accommodate to it. We hope that the social right to self-determination of a people who wish to live within the framework of human rights and not any type of ideological dictatorship, will be placed in the hands of the people themselves. The students will not monopolize December 7.

Similar to years prior to the June 12 election, students constitute the largest number of those murdered, arrested and tortured . . . December 7, 2009 is equated with December 7, 1953 in order to transcend it and move from protesting the coup to determining the fate of democracy in Iran. In order to create a society in which everyone is free to move safely in her/his direction, we need to be together. On December 7, let us comprehend that freedom for the majority can only exist when minorities are safe. Let us be together.

Homosexual Students at Iran’s Universities, publish their third statement on the occasion of a December 7 commemoration which might signify the last gasps of a coup-backed government.

Considering that a significant number of university students are also queers, and considering that the active part of the queer community in Iran consists of university students and university graduates, it is not too late to correct the intolerant and inappropriate drafts of the constitution, in order to guarantee that the perspectives of the representatives of the Green Movement do not fall short of the perspectives of the rank and file of the people’s movement.[The authors of this statement do not cite the specific drafts to which they refer. A draft presented by the “Lawyers of the Iranian People’s Green Movement” does recognize the rights of people regardless of gender, religion, nationality and race, but makes no mention of sexual orientation—tr. The Persian text can be viewed online at http://greenlawyers.wordpress.com/2009/11/08/constitution-1/ A brief summary in English is available at http://persian2english.wordpress.com/2009/10/23/unity-proposal-for-democratization-of-iran-]

Another milestone achieved by this year’s December 7 commemoration was the student body’s deep comprehension of the concept of human rights. It is crucial to remind the readers that the student movement and the women’s movement have captivated a larger portion of Iranian society because these movements are more tolerant and think more deeply.

At a time when two human rights organizations in Iran --which consist of students-- have been courageous and forthright in taking up the rights of minorities and especially sexual minorities who have been excluded from civil rights protection, the representatives of the Green Movement who are devising the outlines of the new constitution, avoid mentioning the rights of minorities. If we do not pay attention, the first opportunity for correcting the defects of the constitution will lead not to reform but to a future imprisoned by prejudice and exclusion.

On the eve of December 7, and at a time when the Green Movement of the people has come to signify fresh air for a repressed society, students who give their all to this movement, do so to make sure that the passion for life is not crushed under the boots of dictatorship.

Homosexual Students at Iran’s Universities who have not been promised any share of political power or fame, would like to send a message to the Green Movement in the spirit of solidarity and kinship. The demands of the people, rooted only in the necessity to abide by human rights and civil rights, are greater than all the demands which the leaders of the Green Movement utter in honor of the [1979 –tr] revolution.

Mr. Karroubi and Mr. Mousavi, Mrs. Rahnavard, students and families, on this December 7, keep the Green Movement dynamic by making a statement about the human rights demands of all the people of Iran. The movement needs more than the blood of the youth to survive. The movement needs a timely declaration of its exact, explicit, and human rights-based demands, in order to defend your lives and your social rights. Let us all be together.

Homosexual Students at Iran’s Universities

For Freedom and Equality

December 2009

Majid Tavakoli Becomes a Symbol of a Growing Student Movement

2009-12-13T20:59:00.000-08:00

Majid Tavakoli, an Iranian student leader who had been imprisoned twice for his defense of human rights, was violently arrested on December 7 after he gave a speech at a gathering of students at Amir Kabir University (Tehran) to commemorate Students’ Day. Three years earlier in December 2006, he had been among students who protested Ahmadinejad’s speech at Amir Kabir University and called him “ a source of prejudice and corruption.” This year, Tavakoli was speaking to Amir Kabir students in the midst of student demonstrations throughout the country. Below are excerpts from two articles which defend Tavakoli and address the meaning of the Iranian government’s claim that he was arrested while dressed in a woman’s hijab. The first article is by Mujtaba Saminejad, a journalist, human rights activist and blogger. The second is by Shakiba Shaker Hosseini, a young feminist activist.

Majid Tavakoli Is Not Afraid. The Fearful Are Those Hiding Under One Cover
By Mujtaba Saminejad
Source: http://www.madyariran.net/?p=3069
Translated by Frieda Afary

December 10, 2009

. . . The coup leaders are very worried today. The more time elapses, the stronger and more widespread the Iranian people’s protest movement becomes. The coup leaders’ illusion about the degeneration of this movement is weakening.

The media that have backed the coup, also support the murderers of the Nedas and the Sohrabs in Iran. They defend the Yemeni and Lebanese and Afghani Taliban terrorists. . . These media are crying out about the connection between a student activist and terrorist groups. . .

Majid Tavakoli has been arrested several times. He spent months at the Evin prison under the most severe psychological and physical torture. First he was arrested when the Basijis [militia –tr] who are supported by Keyhan and the Pars New Agency [a newspaper and a press agency that support Ayatollah Khamenei—tr.] published and distributed a publication which insulted religious beliefs which the Basijis promote and represent in the name of God. They accused Majid Tavakoli and other students at Amir Kabir Polytechnic, of having issued this publication. After 15 months of imprisonement, Majid and the other students were exonerated by the court. Those who had issued the publication were discredited.

Majid’s second arrest took place at the cancelled memorial meeting for Mr. Bazargan [reference to Mehdi Bazargan who was the first prime minister after the 1979 Revolution—tr.] . He was subjected to psychological and physical torture for 115 days at the Evin prison once again. . .

Keyhan and the Pars New Agency are experts at fraud and falsification. That is whey they support the coup-promoting government. They report that Majid was afraid as he was attempting to flee [Amir Kabir University—tr.]. They liken him toBani Sadr who put on women’s clothing in order to escape.[Reference to Abolhassan Bani Sadr, the first president after the 1979 Revolution. Bani Sadr fled the country in 1981 –tr.]

But who is afraid? Majid Tavakoli and the student activists or those who beat women, girls and elderly women in the head to prevent them from chanting slogans or forming gatherings? Who is afraid? Those students who courageously stand in front of the truncheons, tear gas and the violent Basijis and security forces, or those who create a security barrier around the university to prevent people from witnessing their crimes? . . . The fearful are those increasingly in denial about the growing flames of the protest movement.

Tavakoli Carries the Weight of the Humiliation Suffered by Iranian Women
By Shakiba Shaker Hosseini
Source: www.autnews.es/node/4955
Translated by Frieda Afary

December 11, 2009

. . . The story of Majid Tavakoli is the story of centuries of women’s oppression in Iran. He and his fellow activists in this movement are jointly experiencing the bitter taste of this oppressive attitude. This is an attitude that reveals the humiliation of the perpetrators and not the victims.

This event clearly reflects the thought of those who view women and all things associated with women in a humiliating manner. In Iran, the Hijab has been considered a “mandatory honor” and a great deal more than a question of volition or choice. Now it is being used as a sign of humiliation. They [the authorities –tr] dress Tavakoli in women’s clothing and take his picture, and think that they have humiliated him. . .

The bearers of pathological thoughts and images about women, get excited about dressing a student member of the Office for the Consolidation of Unity, in women’s clothing! However, Majid Tavakoli and other men who have experienced this injustice, have now gained an intimate and true understanding of what women are forced to bear. This intersubjective comprehension will make Iran’s progressive movement more united.

The violence, suppression and the arrest of dissidents, regardless of their attire, is to be condemned. The creation of terror and fear among citizens reveals the face of a system that is using fear to stay in power. Under these circumstances, the spectacle of citizens who are willing to do anything in order to not be caught, exposes the violent behavior of the oppressors.
. . . Once again look at those unbelievable pictures. Could any other image express the bitterness and humiliation of the compulsory hijab with such clarity?

Socialists Inside Iran Differ on the Green Movement

2009-12-13T20:53:00.000-08:00

Recently, Alborz, an Iran-based site devoted to a critique of political economy, has published articles which represent differing views among socialists inside Iran concerning the future of the Green Movement. Below are excerpts from two articles which represent some of these differing views.

The “Green Insurrection:” From Dream to Reality
Author: Mohammad Gharagozloo
Source: http://www.alborznet.ir/Fa/ViewDetail.aspx?T=2&ID=241
Translated by Frieda Afary
November 19, 2009

. . . In the first few weeks after the [June 12, 2009] election, many appropriated the color green and chanted slogans which insisted on the cancellation of the election results and called for a new election. Now however, the protest movement has taken a different direction. Starting from the July 16 Friday Prayer to [the September 18 ] Jerusalem Day and November 3, the appearances and the slogans of the protesters --even the ones dressed in green –have not matched the primary and secondary goals of the green insurrection and its election-time leaders. . .

Let us grant that there is a green insurrection whose class hegemony (political, economic, social and cultural) is in fact under the control of the two protesting reformist candidates. In an article entitled, “Are the Economically Impoverished Among the Forces of the Green Movement?”(http://www.alborznet.ir/Fa/ViewDetail.aspx?T=2&ID=237) Mohammad Maljoo correctly points out that during the 16 years of their participation in the leadership of the fifth through the eighth government, these candidates have been economically “market-oriented”

Everyone knows that the neo-liberal plan called “economic transformation” or “targeted monetary subsidies”[reference to the current government’s plan to phase out existing subsidies on basic goods and gas --tr.] which is now being placed as the first item on the agenda of the tenth government and the eight parliament, is a proposal made by the World Bank. The main preparatory steps were implemented through the “economic modification” plan of the fifth and sixth governments under the name of economic development. These steps were continued by the reformist governments. . .

Mohammad Maljoo’s emphasis in the aforementioned article is quite true and objective: “The economically impoverished have not benefited from the economic actions of either side of the June 12 dispute.” In their debates, speeches and half-baked electoral promises, the two reformist candidates have not proposed any article or amendment through which any “favor” is done for the working and the economically impoverished classes. . .

My question for Mr. Maljoo is the following: Based on what material evidence is he so optimistic about the future of the liberals as to write: “At a time when the economic policies of the hurried tenth government do not promise economic growth or social justice, perhaps the political elite of the green movement would have the unique opportunity to not repeat their past calamitous actions concerning the economically impoverished, but instead take up a justice-seeking discourse to officially call on the working classes and the urban poor to join the growing ranks of the Greens. The most important barrier to such a call is the domination of the market-oriented economic discourse among extensive numbers of the political elite of the Green Movement.”

Mr. Maljoo must certainly know that in order to change the direction of the economy from the free market or the closed market (capitalism in any form) , to a “justice-seeking economic discourse to defend the working and urban impoverished classes,” or what I would call a socialist mode of production and the abolition of the sale of labor power, the decision-making body cannot be the “political elite of the Green Movement.” . . .

A Critique of the Perspectives of Mohammad Gharagozloo:
From Repeating Cliches to Understanding Cliches
Author: Yassir Azizi
Source: http://alborznet.ir/Fa/ViewDetail.aspx?T=2&ID=243
Translated by Frieda Afary
November 22, 2009

. . . I wish this proclaimed leftist, who happens to be a true representative (based on being on the left side of the spectrum and not based on his correct thinking) had as much sense as one of the liberal candidates, to comprehend that “the color green has turned into a fluid signifier.”(Statement from Mir-Hossien Mousavi in a post-election speech to a group of university professors) Therefore, this signifier does not represent any particular signified or concept. Having said this, let’s move on to the heart of the issue.

1. The Unity of Theory and Practice

“It is not enough that thought strive to actualize itself; actuality must itself strive toward thought.”
Karl Marx. A Contribution to the Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right

Any reflection on Marx’s thought and his methodology clearly shows that theory to him is not an abstraction from reality. If it were, he would have never ended his Theses on Feuerbach with the historic statement which challenges the official role of philosophers: “Philosophers have interpreted the world in different ways. The point is to change it.”

For Marx, the unity of theory and practice was the most important and the best way to achieve the change that he called for. But a change in what? Changing the world to Marx meant changing the reality around you. To be changed, that reality has to be comprehended first. Then that cognition, as theory, becomes concomitant with and coordinated with objective and conscious practice. It is the lack of such [a concept] that Marx criticized among his predecessors whom he called “utopian socialists.”

He called the likes of Fourier, Owen and others, “utopian” not simply because they sufficed themselves with giving sermons and did not engage in objective action. He called them utopian because of their defective comprehension of reality. . .

Simply drawing up a plan and posing a singular paradigm for action which is not in harmony with the present pulse of history, only strengthens the mental capacities of those who are tourists in the world of theories and not the efforts of those who want to step forward in the rough trails of social reality.

2. The Origin of Today’s Movement

“To be radical is to grasp matters at the root. But for the human being the root is the human being herself/himself.”
Karl Marx. A Contribution to the Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right.

Regardless of the interpretations which call it a middle-class movement, the present people’s movement in Iran is a manifestation of the unity of theory and practice. Leftists such as the one discussed, offer an insufficient analysis. This movement’s material and social form is not that of a working-class movement with a limited conceptual definition, but a middle-class movement which is supported by large sectors of the lower classes. At this sensitive historical moment, based on its experiences and its real sense perception, this movement has found itself preoccupied with political practice. This position is not defective from the standpoint of Marxist theory. In fact, it is based on comprehending reality and transforming it into a theory of action. . .

Of course I believe that a socialist has to clarify her/his horizon, general position and distinctions. Nevertheless, there can be a balance between grand goals, the realization of which seems further on the horizon, and actions with results which may make life a little easier. . .

No one can claim to be a leftist and not have the benefits of the impoverished classes and specifically the working class in mind. . . .We have to ask where the majority of workers in our society—those who have “nothing to lose but their chains” according to Marx—stand as far as the levels of general consciousness and self-consciousness are concerned. The lack of support for the present movement and its slogans, on the part of a spectrum of the impoverished, does not seem to arise from a class standpoint. Rather, realistically, it arises from their lack of consciousness and their having been co-opted by parts of the ruling ideology on the one hand and their being deceived by the donations of the ninth government, on the other . . .

Carefully examining the existing realities of society and the direction which the “Revolutionary Guard” has taken in expropriating the economy and transforming the form of Iran’s economy into a type of “military rule of capital,” should illuminate the challenge which the majority of the unemployed face in their struggle. Given the current situation in which hiring is shifting toward using the members of the Basij (militia --tr) and consequently those who pass the ideological test, we need to pay additional attention to comprehending what position workers would take.

Put Human Rights Defense on Par with Nuclear Safety Concerns, says Feminist Attorney, Shadi Sadr

2009-11-28T19:00:00.000-08:00

On November 9, 2009, Shadi Sadr, a young feminist attorney and journalist received the "Dutch Human Rights Defenders Tulip" for her work in Iran. In her acceptance speech she wrote: "As long as the issue of human rights is not raised at least in a parallel way to the nuclear issue at all levels of political and economic negotiations with the Iranian government, and sanctions and other possible guarantees of action do not include both areas, one cannot accept that some real effort has been made to stop the violation of the rights of Iranian citizens." The English translation of her speech is reprinted below. For more information on Shadi Sadr and for a translation of her article on the rapes of young women protesters imprisoned after the forged June 2009 election, see http://iranianvoicesintranslation.blogspot.com/2009_08_01_archive.html

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Acceptance speech by Ms Shadi Sadr, winner of the 2009 Human Rights Defenders Tulip
Source for Persian original:
http://news.gooya.com/politics/archives/2009/11/096096.php

Source for English Translation:
http://www.minbuza.nl/en/News/Newsflashes/2009/November/2009_Human_Rights_Tulip_presented_to_Iranian_Shadi_Sadr/Acceptance_speech_by_Ms_Shadi_Sadr_winner_of_the_2009_Human_Rights_Defenders_Tulip

Translator Unknown

Jury of the Human Rights Tulip Award,
Your Excellency Foreign Minister of Holland

Ladies and Gentlemen

I am greatly honoured that the jury of the Human Rights Tulip Award has found me worth of receiving this year’s award and given me the opportunity to speak about the situation of women’s rights in Iran, the dire needs of people in Iran and also their expectations from the international community. You have all seen pictures and videos of people’s protests in the aftermath of this year’s presidential elections. You have seen how women, particularly young girls, have been at the forefront of all protests. They challenged the stereotype image of Iranian woman which was often imagined in veil or passive around the world. Neda, the young girl who was shot and murdered in demonstrations, quickly became a symbol for the struggles of Iranian people for freedom and democracy. To me, however, the active and determining role of women was not shaped only through images and videos. I had seen the leadership of women on the streets and the most lasting images I have in mind go back to the 9 th of July this year.

On this day, large crowds of people took to the streets of Tehran on the 10 th anniversary of the suppression of student protests of 1989. Demonstrations were about to end and as usual, violence and attacks were increasing by the minute. Along with a number of the demonstrators, to get away from pepper gas which was thrown into the crowd by security forces, I had to run into a city bus, while I was badly coughing from the effects of tear gas. A few stops away from there, when coughs were less disturbing, a political debate began among the people on the bus. Young women, who had broken the gender segregation rule on public buses and had found seats in the male area of the bus, were leading the debate. I asked loudly and with suprise, “Anyone from the gentlemen? They are all quiet!” Instead of someone from among men, a young girl who was dressed in black said, “Men had better be quiet now. Thirty years ago, they made this revolution and we have now seen its result. They had better be quiet now and let us do our job! This revolution is our revolution, women’s revolution!”

Here, I would like to pose this question: who are these women, who simply speak about a revolution of women, those whose images you have seen and I hope you have not forgotten? Who are they? And why do they fight so bravely for freedom and democracy?

Many of these young women have been born after the 1979 revolution or they have been young kids in the early days of the revolutions; they are completely products of an ideological system, which has had the monopoly of power in Iran for thirty years. Apart from having to suffer the lack of political freedoms and democracy like men, they also have to accept rules of compulsory veil, live with family laws which put them under the guardianship of men, seek the consent of their fathers for marriage, the right of getting a divorce and they are often deprived of the guardianship of their children. These are the same women who will be flogged in they have relationships other than in a marriage and if they are married women, an extra-marital relationship may lead to being stoned. These are the same women that Ahmadinejad’s government wants to minimise their role in universities and the labour market and make them stay at home and be isolated with fundamentalist policies which is now even more restrictive than the past 30 years.

In the past thirty years, Iranian women have gone through the highest level of suppression and pressure in their personal and social lives and have sustained the most damage of all from the ruling system. Under such circumstances, it is obvious that they are the unhappiest and the angriest citizens who do not have much to lose. If they are arrested today because of attending demonstrations for democracy, they have been arrested before for attending gatherings in defence of women’s rights and they have gone to prison for it. If they are raped today by security forces, they have felt this rape on their body and their soul for thirty years in the violation of their rights and their human dignity. Given all these facts, do we still have to ask why, today, women are at the forefront of the struggles of Iranian people?

At the beginning of my talk, I said I hope you have not forgotten the images of the protests of Iranian people against the violation of human rights and the absence of freedom and democracy.

However, let me be honest and tell you that I concerned. I am concerned that these images and these struggles may be forgotten. Yes, if violation of human rights in Iran does not face any resistance or repercussions and if these struggles are not defended in a concrete way, the Iranian people have the right to tell us you have forgotten us. My concern becomes even much deeper when I see that the western media is becoming less and less concerned about the violation of human rights in Iran and even politicians are not better than the media.

Unfortunately, forgetting the thousands who were arrested and tortured in prisons, the hundreds who were killed and the unknown number of prisoners who were raped are killed in detention is a real concern. The fact is that in Iran, while on the one hand people’s struggles and protests are still powerful and living and on the other hand , violation of human rights continues in a systematic way in all spheres, from women’s rights to freedom of gatherings, from rights of prisoners to freedom of speech, it appears that European nations and states are beginning to forget what they witnesses in Iran this summer. It is my conviction that by forgetting these realities, western governments not only forget their own responsibility which has been defined as countries who uphold human rights, but they are also putting in jeopardy the interests of their own state and their own citizens by forgetting these events.

They sit at the same table of negotiations with Ahmadinejad in the capacity of a legitimate president and the only item on the agenda of these negotiations is the issue of nuclear energy, as if none of these events had happened in Iran and as if none of the disasters which we see today keep occurring in Iran. On the level of international politics, everything is business as usual with the Islamic Republic like before the events of this summer. Even when there is talk of sanctions against Iran, sanctions are considered in the face of Iran’s advancements in the area of nuclear technology, as if no one sees the day to day violation of the basic rights of Iranian citizens by the Iranian government. Human rights is a universal issue and if one state claims to be supporting human rights, this claim brings about responsibilities with it . Ignoring these responsibilities, not only subjects Iranian people to further and wider suppression, but it also has long term repercussion for the citizens of countries who consider themselves defenders of human rights, because just in the same way that human rights is universal, fundamentalism as one of the greatest enemies of human rights has also become universal and global. Silence, toleration and recognition of a fundamentalist government that violates the rights of women, dissidents and minorities result in the enhancement and the export of global fundamentalism. We can already see symptoms of it even on this side of the borders: Holland is one of the societies which is now dealing with the issue of religious fundamentalism as a social and political problem..

In the latest demonstration of the Iranian people against the government which was held last week, a large number of people and this time, women more than before, were attacked, beaten up and abused by security guards. Women were wounded, arrested and among them were a large number of political activists such as Vahideh Mowlavi, a women’s rights activist , were violently arrested. In these demonstrations, people were chanting the slogan: “Obama! Obama! You are either with us or with them!” The slogan clearly implies that right before the eyes of the people who are now fighting for freedom, democracy and human rights in Iran, one cannot sit at a negotiation table with a dictatorial government to speak about nuclear energy or economic contracts and talk about concrete conditions and at the same time, criticise the state of human rights in Iran through political statements which have no actual guarantee to be put into action. Demonstrators are overtly challenging Obama to clarify his position towards the struggles of the Iranian people and they have the same expectation from European governments.

As a women’s rights activist who comes from the heart of the struggles of the people, I am here in The Hague, in Holland – the city which is the seat of the International Criminal Court for addressing crimes against humanity – to speak of two dire needs of the movement of the Iranian people. These needs and necessities will not be realised unless western governments take responsibility. First, it is necessary that the issue of human rights in Iran remains on the table of negotiations alongside the issue of nuclear energy with equal significance. As long as the issue of human rights is not raised at least in a parallel way to the nuclear issue at all levels of political and economic negotiations with the Iranian government and sanctions and other possible guarantees of action do not include both areas, one cannot accept that some real effort has been made to stop the violation of the rights of Iranian citizens.

The second necessity is that all those involved and all those who have ordered the widespread and systematic violation of human rights in the Islamic Republic of Iran should be prosecuted and tried. It is true that Iran, like many other violators of human rights, has not ratified the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, but western governments, including the Dutch government, as the host of the International Criminal Court, can ask the UN Security Council to pursue the issue of crimes against humanity through setting up an international court for Iran. Let us not forget that a global issue can only be dealt with through a global action.

Thank you.

Last Statement by Kurdish Activist, Ehsan Fattahian

2009-11-22T19:45:00.000-08:00

On November 11, 2009, Ehsan Fattahian, a young Kurdish activist and political prisoner was executed in Sanandaj, Iran. He had been arrested in July 2008 and imprisoned for his association with Komalah, a Kurdish opposition group which considers itself Marxist. His execution was carried out by the Iranian government despite expressions of protest inside and outside Iran. The English translation of Fattahian's last statement is being reprinted from the official website of the Iranian Green Movement. My corrections have been interpolated in square brackets. For more information about Fattahian's case, please see the article, "What Happened to Ehsan Fattahian?" in Tehran Bureau (http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/tehranbureau/2009/11/what-happened-to-ehsan-fattahian-the-kurdish-activist.html)

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Last Statement by Ehsan Fattahian
Source:
http://english.mowjcamp.com/article/id/63515

http://www.hra-news.org/news/8677.aspx

Translator Unknown

Last ray of sun at sunset/

is the path that I want to write on/

The sound of leaves under my feet/

say to me: Let yourself fall/

and only then you find the path to freedom./

I have never been afraid of death, even now that I feel it closest to me. I can sense it and I'm familiar with it, for it is an old acquaintance of this land and this people. I'm not writing about death but about justifications for death, now that they have translated it to restoring justice and freedom, can one be afraid of future and destiny? "We" who have been sentenced to death by "them," were working to find a small opening to a better world, free of injustice, are "they" also aware of what they are working towards?

I started life in city of Kermanshah, the city that my country people consider grand, the birthplace of civilization in our country. I soon noticed descrimination and oppression and I felt it in the depth of my existence, this cruelty, and the "why" of this cruelty and trying to resolve it made me come up with thousands of thoughts. But alas, they had blocked all the roads to justice and made the atmosphere so repressive that I didn't find any way to change things inside, and I migrated to another resort: "I became a pishmarg [armed Kurdish fighter or literally "one who faces death"] of Koomaleh," the temptation to find myself and the identity that I was deprived of made me go in that direction. Although leaving my birthplace was difficult but it never made me cut ties with my childhood hometown. Every now and then I would go back to my first home to revisit my old memories, and one of these times "they" made my visit sour, arrested and imprisoned me. From that first moment and from the hospitality (!!) of my jailers I realized that the tragic destiny of my numerous [comrades] also awaits me: torture, file building, closed and seriously influenced court, an unjust and politically charged verdict, and finally death...

Let me say it more casually: after getting arrested in town of Kamyaran on 29/4/87 [July 19, 2008]and after a few hours of being a "guest" at the information office of that town, while handcuffs and a blindfold took away my right to see and move, a person who introduced himself as a deputy of the prosecutor started asking a series of unrelated questions that were full of false accusations (I should point out that any judicial questioning outside of courtroom is prohibited in the law). This was the first of my numerous interrogation sessions. The same night I was moved to the information office of Kurdestan province in city of Sanandaj, and I experienced the real party there: a dirty cell with an unpleasant toilet with blankets that had probably not seen water in decades! From that moment my nights and days passed in the interrogation offices and lower hallway under extreme torture and beatings and this lasted three months. In these three months my interrogators, probably in pursuit of a promotion or some small raise, came up with strange and false accusations against me, which they better than anyone knew how far from reality they were. They tried very hard to prove that I was involved with an armed attempt to overthrow the regime. The only charges they could pursue was being a part of "Koomaleh" and advertising against the regime. The first "shobe" [branch] of Islamic republic court in Sanandaj found me guilty of these charges and gave me 10 years sentence in exile in Ramhormoz prison. The government's political and bureaucratic structure always suffers from being centralized, but in this case they tried to de-centralize the judiciary and gave the powers to re-investigate (appeal?) the crimes of political prisoners, even as high as death penalties, to the appeal courts in Kurdestan province. In this case [Kamyaran's city attorney] appealed the verdict by the first court and the Kurdestan appeals court changed my verdict from 10 years in prison to death sentence, against the Islamic republic laws. According to section 258 of “Dadrasi Keyfari” law [criminal justice law], an appeals court can increase the initial verdict only in the case that the initial verdict was less than minimum punishment for the crime. In my case, the crime was “Moharebeh” (animosity with God), which has the minimum punishment of one year sentence, and my verdict was a 10 year sentence in exile, clearly above the minimum. Compare my sentence to the minimum sentence for this crime to understand the unlawful and political nature of my death sentence. Although I also have to mention that shortly before changing the verdict they transferred me from the main prison in Sanandaj to the interrogation office of the Information Department and requested that I do a video interview confessing to crimes I have not committed, and say things that I do not believe in. In spite of a lot of pressure I did not agree to do the video confession and they told me bluntly that they will change my verdict to death sentence, which they shortly did, and demonstrated how the courts follow forces outside of judiciary department. So should they be blamed??

A judge has been sworn to stay fair in every situation, at all times and towards every person and look at the world from the legal perspective. Which judge in this doomed land can claim to has not broken this [oath]and has stayed fair and just? In my opinion the number of such judges is less than fingers on one hand. When the whole judicial system of Iran with the suggestion of an interrogator (with no knowledge of legal matters), arrests, tries, imprisons and executes people, can we really blame the few judges of a province which is always repressed and discriminated against? Yes, this house is ruined from its foundations...

This is in spite of the fact that in my last visit with my prosecutor he admitted that the death sentence is unlawful, but for the second time they gave me the notice for carrying out the execution. Needless to say that this insistence on carrying a death sentence under any circumstance is the result of pressure from security and political forces from outside of the judiciary department. [The people who belong to these circles] look at life and death of political prisoners only from the point of view of their paychecks and political needs, nothing else matters to them other than their own goals, even if it is about the most fundamental right of other human beings, their right to live. Forget international laws, they completely disregard even their own laws and procedures.

But my last words: If in the minds of these rulers and oppressors my death will get rid of the “problem” called Kurdestan [the province], I should say, what an illusion. Neither my death nor the death of thousands like me will be remedy to this incurable pain and perhaps would even fuel this fire. Without a doubt, every death points to a new life.

Ehsan Fattahian

Sanandaj Central prison

17/8/1388
(November 8, 2009)

The Poor Face a Logjam in the Labyrinths of Work

2009-10-31T13:10:00.000-07:00

Translator’s Note: The official unemployment rate in Iran stands at 18%. Unofficial rates however are as high as 40%. The official minimum wage is $263 per month, and the legal working day should not exceed 8 hours or a total of 44 hours for 5.5 days. (1) Many of the unemployed have no choice but to accept lower wages and longer working hours. Below are large excerpts from a report by the reformist Iranian Labor News Agency, which describes the types of jobs, wages and working hours that unemployed Iranians are forced to accept.

For more information about poverty in Iran and about the history of the Iranian Labor News Agency, please see my translator’s note to the article entitled “Poverty Line: A ‘Hoax?” (2)
1) http://www.khabaronline.ir/news-19323.aspx
2) http://iranianvoicesintranslation.blogspot.com/2009/10/poverty-line-in-iran-hoax.html

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The Poor Face a Logjam in the Labyrinths of Work

Author: Unknown

Source: http://ilna.ir/newsText.aspx?id=84390

Translated by Frieda Afary

October 21, 2009

When you get lost in the commotion of the city, it is only the workers who can show you extreme pain and expose you to the unsavory smell of life. Believe me, this is true. Given the current Iranian economy, being a worker is very difficult. It permanently exposes you to the bitter taste of life.

Of course the road is open to everyone. Anyone who is unemployed can experience what it is like to be a worker for a while. In this city [Tehran –tr.] there are jobs that await the unemployed.

These are jobs that are not covered by labor laws, insurance and the minimum wage, i.e. issues which continue to be the subject of a battle between workers and employers. These are neither underground and illegal jobs offered unbeknownst to the government, nor part-time jobs for which wages and benefits do not fall under the government’s jurisdiction. These are jobs advertised daily in the job advertisement pages of Tehran’s morning newspapers. Job seekers search them in the hope of finding a job. Perhaps hundreds of managers and employed people glance at them without any interest.

Job seekers however, continue to dial eight-digit telephone numbers. Upon discovering that wages and benefits are not even at the minimum level, they hang up and test their fortune again by trying another job advertisement. If a long search for work, forces them to forego the minimum wage and health insurance requirements, they join all the other job seekers who have given up on the minimum wage. They obtain the employer’s address and fill out the job application without any hope.

All of this in order to work from 8 a.m. to 6 p.m. at a clothes packaging workshop in exchange for $180 to $200 per month, or in order to work at a similar workshop, where justice is slightly more observed as it concerns worker’ wages, and where they can work for ten hours a day and earn $220 per month, with the hope of getting health insurance after a year.

It is not only the packaging companies that reveal this lack of regard for the rights and benefits of workers. Sales clerks at clothing stores, cosmetic stores and medical equipment stores, and in general all sales clerks are not exceptions to the rule. The unemployed who do not have production skills and have good oral skills, are part of the above category.

An inexperienced sales clerk who works 12 hours a day, receives $120 to $140 per month. Experienced sales clerks receive $200 to $250 per month. If they are skilled and can demonstrate good sales in their monthly work record, they receive a commission as well. However, there is no health insurance.

The situation is much worse for the typists. The pay for each typed page is 12 cents. A hired typist sits and types at a computer monitor from 8:30 a.m. to 5 p.m. At most, she or he makes $230 per month.

Unskilled workers are also not immune from this lawlessness. During the last few and first few months of each years, determining the minimum wage for workers turns into a great battle between workers and employers. Various meetings are held at the Supreme Council for Labor in order to arrive at a single figure. Workers and employers each struggle to increase or decrease the wages on the basis of their interests. Unskilled workers do not benefit from this battle. They receive the $8 per day laborer’s wage. Taking into account the four monthly days off, their wages amount to $208 per month. A worker who pastes shoe parts 12 hours a day from 8 a.m. to 8 p.m. receives $10 per day.

The term employee, may imply more optimism about the wages. However, the wages are no better. Computer-savvy employees who work for 12 hours a day from 9 a.m. to 9 p.m. at an internet café, receive $200 per month. An office employee who works eight hours a day, receives $200 per month and a 15% commission.

Although, job advertisements list the wage of a secretary as $300 per month and sometimes even $300 to $500 per month, secretaries often do not receive an adequate wage. They receive $200 per month for an eight or 9 hour working day. Wages are lower for part-time work or job types such as answering the phone or typing letters etc. . .

Nowadays the $200 monthly wage, and not the minimum wage, is considered the norm by employers. This is the approximate first figure that is offered to job seekers in morning job advertisements. This figure is about $70 less than the minimum wage which the Ministry of Labor has set as the monthly wage for a worker.

However, given the rise in marketing job during the past few years, the concept of a fixed salary has become meaningless. Most employers who hire job seekers for marketing purposes, speak in terms of commissions from the beginning. Even if the employers offer a fixed salary, most of them consider it a benefit paid alongside the commission.

This is not the end of the story as far as wages offered to the unemployed are concerned. Iran’s crowded capital is not the only place where wages and benefits for workers are ignored. The situation is even worse in other cities in our country. In those cities, wages amount to $150 to $200 per month. Most employers who do not want to offer legal wages or health insurance to their employees, pay a $150 fixed monthly wage and a commission on the side.

For a long time, the subject of the minimum wage for workers has been brought up twice a year. However, sub-minimum wages which violate the labor laws continue. Given the opposition to the enforcement of the minimum wage, this subject has been forgotten for the past month.

Nevertheless, in the underground economy of this city and other cities in this country. . . the large unemployed labor force has created the condition for employers to offer wages and benefits that openly rob the workers. In light of this worrisome unemployment, there are no inspections to enforce working hours, wages and insurance benefits. The unemployed are the victims. They work 12 hours a day, that is 4 hours above the legal working day, in order to receive wages below the minimum wage. . .

The Poverty Line in Iran. A "Hoax?"

2009-10-13T15:16:00.000-07:00

Translator’s note: At a recent press conference in Tehran, fraudulently elected president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad claimed that customary approaches used by economists to determine the poverty line are a “hoax” and cannot be used as a measure to prove that there is poverty in Iran. Existing facts, however, contradict Ahmadinejad’s statement.

According to a World Bank study done in 2005 and published in 2008, over 8% of Iran’s population of 72 million live under the severe poverty line of $2 per day or $240 per month for a family of four.(1) Based on a study done by the Central Bank of Iran in 2006, the general poverty line is currently no less than $400 per month for a family of four. (2) Another study done by the Iranian economist Hussein Raghfar, and endorsed by the Iranian newspaper, Capital, states that the poverty line in Tehran is around $800 per month for a family of four. This study also claims that given the large number of Iranian city dwellers, around 30% of the population fall below the poverty line. Raghfar’s study emphasizes that an increasing percentage of the following groups have fallen below the poverty line: 1. Laid off and unemployed workers. 2. Farmers who cannot compete with the cheaper prices of imported agricultural goods. 3. Civil servants whose salaries cannot pay for living expenses, given the current 26% inflation rate(3) While a minority of Iranian economists claim that poverty has declined during the past ten years, most Iranian economists think otherwise. (4) The following report from the Iranian Labour News Agency (ILNA) responds to Ahmadinejad’s latest claim that there is no poverty in Iran. ILNA was launched in February 2003. It belongs to the Workers House, a labor union set up by the Iranian government. However, it is considered close to the Iranian reform movement. ILNA was banned in the Summer of 2007 and was reinstated a year later after much pressure from workers’ organizations, students and journalists.(5)

1. Poverty Data: A Supplement to World Development Indicators 2008, p. 19.
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/DATASTATISTICS/Resources/WDI08supplement1216.pdf

2. http://www.bbc.co.uk/persian/business/story/2008/08/080804_ka-poverty.shtml

3. http://www.sarmayeh.net/ShowNews.php?47646

The following summary of a report by Iran’s Chamber of Commerce states that only 30% of Iran’s production units are actually engaged in production.
http://www.bbc.co.uk/persian/business/2009/10/091002_ka_output_iran.shtml

Also see the following article for a recent analysis of the Iranian economy by an economist inside Iran.
http://www.alborznet.ir/Fa/ViewDetail.aspx?T=2&ID=222

4. Djavad Salehi-Isfahani is an Iranian economist and a Dubai Initiaitve research fellow at Harvard University, who believes that the current protests in Iran are not proof of mass dissatisfaction with rising poverty and economic stagnation. He believes that “poverty has declined steadily in the last ten years.” However, he does admit that “in the last ten years, a huge inflow of oil revenues has taken place without any improvement in income inequality.” See http://www.brookings.edu/opinions/2008/0805_iran_salehi_isfahani.aspx

http://www.brookings.edu/opinions/2009/0129_iran_salehi_isfahani.aspx?rssid=salehiisfahanid

Two other Iranian economists, Sohrab Behdad and Farhad Nomani, have also carefully examined economic life and labor in Iran since the 1979 revolution, and have presented a more critical analysis in their recent book, Class and Labor in Iran: Did the Revolution Matter? (Syracuse University Press, 2006)

5.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Iranian_Labour_News_Agency

http://fa.wikipedia.org/wiki/%D8%A7%DB%8C%D9%84%D9%86%D8%A7
*******************************************************************************
ILNA Examines the Government's View:
The Poverty Line Hoax
By Tara Bonyad
Source: http://www.ilna.ir/newsText.aspx?ID=77900
Translated by Frieda Afary

You need not travel too far from the city to see the poverty hoax. In order to discover the poverty line hoax, you simply need to turn your head to see the child peddlers and the homeless people who spend their days and nights under freeway bridges.

You need not travel too far from the city to see this poverty hoax. You simply need to open your eyes a little and turn your head. In order to discover the poverty line hoax, you simply need to see the children who hang by your clothes to sell you something, the old women and men who stick out their hands to beg, the women and men who make a living through peddling, or the homeless people.

We enter a street. Children are playing. As soon as they see the camera, one screams out: “Reporters are here. Run away. Tomorrow our pictures will be in the newspapers. Run away.” Each runs in a different direction and disappears in the narrow streets.

Ashkan has a sister and a brother. He lives with his parents, sister and brother in a two-story dilapidated place. His father is a cobbler on the street. His mother cleans homes. His mother says: “But we can’t make ends meet.” Ashkan is a citizen of Tehran. His parents are Afghans. . . .

The Iranian Labor News Agency reports that according to experts, the poverty line in Iran is $850 [per month for a family of four –tr]. If Ashkan’s parents earned half this amount, they could have fixed their home. The first floor is uninhabitable. The entire family lives on the second floor.

In the first press conference of the tenth government [on September 7, 2009 –tr.], Mahmoud Ahmadinejad called the poverty line a hoax. He said that first you have to pay attention to the definition of the poverty line. It changes depending on whether the definition considers minimum needs or less important needs.

Ashkan has a home, a dilapidated one. Are his minimum needs satisfied? Does he live above the poverty line?

The further we walk on the streets, the narrower the streets get. A door is open. Dirty soap suds are seeping out from the bottom. I knock on the door. A beautiful young woman opens the door and calls on someone who turns out to be her sister-in-law. They emigrated from Kurdistan years ago. Her husband went bankrupt four years ago. She says he was a garment worker and a foreman at a production unit. A few years ago, after the introduction of Chinese goods, the business slowed down. It cost this workshop $22 to make a raincoat. But retail stores could buy that item for $14 or $15 [from importers—tr.]. Clearly it is more economical to buy the Chinese goods . . .

According to the Iranian Labor News Agency, between the years 1992 and 2007, family incomes in Iran have increased by 71%. At the same time, family expenses have increased by 1840% . . . In his aforementioned press conference, the president claimed that the addition of 200,000 people to the rolls of the unemployed in one year is not very large, but in fact normal. He claimed that the labor market continuously involves job loss for some and job gains for others. This means that those who are laid off today, may regain employment after a while. Therefore, the labor market is constantly engaged in the exchange of human labor power.

This woman’s husband has not “regained employment” after four years. However, based on the above [Ahmadinejad’s statement about the poverty line—tr] her family does not live below the poverty line. They have food and clothing and a dwelling, in the worst possible way. . .

According to the president, having barely enough food to survive, enough clothing to cover yourself, and a roof to protect you from the rain, constitutes the satisfaction of minimal needs. Thank God we all have that. Therefore, no one lives under the poverty line in Iran.

September 22, 2009

Iran's University Students Defend the Humanities

2009-09-19T15:28:00.000-07:00

Translator's note: The study of the humanities has become a major focus of Iranian university students during the past decade. Over half of Iran’s 3.5 million university students are enrolled in various branches of this field. In order to combat the effects of this field of study on the minds of young students, the Iranian government has launched a campaign against the humanities. At the recent shows trials of reformists, the prosecution specifically attacked western philosophers and academics for supposedly having instigated the latest protest movement. On August 30, Ayatollah Khamenei also addressed a gathering of professors and university administrators with a stern warning. He blamed the humanities for Iranian students’ “lack of faith,” and called on professors to “identify the enemy” and to revise this field of study. Below is a response from a student at Amir Kabir University in Tehran. Amir Kabir University has been the site of several important human rights protests during the past few years.

Why Is the Islamic Republic Afraid of the Humanities?

By Abuzar

Source: http://www.autnews.cc/node/2238

Translated by Frieda Afary

The teaching of the humanities is often under scrutiny by governments and statesmen in various countries. It is under particular surveillance by those rulers and statesmen who are constantly afraid of the of dissemination of beliefs contrary to theirs. They do their utmost to set the direction and outlook of this field.

The humanities embody theories, perspectives and various political, social or philosophical schools of thought. These schools of thought develop in the context of the humanities and ultimately permeate various sectors of society.

Sociologists, legal scholars, economists, etc. are all products of the humanities. The type of government and school of thought upon which a society is based determines its laws, lifestyles, individual-social activities, and plans. Perhaps this is why rulers and statesmen with a weak power base and intolerant of dissident views are afraid of the dissemination of the humanities. From time to time, they attack or seek to revise this field.

In Iran, academics, whether students or professors, have always been highly scrutinized. If we examine contemporary Iranian history, we will see that in the past and the present, the university has been the site of critique, of opposition to , and struggles against the rulers. A great deal could be said about the influence that academics exert upon society and its political environment. However, it needs to be emphasized that this wise sector of society is constantly a source of fear for Iran’s rulers and statesmen. There is an added concern with regard to academics who represent the humanities. Rulers come to the conclusion that this sector should be either eliminated or cleansed. They [academics -- tr.] should be prevented from moving in a direction contrary to that of the rulers.

In a government like the Islamic Republic, freedom of speech and opinion only exist within the framework of the beliefs and interests held by the rulers and the system. There is no need for a person studying law, sociology, philosophy, etc. to become familiar with different philosophic schools of thought, with theories held by various intellectuals, with law as practiced in other countries, or with human rights, etc. After all, isn’t it true that in an Islamic state, all should follow a single school of thought and a single belief? And that is the school of Islam, of course as interpreted by the state authorities.

Therefore, rulers should see to it that no one strays from the path or thinks differently. And if the rulers don’t begin the surveillance at the university, the task of controlling dissident and diverse beliefs and theories in the society as a whole becomes very difficult, if not impossible. This explains why those who rule the system are concerned about the increasing numbers of students in the humanities and their own inability to control them.

Likewise, in the latest show trials, the attacks have been aimed at the humanities, intellectuals and philosophers. Even Saeed Hajjarian [former advisor to president Mohammad Khatami -- tr. ] says the following in his confessions (which are not really his own words): “Teaching the theories of the humanities in Iran’s universities has been a factor leading to waste and destruction of public property after the recent election.”

For years, the Islamic Republic has attempted to dismantle the field of humanities, and to limit it or teach it in a selective way. Years ago, it started to cleanse the universities devoted to the study of the humanities. Great scholars in various fields like sociology, psychology, law, literature, political science, etc. were expelled or forced to resign. Many students were denied an education. Many limitations were imposed on the universities. Now, the Islamic Republic is making an ultimate effort to further limit the teaching of the humanities in order to deny future Iranian society the presence of thinkers, philosophers, intellectuals, and scholars.

September 2, 2009

Feminist Political Scientist Analyzes Transformations in Iranian Society Today

2009-09-10T11:40:00.000-07:00

Fatemeh Sadeghi has a PhD in political science and has taught at the Islamic Azad University of Karaj near Tehran. Soon after the publication of her controversial article, “Why We Say No to the Compulsory Hijab” in May 2008 ( see translation available on this blog at http://iranianvoicesintranslation.blogspot.com/2009/07/fatemeh-sadghi-is-assistant-professor.html ), she was suspended from her teaching post at the University of Karaj. In the article below, she takes a strong stand against the fraudulent June 2009 presidential election and presents a brief sociological analysis of changes in Iranian society during the past 30 years. Excerpts follow.

Why Don’t They Believe It?

By Fatemeh Sadeghi

Source: http://www.alborznet.ir/Fa/ViewDetail.aspx?T=2&ID=189

Translated by Frieda Afary

. . . Many have tried to present minor or major documents to prove that a great fraud has taken place in this election, and that the results have been rigged in one way or another in favor of a particular candidate. In the following notes, my goal is not to present these documents which are quite considerable. My goal is to present a brief sociological analysis to demonstrate that given the social developments of the past few years, it is highly unlikely that the majority of voters would have voted for Ahmadinejad. Based on many predictions, Iranian society is heading toward a different choice. These developments could be detected even during the June 2005 election which was boycotted or treated with indifference by many who were called the silent majority.

Below, I will demonstrate why part of the voters, whether those who had boycotted the previous presidential election or the silent majority who account for the high rate of voter participation in this election, demanded change. This fact will give credence to the doubts about the announced results of this election. First I will examine some general development in Iran during the past few decades. Then, I will examine Ahmadinejad’s cultural and social resume and its effect on people’s participation in the recent election. The arguments below are by no means new. I am only emphasizing them as a reminder. Considering these arguments will allow us to better comprehend Iranian society’s protests against the recent events and its concerns about the latest trends.

Political disillusionment in post-revolutionary Iran has increased in all the years after the revolution. This phenomenon can be explained by many factors. The most important factor is the inability of the Islamic system to satisfy many of the demands of the middle and lower classes and realize their dreams. I am referring to freedom and social justice in particular. Prominent signs of this political disillusionment can be found in the daily increase in open and hidden forms of opposition. These forms of opposition have continuously increased during the past several years. Two phenomena in the past few years can be considered symbols of this opposition.

One is the increasing use of internet sites as sources for obtaining news and analysis. The other is the increasing use of satellite news and information stations as the most important source of news and analysis inside the country. There has been a turn away from the government’s “Voice and Face of Iran.” [The name of the Iranian government’s television and radio network -- tr.]

The number of internet users in Iran exceeds 25 million [Iran’s total population as of 2008 was 72.2 million -- tr.] Despite extreme forms of media censorship, the internet became an important medium for transmitting news, especially during the ninth government [2005-2009 – tr.]. Even many of those who sympathized with the ruling current turned to the internet to obtain news and analysis. It is estimated that there are over 100,000 Persian language weblogs and news and analysis websites. Most are in one way or another critical of the status quo or opposed to it. . . .

Most remember that up until a few years ago, it was not easy to speak of satellite [television –tr.]. I was very surprised to see that intensely religious people in remote areas and in religious cities such as Qom were turning more and more to satellite [television—tr.]. Their earlier reluctance has almost disappeared. The increasing use of the internet and virtual space to obtain information and news reveals that the official ideology cannot satisfy searching and critical minds. During all these years, the government’s “Voice and Face of Iran” has emphatically adopted an approach which resists change and underestimates its audience’s ability to reason. This approach has resulted in people’s disillusionment and their turn to other sources and media for news and analysis.

Political disillusionment revealed itself openly in the voters’ behavior. Many voters refused to participate in the June 2005 election because they were not satisfied with the pace of the reforms in Iranian society and expected the reformists and Mohammad Khatami to be more decisive and to take more action in creating changes. However, the rates of disillusionment were even higher in the post-reformist period.

Many reasons can be given for this disillusionment. Here I will only point to reasons which seem to be significant in explaining the general trend toward disillusionment in the years after the revolution and especially in the past four years. The more time elapsed after the Islamic revolution, the more people disembarked the ship of the revolution. However, disillusionment increased at an accelerated rate during the term of the ninth government [2005-2009 tr.] because of the many criticisms of its record, particularly in the realms of culture and the economy. Naturally, this disillusionment reveals itself in the actions of the voters and their choice of a candidate or candidates who call for change, even if the candidate or candidates are not able to satisfy all of the voters’ political and social demands.

The increase in literacy and consciousness among Iranians is most important in explaining all the markers of development and especially the disillusionment with the status quo. The literacy rate has increased during all the past few years. University entrance rates have increased considerably in comparison to the past.

Women’s increased consciousness is very significant. During the past few years, the majority of university entrants have been women. We have often heard slogans about how women are the educators of humanity. Regardless of the intentions of those who created these slogans, it seems that this statement is undeniably true in Iran. If Iranian women of [the generation -- tr.] prior to the revolution were the educators of the ideological generation which opposed the Shah’s regime and engaged in a ceaseless struggle against it, women in post-revolutionary Iran are to be given credit for much of the sociological developments, the rise in consciousness, and the development in methods of educating the young generation. Once faced with barriers to or limitations in their choices for advancement, these women turned to the universities and became determined to raise their consciousness and increase their knowledge.

I cannot say what percentage of the votes for Mousavi or Karroubi were cast by women. What I can say based on my own observations is that women and especially young women constituted the majority of those who voted for reformist candidates and especially Mousavi. Furthermore, their strong presence in the electoral campaigns of both candidates [Mousavi and Karroubi -- tr.] was completely new. Based on my personal observations I can even say that in many cases, the number of women activists at the campaign headquarters of both candidates outweighed that of men. . .

I don’t mean to say that women did not vote for Ahmadinejad. However in the last part of this essay I will argue that Ahmadinejad was unable to draw the votes of the majority of women in this election. Even based on my own personal observations in many parts of Iran, it can be said that those who did vote for Ahmadinejad in 2005 did so not for the sake of nuclear energy or other ideological slogans.

They voted for him because of economic problems and because of his electoral slogans about social justice and combating corruption. In all the interviews that I have conducted with women who have voted for Ahmadinejad, not one has referred to his foreign policy and nuclear energy. All unanimously said that they voted for Ahmadinejad because his platform was against corruption and for social justice. Of course many complained that the government had not taken serious steps in this direction, and all complained about the rising prices and other problems, especially drug addiction. They regretted having voted for him.

It seems highly unlikely that the majority of the rural and suburban [poor -- tr.] population would have voted for Ahmadinejad during the last election. Such a vote would be even more questionable in areas populated by ethnic and religious minorities. . .

During these years [2005-2009 tr.] the number of publishers declined. The government has practically set barriers against the publication of useful books. Many books did not receive a publication permit or faced difficulties in receiving republication permits. Many internet sites were blocked. Censorship increased massively in all areas.

The “cultural revolution” that has taken place during the past few years has led to the expulsion of many university students and professors. At all the universities, the government attempted to replace critical professors and students with its own handpicked students and professors. Many students received stars [reference to students who were suspended for being political activists -- tr.]. Some received warnings from national security agencies or were expelled. Many Islamic student councils or other university student councils were closed and many students were arrested or harassed. Another measure taken by the government was to censor textbooks.

The gender quota system for university students was imposed [to limit the number of female students -- tr.] There has been a campaign to limit female university students’ choice of campuses to those in their home province. The government’s ideological machine was backed by institutions such as the Center for Women and Family Affairs which had proposed plans such as the Family Bill [Reference to bill introduced in the Summer of 2007 which made it more convenient for men to take a second wife. This bill also imposed taxes on a woman’s alimony. In September 2008, after much protest by Iranian women’s rights activists, the most controversial aspects of this bill were removed --tr.], the Mercy Plan [introduced in 2006 to teach housewives to be more obedient -- tr.] as well as plans to ban women from work outside the home, and to promote polygamy. Their goal was to force women to stay at home and take care of their husbands for fear that the husband would take another wife.

Furthermore, the government set out to enforce the “Plan to Elevate Public Chastity” which forced all institutions to strictly enforce women’s dress codes and the rule against the mixing of women and men in the workplace. The government reduced women’s working hours [outside the home -- tr.] to allow them to have more time for family chores. Most important was the “social security plan,” the enforcement of which led to harassment and police searches of thousands of women by the Ministry of Culture. Many men were arrested as hooligans and saboteurs, and were taken to unknown places. There are even reports that some were murdered.

The ninth government came to power with the slogans “social justice” and “combating corruption.” It did not even elevate social justice and the battle against corruption. The slogan “social justice” was in many cases limited to distributing money and consumer goods among people, without making them economically self-sufficient.

Workers’ economic status worsened in all these years. Many workers’ organizations were suppressed. Their activists were arrested. The civil rights demands and protests of teachers also faced suppression.

The ninth government set out to dismantle all civil rights organizations by accusing them of getting money from abroad and aiming to create a “soft revolution.” Many non-governmental organizations were closed. Their activities were put under severe limitations. Many civil rights activists landed in prison. Newspapers critical [of the regime -- tr.] were banned one after the other. Many journalists lost their jobs or were subjected to harassment by governmental and judicial institutions in one way or another.

Much evidence attests to the increasing level of social dislocation during the past few years. In many urban areas, drug addiction and unemployment are rampant. Analysts attribute this to the government’s inept efforts to reduce economic problems. The rates of suicide, homicide, and assaults have increased during the past few years. The roots of most of these phenomena can be traced to economic inequality and to social and gender prejudices.

The ninth government has not left any class or social group unharmed. As a result, all social classes blame the ninth government more than any other government. While it is true that some groups such as women or youth have been subjected to a much greater degree of oppression and prejudice, no class, social or minority group has been left untouched by this government. It is not only the middle class that has suffered. Upper and lower classes, the rural population, bazaris [traditional merchants who have tended to support the clergy -- tr.], and ethnic and religious minorities have all suffered in various ways, and many of them are critical of the government.

Many within the ruling establishment have also criticized the [ninth -- tr.] government during its term in office. It seems that the only ones left unharmed by this government are the minority that the government has enriched as security officials, guards for the existing order, or passive voters. However, the dissatisfied and injured majority protests the results of this election. Perhaps [this majority -- tr.] has by now understood why the ninth government acted confidently and without any concern for people’s protests.

June 19, 2009

Feminist Attorney Speaks Out Against Rape As a Weapon of Torture in Iran

2009-08-25T15:37:00.000-07:00

Shadi Sadr is a young feminist attorney and journalist who has been in the forefront of women’s rights struggles in Iran during the past few years. She was abducted by plainclothes police on July 17, and released eleven days later. She was arrested once before at a women’s rights demonstration in 2006. In this article dated August 14, 2009, she responds to Ayatollah Mehdi Karroubi’s open letter to Ayatollah Hashemi Rafsanjani about the need to investigate the rapes of young protesters imprisoned after the forged June 2009 election. Sadr begins her article specifically with the case of Taraneh Mussavi, a young victim whose identity has been questioned by the Iranian government.

Rape as Systematic Torture in Iran

By Shadi Sadr

Source: http://www.meydaan.com/Showarticle.aspx?arid=894

Translated by Frieda Afary

Translator’s Note: Shadi Sadr is a young feminist attorney and journalist who has been in the forefront of women’s rights struggles in Iran during the past few years. She was abducted by plainclothes police on July 17, and released eleven days later. She was arrested once before at a women’s rights demonstration in 2006. In this article dated August 14, 2009, she responds to Ayatollah Mehdi Karroubi’s open letter to Ayatollah Hashemi Rafsanjani about the need to investigate the rapes of young protesters imprisoned after the forged June 2009 election. Sadr begins her article specifically with the case of Taraneh Mussavi, a young victim whose identity has been questioned by the Iranian government.

************************************************************************************

Taraneh Mussavi may or may not be that green-clad girl who was arrested at a demonstration near the Ghaba Mosque on June 27. The girl who was raped, suffered from a torn uterus and a torn anus, landed at a Karaj hospital, and was finally found dead in an unknown cemetery in northern Iran. Regardless, her name is the secret name for all the women who have been raped in prisons since the 1979 Revolution. What I want to say is that Taraneh Mussavi is not just one individual.

Mehdi Karroubi writes: “Some individuals have raped detained girls with such force as to cause tears and injuries to their sexual organs.” His claim may be entirely false, but that does not make any difference. The following are not exceptions: When Azar Al Kanaan (Nina Aghdam) speaks in front of the camera about how she was raped at Sanandaj prison. When Roya Toloui speaks of how she was raped by her interrogator. When Monireh Baradaran writes in her book Simple Truth, about Tahereh, a woman remembered by most prisoners from the 1980s, a beautiful woman who lost her sanity after being raped by a Pasdar [“Revolutionary Guard”]. When [Canadian Iranian Journalist] Zahra Kazemi’s dead body is covered with cement and her attorney, Shirin Ebadi asks the court, “Why the victim’s clothing was torn and bloodied in a particular location.” When the report from the coroner’s office states that Zahra Bani Yaghub was raped in the Basij headquarters’ detention center in Hamadan.

Raping women political prisoners and threats to rape or sexually abuse them are acts which can be committed by those who arrest them or by interrogators, prison wardens or even judicial officials. These acts constitute the most brutal forms of torture, and cause physical and especially psychological effects which are not comparable to other forms of torture.

Published reports are available about these types of torture committed against women political prisoners after the 1979 Revolution. The most systematic type of reported rape has been the rape of virgin girls who were sentenced to death by execution because of political reasons. They were raped on the night before execution. These reports have been substantiated by frequent statements from the relatives of women political prisoners. On the day after the execution, authorities returned their daughter’s dead body to them along with a sum considered to be the alimony. Reports state that in order to lose their virginity, girls were forced to enter into a temporary marriage with men who were in charge of their prison. Otherwise it was feared that the executed prisoner would go to heaven because she was a virgin!

Years later, [Reynaldo] Galindo Pohl, the United Nations Special Rapporteur on human rights, who had been assigned to examine human rights violations in Iran, emphasized the following in his report: “Virgin women who are sentenced to death are forced to enter into a marriage with a man. They lose their virginity before execution. Concerning this matter, the special reporter for the commission on torture would like to emphasize that rape is a form of torture.”*

Nevertheless, up to now, no fatwa [edict] has been issued concerning this systematic torture, and no documentation has been offered regarding its specific cases. As we will see, proving rape is very difficult and often impossible. It is even more [difficult to prove] in prison.

Nevertheless, it is known beyond a shadow of a doubt, that during the 1980s, the rape of women political prisoners was prevalent. It was so prevalent as to make Ayatollah Montazeri, who was Khomeini’s deputy at the time, write the following to Khomeini in a letter dated October 7, 1986: “Did you know that young women are raped in some of the prisons of the Islamic Republic? Did you know that swear words offensive to one’s honor are commonly used during the interrogation of girls?”

This reality contradicts what is inferred from Karroubi’s letter which gives the impression that only those women political prisoners arrested after the post-June 2009 election protests have been raped. As if there is no precedent in the past 30 years of the Islamic Republic. In his letter to Hashemi Rafsanjani dated July 27, 2009, Karroubi writes the following without referring to previous cases of rape in political prisons: “I have heard about this matter from those who have sensitive posts in our country. I can identify these powerful individuals, some of whom were part of our sacred national defense. These individuals have told me that the events which have taken place in our prisons are a catastrophe for the Islamic Republic. This catastrophe can turn the Shia clerics’ brilliant and unblemished history into a black and shameful adventure, and would make many dictatorial regimes including the Shah’s oppressive rule seem fair in comparison. . . . Some of those detained have reported that some individuals have raped detained girls with such force as to cause tears and injuries to their sexual organs. On the other hand, the brutal rape of young boys by some individuals has made these boys depressed and psychologically and physically damaged. They have become recluses in their own homes. . . “

Since [the publication of Karroubi’s letter], interviewees, officials and political activists, who have sought to affirm or deny this issue, have limited the question to the events that have taken place after the election. In this manner, the rape of women political prisoners as a continuing form of sexual torture has been reduced to an “incident.” The fact is that this issue has a long-term history.

It is a fact that proving rape and other forms of sexual abuse has always been difficult. First, these acts take place surreptitiously and without possible witnesses. The victim’s shame or fear prevents her from reporting the case to government officials. While it appears that women have the freedom to act, move and complain to officials, in prison, where government forces and the individual or the collective rapist become one, the victims of rape have no recourse. The issue becomes more complicated when rape is used not only as a means of domination, of satisfying sexual urges and disabling and vanquishing the victim, but also as a means and method of torture in order to demean a political prisoner, break her, extract confession and in sum vanquish her or the organization, party or tendency to which the victim belongs. Under these circumstances, it is incumbent upon independent and mass-based forces to present a precise analysis of the nature of this type of rape/torture. This effort is not possible without assistance from the victims.

It is the responsibility of human rights activist and especially women’s rights activists to review similar experiences in Bosnia and Sudan. We need to learn from the methods by which the perpetrators of systematic rapes have been exposed, and legally prosecuted for their crimes against humanity.

May the names of Taraneh Mussavi, Zahra Bani Yaghub, Zahra Kazemi and other dead victims of rape-torture, come to life in a trial to justly prosecute the perpetrators of these crimes.

August 14, 2009

*This paragraph was added a day after the original publication of this piece and was based on a document which I came across in Mehdi Aslani’s prison memoirs, The Crow and the Red Rose.

Interview with an Iranian Queer Activist

2009-08-11T14:43:00.000-07:00

Hazhir is a young writer/poet/journalist/activist. Soon after the publication of this interview with Cheraq, the online journal of Iranian queers, he was forced into exile. Excerpts from the December 2007 interview follow.

Interview with an Iranian Queer Activist

Hazhir is a young writer/poet/journalist/activist. Soon after the publication of this interview with Cheraq, the online journal of Iranian queers, he was forced into exile. Excerpts from the December 2007 interview follow.

Source: http://www.irqr.net/cheraq/35/hazhir.htm
Also see http://www.nedamagazine.net/

Translated by Frieda Afary

Cheraq: When we spoke on the phone and you accepted my request for an interview, you responded to my question about the types of concerns which an interview about the rights of queers in Iran would create for you inside the country. You said, “I’m beyond that point.” Are political and human rights activities so needed that you have made a decision to accept all the dangers and fight for these demands?

Hazhir: The U.S. intellectual, Noam Chomsky, says: “Either we give in to global injustice and dictatorship, or we join the struggle for justice, democracy and freedom.” I believe there is no other way. I am not a hero or a vanguard. I do not wish to be martyred in order to awaken the “masses” with my blood. No! The age of this type of literature and fatalist outlook has passed. Like other human beings, I feel fear, cry, laugh, fall in love, experience cowardice, and also show a little courage. I am a human being with all the dimensions of a human being. But I believe that this squalor filled world is not a suitable place for human existence. If I didn’t have the hope that there could be a better world, I would certainly choose death at this moment and would be relieved. Of course it is not simply enough to have hope. History does not automatically lead us to emancipation from the shackles of oppression and exploitation. Hope compels me to actively intervene in my surroundings, in order to have not only a homeland but a world that is worthy of “human” existence.

Cheraq: What is your definition of human rights?

Hazhir: . . . As a socialist, I believe that human “respect and dignity” and “the free development of the human being’s character” are only preserved and guaranteed when she/he is freed from the domination of dictatorship as well as exploitation, patriarchy and racial/ethnic prejudice. As a socialist, I believe that in economic terms, this would mean the abolition of the right to private ownership of the means of production, in favor of public and not state ownership of the means of production. . . .

Cheraq: Do you think that queer rights are a part of human rights?

Hazhir: I consider queer rights to be part and parcel of human rights because Iranian queers are human beings. In human rights terms, when we speak of human beings, we mean human beings regardless of their race, religion, nationality, ethnicity, beliefs, class, sexuality or sexual preferences.

Cheraq: You are a member of the Student Committee of Human Rights Reporters. This Committee has on several occasions reported on the violation of the rights of queers. Please tell us more about this Committee and why it decided to defend the rights of queers as well.

Hazhir: I have been a member of this committee for the past few months. It started its activities in March 2005 and has already become a credible and effective organization thanks to the tireless and continuous efforts of its members. Naturally, this credibility was not easily gained. The members of the committee have been placed under pressure by judicial and security forces. For instance, Shiva Nazar Ahari was summoned to the information ministry. Another colleague, Sepideh Pour Aghai has been in detention for the past three months. [In January 2009, she was released after posting bail. tr.} The Student Committee of Human Rights Reporters defends the rights of queers and has reported the violation of their rights because all committee members, regardless of their different or sometimes contradictory beliefs, agree on the following: “When we speak of human beings, we mean human beings regardless of their race, religion, nationality, ethnicity, beliefs, class, sexuality or sexual preferences.” On this particular issue, we are clearly only starting to hew out a path. There are still many questions concerning the rights of queers, that have not been addressed. But we have to consider the fact that the committee is reporting on these violations under conditions in which speaking of the rights of queers is considered an obscenity in the eyes of the rulers. The prohibition on speaking of the rights of queers, does not only exist in the public sphere. Even many of our intellectuals and elite thinkers consider the discourse on the rights of queers to be obscene. We have a long road ahead of us and are not afraid of its difficulties.

Cheraq: Somewhere you say that “Understanding the Presence of the Other” which is the title of one of your blogs, constitutes another dimension of your being. It is a struggle for existence, for being different. This is a very profound statement and has preoccupied my thoughts for hours. If we could understand the presence of the other and accept her/him the way she/he is without imposing our standards on her/him, the majority of the problems of minorities in society would be solved. In your opinion, what is the role of minorities in Iranian society today, and how can they be defended?

Hazhir: Before answering your question, I would like to give a brief explanation of the name of my weblog (http://www.deghar.blogfa.com/). I borrowed this name from Mohammad Mokhtari [Iranian writer who was abducted and murdered in the December 1998. After a great public outcry, the Iranian government admitted that the intelligence ministry was involved in his murder. tr.] Although I am not a fan of citing verses from others, or in more political language, citing “facts,” occasionally, one comes across a statement that is exactly what one wanted to say. However, either one’s language is inadequate or at the very least, the person who uttered the statement has been far in advance and has arrived at that statement earlier. In the introduction to his work, The Human Being in Contemporary Poetry, Mokhtari writes: “A human being is precious and respectable in all her/his faces, conditions and differences. Understanding the presence of the other does not mean understanding a specific or stellar part of the presence of the other. No human being is pure angel or pure devil. The angel-like and the devilish persons are both products of our imagination. We are different people with different ranks and different cultural circumstances, weak and strong, cultured and uncultured, small and large. We are all organs of one body. . . Understanding the presence of the other is a collective understanding of the presence of the human being, until the conditions are created for all to develop their characters and not have to remain the way they are.” For me, starting that weblog was a way to test this principle in order to understand the other dimensions of my own presence. I believe that given the unquestioning and dictatorial culture in which Iranians are rooted, the various dimensions of the human soul are suppressed by the self in favor of a higher and more evolved dimension. For the past few years however, I have been trying to let the different dimensions of my being do whatever they want, and I have established a peaceful co-existence among them.

Going back to your question . . . In Iran, there is a violation of the rights of the majority. Within this absolute majority, there are different collective identities which can be called “minorities” such as queers or the followers of religions other than Shia Islam. But our strong point is that we are part of the majority. All of us have been denied our most basic rights in one way or another. To answer the question about defending the rights of the minorities in Iran, I have to say that it can be done when all of us struggle for emancipation and justice alongside that absolute majority, the dispossessed and the suppressed, not apart from them. This is a difficult path that demands participation from all of us. Whether we are women who constitute half the society, or workers who constitute a large part of society, or slum-dwellers or rural folks, whether we are non-Persian speaking ethnicities or queers, we can only achieve emancipation and justice when these goals become a collective ideal and when we discern the universality of our ideal.

Cheraq: Many prominent political, human rights and women’s rights activists etc. who have endured prison and torture in order to defend human rights, do not believe in the rights of queers. In other words, they are not willing to defend those rights openly. In your opinion, why have Iranian activists not paid attention to the rights of queers as a serious human rights issue up to now?

Hazhir: Two important points have to be considered to respond to this question. First, all of us have been raised in an environment in which dictatorship and exploitation and patriarchy have old roots. According to Reza Baraheni [ exiled Iranian novelist, poet and political activist who teaches literature at the University of Toronto. tr.] we live in “masculine history.” If we agree that human behavior and beliefs are the products of the social environment in which humans grow, we have to accept that none of us has been left unscathed by the effects of these conditions. That is why traces of dictatorial, exploitative and patriarchal behavior can be discerned in our daily lives. Even our daily language is not free from traces of this scourge. Nevertheless, the fact that we have been raised in this social milieu should not free us from the responsibility to fight its effects. If one considers opposition to queers to be part of the awe of patriarchal domination, which I do, then one can consider the lack of attention to the issues of queers to be the product of living and growing up in patriarchal history. . . Because that general belief is intertwined with a religious belief, a serious determination to combat it is still not evident among those of us who are a product of this society. Even the most secular among us still live with the doctrines that have been fed us as children, in the family, in school and on the streets. And of course after the revolution and the coming to power of the newcomers, [these doctrines tr.] have been fed us in the form of official propaganda and the so-called national media. That is why I think we have a long road ahead of us in order to break with these taboos.

The above does not apply to a small minority. On many occasions, when I have spoken at various meetings about the rights of queers, I have been told the following: “How much of a priority is this issue?” or “Isn’t it only a small percentage of the population that has this problem?” In truth, I do not accept this sense of priorities. In fact I strongly believe that those who think this way are also opportunists in other areas. Their struggle is an opportunistic struggle for power. I doubt them when they also speak of women’s rights or workers’ rights. I believe that those who dismiss the struggle for queer rights in the above manner, only speak of women’s rights or workers’ rights because they know that women and workers constitute a larger portion of the population. The higher numbers of women and workers make them more suitable instruments for gaining power. In my opinion, even if the above mentioned individuals speak of human rights with a revolutionary tone, their words are nothing more than dirty election promises. But there are also those who defend the rights of workers, women, queers, religious minorities, non-Persian ethnicities, and all the dispossessed and oppressed and the poor. They do so not because of a passion for power. Their humane ideals compel them to stand with those at the bottom during the struggle. I try to be one of them.

Cheraq: Do you think Iran’s academics think like the majority? In other words, how do academics in Iran view Iranian queers?

Hazhir: I cannot comment on the views of the entire society of academics but only on the sector of academics i.e. students with whom I am in touch. . . Something specific has happened to the youth of Iran. Something which has been outside the realm of control of the rulers. Although young people like others are influenced by the ideological doctrines of the rulers, the introduction of the internet in Iran, and the youth’s embrace of this vast virtual space has led to the weakening of some of these religious doctrines. This has compelled some youth to try to view their surrounding world in a new way. I am a prominent example of such a transformed human being. I am ashamed to say that up until the near distant past, that is two years ago, I considered queers to be at best mentally disturbed individuals who needed treatment. Becoming acquainted with the ongoing debates in the virtual world and establishing virtual friendships with several queer activists or queer advocates, and long discussions, led me to accept the human identity of queers. . .

Cheraq: As you mentioned, the bulk of our problems are rooted in a masculine history. In your view, how can the student movement and the women’s movement work in concert with the queer movement to fight against patriarchy? There isn’t much communication between them, and there is a tangible need for enlightenment for the members of these movements.

Hazhir: I think that your question partially contains the answer. You say that there is a tangible need for enlightenment for social movement activists. This is very true. Consider the fact that most of us queers only have two images in mind. The first is the image of the “sinner” which has been created for us by official sources of education. The second is the image of “promiscuity” which we have seen in pornographic movies. Showing a third image can be part of this enlightenment. Allow me to issue a minor critique of the journal Cheraq from this angle. Sometimes Cheraq publishes stories which can not be considered erotic by any standard. These same exact stories can be found in sites that publish stories about mostly heterosexual sex. Such stories can evoke those aforementioned images. If the editors of your journal have a reason for publishing these stories, that has to be explained. Please note that I am not referring to the use of so-called “obscene” words. A non-aesthetic depiction of sex, regardless of its form, is offensive.

On the other hand, I think that paying attention to the events taking place inside Iranian society -- a society that Saqi Qahreman, the author of your editorial in issue # 31 calls the mother society-- and responding appropriately to events inside Iran can have a positive effect on the minds of social movement activists. Up to now, Iranian queers have issued statements in response to events such as the banning of the Tehran Bus Workers Union on Jan. 28, 2005, International Women’s Day and the beating of women participants in Student Park, May Day 2006, the call to protest of the Iranian Writers’ Society, and the defense of the rights of Baha’is. These statements have made a positive impact on social movement activists or at least the sectors of social movement activists with whom I am in touch. These beginnings can show us the pathway forward.

December 2007

Young Activist Comments on Class & Social Composition of June 2009 Tehran Protests

2009-07-28T14:50:00.000-07:00

A young activist/intellectual and blogger, objects to an older Iranian leftist intellectual who calls Ahmadinejad’s supporters the “youth of the lower depths.”

The Real “Youth of the Lower Depths”

Author: Fuad

Source: bazgooftan.blogfa.com/
Translated by Frieda Afary

Translator’s note: Fuad is a young activist/intellectual and blogger. In his recent blog entry, he objects to an older Iranian leftist intellectual who calls Ahmadinejad’s supporters the “youth of the lower depths.” Fuad describes his own view of the class and social composition of the protests that have taken place in Tehran after the fraudulent June 12, 2009 election. Excerpts follow:

. . . As against all the myths circulating among analysts of all persuasions, I dare say that the main body of this movement consists not of the upper-middle class and the bourgeoisie, but the lower-middle class and “working class individuals” and the poor. (Later, I will explain why I say working class “individuals.”)

I don’t deny that a middle class leadership initiated the protest movement. But the body of the movement consisted of working class “individuals” and the poor. And as time passed, the movement consisted more and more of working class “individuals” and the poor, and moved toward south Tehran neighborhoods.

To prove this claim, one only needed to be present at the recent protests. This fact could be clearly comprehended. That is why I would like to review the recent demonstrations briefly. . .

During the first two days (June 13 and June 14, 2009) there were sporadic protest in all of Tehran’s neighborhoods. All social and economic classes participated. Of course protests were mostly taking place in central and north side neighborhoods. The upper- middle class was present at these protests. But the youth of south Tehran were also demonstrating in central and north side squares, if not in their own neighborhoods. I dare say that it was the youth from Afsarieh, Nazee Abad, Javadieh . . . who started throwing stones at the anti-riot police at Vanak Square. . .

During subsequent days, the situation was different. On June 15, over a million attended the protest from Imam Hussein to Azadi Square. On June 16, a million attended the protest from Vanak Square to Iranian Television and Radio Station Headquarters. On June 17, a million attended the protest from 7th Tir Square to Revolution Square. On June 18, a million attended the protest from Imam Khomeini Square to Revolution Square. I dare say that these four protests that involved millions, were some of the wonders of the world of politics, wonders that are unique to Iran. These demonstrations reflected a popular movement which cut across classes. All classes participated. All economic and ethnic groups were present. There were equal numbers of women and men. All age groups were present. The interesting point was that although the protests were silent, all participants had the equal and unlimited right to write their slogans on placards which they carried. No one objected to anyone else’s slogan. This was the greatest practice of democracy on the streets.

But the main issue is that when these protests were met by attacks from pressure groups or what our so-called leftist intellectual interpreted as the “youth of the lower depths” –of course in “plainclothes” [reference to plainclothes policemen] — it was the poor youth of south Tehran who fought back. . .

At the June 16 demonstration at Vanak Square, when those same “plainclothesmen” or what the so called leftist intellectual likes to call “youth of the lower depths” attacked the people, I personally witnessed that it was once again the youth of south Tehran who faced the bullets in order to allow the elderly women and men to withdraw and not become victims of the axes, truncheons and bullets of the “youth of the lower depths” in “plainclothes.”

Luckily no violent episodes took place in the other two demonstrations that involved millions.

But the real story of the participation of the “working class and poor individuals” began on June 20. As we all know, that demonstration was of a different kind.

The commander in charge of those “youth of the lower depths” in “plainclothes” had issued the attack order. This time the issue was whether you were “present on the street or not.” Leaders of the upper class kind withdrew and took back their call to protest. They asked people to stay home or stay quiet. The ones who were willing to give up their lives in order to stay on the streets, were those who had nothing to lose but their chains. These were the youth of south Tehran and “working class individuals.” Of course I have to admit that the crowd included youth from north Tehran whom I salute for their honor.

After June 20, people’s presence on the street changed. The slogans became more radical and everything became more serious. Based on testimonies from those who were on the streets and in the areas where the major confrontations took place, this time the movement had moved to south Tehran. The main confrontations took place in Sattar Khan, Towhid, Navab, Jomhuri and . . . which are lower-middle class and lower class areas of town.

After June 20, those “youth of the lower depths” in “plainclothes” no longer dared to confront the protesters without being mounted on motorcycles and without support from forces that were armed from head to toe. Despite all the propaganda that the rulers’ media and ideological apparatus had drilled into their heads, they knew that they were not dealing with a bunch of weakling, rich, and westernized youth. They were faced with the “real youth of the lower depths.” . . .

The protesters are young women and men. They are “unemployed, students and wage earners.” They are middle-aged women and men who are breaking under the heavy weight of life expenses for themselves and their families. They are in pain and screaming to the heavens. Even if they “dress well, speak well, don’t have calloused hands, live a modern life, speak a foreign language, smell like perfume, are internet and media savvy, enjoy poetry and music, enjoy dancing, enjoy modern Western culture, enjoy Michael Jackson, Madonna and Sasy Mankan, etc . . .” they are part of the working class. They are either “wage earners” and thus workers or will be “wage earners” in the future because they are “unemployed” or “students” ! ! !

Our dear intellectuals who still act like “leftists,” have a problem. They have turned leftism into a religion. A religion that has certain rites. These rites begin with insulting the U.S. and the West. They include mythologizing the worker. These rites equate a modern lifestyle to being too westernized and Americanized and sissy. They classify anyone in this category as part of the “velvet revolution.” They ignore the fact that the youth who are screaming in the streets and demand an honorable modern life, are mostly from the lower-middle classes. The problem is not that the working class and the poor are supporters of Ahmadinejad and do not protest. The problem lies in the definition and typical outlook propounded by the so-called leftist intellectuals. These gentlemen still define a worker as someone who is “ugly, has calloused hands, is dishevelled, foul-mouthed, lumpen, backward, uncultured, unfamiliar with the internet and satellite T.V., sexist, listens to the music of Ahangaran [reference to Sadeq Ahangaran’s lyrics about war and mourning], rides a motorcycle, smells like alcohol, onions and rose water” . . .Therefore they have the illusion that truncheon bearing, motorcycle riding “plainclothesmen” are the “youth of the lower depths.” . . .

Unlike these friends, I do not want to have any illusions. Therefore, I have to confess that the “working class” has not yet entered the scene as a class. In reality, it is “working class individuals” who have entered the scene. That is why I have often used the term working class “individuals” in this text. The working class has not yet entered the scene with its own class perspective. . .

July 14, 2009

2007 Open Letter to Ahmadinejad Illuminates Student Demands

2009-07-13T15:42:00.000-07:00

The Office for the Consolidation of Unity is Iran’s largest student organization. In this open letter to Ahmadinejad, which was distributed two weeks after his controversial speech at Columbia University in September 2007, readers can find important details about the demands of Iran's current student movement.

Open Letter to President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad
From The Office for the Consolidation of Unity
October 7, 2007

Source: http://www.bbc.co.uk/persian/iran/story/2007/10/071007_bd-tahkim-letter.shtml
Translated by Frieda Afary

Translator’s note: The Office for the Consolidation of Unity is Iran’s largest student organization. In this open letter to Ahmadinejad, which was distributed two weeks after his controversial speech at Columbia University in September 2007, readers can find important details about the demands of Iran's current student movement. Large excerpts from the letter will follow.

Mr. Ahmadinejad:

. . . .We were informed that you have been scheduled to come back to Tehran University [tomorrow]. However, you have not responded to our demand to have even one representative of our central committee pose questions to you at the gathering of selected invitees at the university tomorrow.

The authorities are planning to prevent us from entering the hall or holding our own gathering at the time of your speech. The security forces have contacted students to warn them not to be present on the campus on the day of your speech. Therefore, we are presenting some of our questions now and hope to hear the answers at the venue of your speech and to present further questions there.

University Students:

1.
Three students at Amir Kabir University, Ehsan Mansouri, Majid Tavakoli, and Ahmad Ghassaban who are members of our organization, have been in prison for over 5 months on charges of forging publications. Many believe that your supporters published the forged journals in order to take revenge from the students. At the last court session for these students, their criticism of you at Amir Kabir University was raised [Reference to protests at Amir Kabir University to condemn Ahmadinejad’s sponsorship of a conference to question the Holocaust]. Considering these facts, how could you claim in your speech at Columbia University, that no hostile measures have been taken against your student critics at Amir Kabir University?

2.
From its inception, the ninth government [Reference to Ahmadinejad’s government] branded student activists as star bearers[Reference to university student activists who had been expelled or suspended] and banned them from continuing their education. This year, the ban has been extended to ethnic and religious minorities and teachers who participate in the annual university placement exam. On what legal, ethical, and humanitarian grounds are your organizations and institutions banning students, other critics and minorities from continuing their education?

3.
Discrimination on the basis of gender was practiced at this year’s national
university placement exam. A group of women were not admitted into universities or were sent to universities in remote parts of the country, even though their scores were better than those of males. When protesters questioned the organization that evaluates Iran’s educational system, this [discrimination] was admitted. What legal document are you using to enforce such discrimination? Fundamentally, is this anything other than the open violation of women’s rights?

4.
Although there has been a 25% increase in the number of university students this year, the current national budget for the universities has been reduced. This reduction does not even take the annual inflation rate into consideration. As a result, we have witnessed massive cuts in educational and social services at universities. Why and based on what logic should we be subjected to such cuts in university budgets when there has been a large increase in the government’s income?

5.
In the two years of your incumbency, 550 university student activists have been sent to disciplinary committees, 43 university student organizations have been closed, 130 student newspapers have been banned, over 70 members of our organization have been arrested. The crime attributed to all these individuals, organizations and publications consists of criticizing the ninth government’s mismanagement and irresponsibility. In almost no university in our nation does an organization critical of the government exist. All such organizations of this kind have been either suspended or disbanded or are on the verge of being disbanded. In truth, what does free speech mean to you, and where is the crystallization of this freedom, given that in your speech at Columbia University, you claimed Iran’s level of freedom of speech to be unparalleled?

6.
During your incumbency, over 100 prominent university professors have been forced to retire or have been expelled through the use of seemingly legal maneuvers. For the first time in Iran’s educational history, a person who does not have a university degree has been appointed president of a university. The degree of loyalty to the faction that supports the government has become the determinant for hiring professors. In reality, considering that all undergraduate university students attest to suffering from a shortage of professors, and considering the fact that Iranian universities are not ranked among the top 2000 universities of the world, why are professors being treated in this way?

Human Rights and Freedom of Speech:

7.
Official and governmental news sources reveal that during the two years of your Incumbency, workers and teachers have been imprisoned or laid off simply because they demanded their economic rights and slight increases in wages. Please tell us when and how your support for the low income and deprived sectors of the society will be realized.

8.
Many publications and news services have been closed or banned based on government complaints. . . The newspaper, Iran, has been turned into a government bulletin. The editorial board of the Iranian student press service, ISNA, has been prevented from covering the illegal actions taken against students. What is the reason for this suppression of the press, and how long will it last?

9.
During your incumbency, political parties have faced the most intense suppression. . . Please clarify what you mean by the “nauseating democracy” which you had discussed not too long ago? Explain how it is different from the type of democracy which you defended when you were in the U.S.? In general, do you think democracy is possible without independent and truth-seeking parties?

10.
Women constitute over half the population of Iran. Aside from the gender-based prejudice which you have enforced against female participants in the national university entrance exam, your government has presented a bill on the rights of the family which openly ignores women’s rights.[Reference to a bill presented to the parliament which was not passed under pressure from women's rights activists] This measure has been concomitant with the punishment and imprisonment of women’s civil rights activists who demand equality in men’s and women’s blood money, equal inheritance, and oppose polygamy.

The Economic Situation:

11.
You participated in the [2005] election with two slogans: bringing oil money to people’s dinner tables, and fighting prejudice and corruption. During the past two years, authoritative sources have reported that corruption has increased among Iranian officials. Iran has moved fifteen steps up on the scale of corruption. The People’s low subsistence level is obvious. Given that you are less than two years away from the end of your presidential term, when do you plan to realize your electoral promises?

12.
During the past two years, the oil revenue has increased because of the increase in the price of oil (this is also related to your policies). This revenue has been equivalent to the oil revenue during the eight-year-long presidency of Mr. Khatami or that of Mr. Rafsanjani. Give us a quantitative and not a qualitative report on how this revenue has been spent. How many construction projects have been started and how many infrastructure projects have been completed?

13.
As a result of the government’s bad policies, economic growth has been two percent less than [what was projected by] the fourth development plan, even as the oil revenue has increased tremendously. Within a five year period, this will mean a 70 billion dollar loss, or a $1000 loss for each Iranian. Do you know that some people are unable to provide even their basic means of subsistence? They cannot even imagine a $1000 income in their wildest dreams? The profit on the “justice stock” which you advertised is a lot less than this amount. Consider that the entire budget deficit for Iran’s universities can be made up by the amount of $320 million.

14.
Inflation in the housing sector has increased severely as a result of bad governmental policies. Your government officials admit that. As a result of these policies, officials are now declaring that people who live in large cities should not even think about finding housing. Did you know that most young people cannot get married because of the housing issue? Did you know that as a result of these wrong policies, housing is now the gravest problem that afflicts people? Perhaps housing too is cheap in your neighborhood.

Foreign Policy:

Although the country’s foreign policy is affected by various centers of power inside Iran, the role of the government cannot be denied. Iran has paid an especially heavy price for your thoughtless and irresponsible statements.

15.
The massacre of Jews during World War II is a bitter and undeniable truth. Why do you argue about this issue? Is the Holocaust the most important issue facing humanity? If your goal is to defend the Palestinians, will questioning the Holocaust solve the Palestinian problem?

16.
Your provoking and scandalous statements about [Iran’s] nuclear policy have been critiqued even by your co-thinkers, and are occasionally in conflict with official government positions. These statements make diplomatic observers wonder about your intentions. Isn’t it true that your inflammatory and thoughtless statements have played a large role in sending Iran’s case to the United Nations?

17.
Where are you getting the funds to pay for your frequent trips to South America and your extreme generosity toward the people of those countries? What is your goal? What has all of this achieved for Iran?

18.
Why are you silent about the heavy tolls which China and Russia demand from us? Why are you giving them so many economic benefits? Isn’t it true that your wrong policies in this regard will destroy our resources? Isn't it true that both countries will eventually vote in favor of resolutions against Iran. Why are you selling gas to India and Pakistan at a cost below the lowest price?

19.
Why did you arrest British sailors? . . . .

20.
Last question: In your speech at Columbia University and in other speeches and interviews abroad, you made statements that openly contradict your aims, actions and positions. What is the reason behind this contradiction? One can only conclude that your goals and actions are not defensible and will have consequences even more destructive than what we have seen so far. In essence, this contradiction between word and deed reflects nothing but demagoguery. . .

The Central Committee of the Office for the Consolidation of Unity
October 7, 2007

Why We Say No to the Compulsory Hijab?

2009-07-04T13:52:00.000-07:00

Fatemeh Sadeghi has a Ph.D. in political science and has taught at the Islamic Azad University of Karaj near Tehran. She is the daughter of Ayatollah Sadeq Khalkhali. In this courageous article, published in May 2008, she challenges the oppression of women in Iran today. Soon after the publication of this article, she was suspended from her teaching post at the University of Karaj. A number of students protested her suspension.

Why We say “No” to the Compulsory Hijab?
By Fatemeh Sadeghi
Source: http://www.meydaan.com/Showarticle.aspx?arid=548
Translated by Frieda Afary

Translator’s Note: Fatemeh Sadeghi has a Ph.D. in political science and has taught at the Islamic Azad University of Karaj near Tehran. She is the daughter of Ayatollah Sadeq Khalkhali. The following are translated excerpts from an article entitled “Why the Hijab?” which she published in the feminist website Meydaneh Zan (Women’s Field) on May 14, 2008. Soon after the publication of this article, she was suspended from her teaching post. A number of students at the Azad University of Karaj protested her suspension.

. . . Let me tell you about how my painful experience with the hijab started. I remember the day when I had to wear a headscarf for the first time in front of the boys in our family who were my playmates and often competitors. I felt humiliated. I felt paralyzed and crushed in their eyes. I could especially read the following message in the eyes of one of them: “See how your were vanquished?” The story was not just about covering my body. It was much more. On many occasions when I was busy playing or preoccupied with myself, I heard chiding voices from various corners: “Sit properly. Straighten your outfit. All your body parts are uncovered. Pull you scarf forward, Your veil is too far back on your head, Your neck is showing, Your hair is showing etc . . . “ I never knew the meaning behind these reprimands and even why I was being addressed in such a manner.

The personal experiences and humiliation which the hijab has caused me and many others, cannot be found in any of the precious and often reprinted books of the clergy in Qum. Less can it be found in the colorful poems which are force fed us in honor of this momentous task. Let me tell you that after those childhood experiences, the most humiliating sentence about the hijab which I have heard, has been the following: “For a woman, the hijab is like a pearl which covers a jewel.” I could tolerate more respectable sentences such as “Sister, your hijab is a more powerful weapon than my blood.” But I could never tolerate the former sentence.

The former sentence contains an insult which can be understood by any human being. Without having met the creators of that sentence, I can tell that they were experts in the psychology of personality disorders. Can you guess why? This sentence combines praise and humiliation. A woman is praised but only as a being who must be beautiful. Anyway, you know this better than I do. In the latter sentence however, I sense a type of respect. I like its combativeness along with the respect that it has for my femininity, even though it does not understand me and dismisses me as a woman.

As I was growing up, I realized that this story has gained more complex dimensions. Soon I understood that there is a difference between the headscarf and the veil. If the headscarf was to sexually control me --although very unsuccessfully-- or to pull me out of the realm of childhood and force me to become a woman, the veil was something else. I could see that my mother and many other women around me, used the veil in a variety of ways. They did not wear the same veil at all places and they did not cover themselves as tightly in all places. Especially when a grand clergyman was to visit our house or when we were to visit a grand clergyman, they would hold their veils more tightly. Naturally under these circumstances, I was told, “Watch your hijab,” meaning, hold it more tightly. Were these men considered more representative of the outsider category [namahram in Persian refers to a non-kin with whom a man or woman may not associate closely ] than other men? I think so. The higher the class and rank [of a man], the more the [woman’s] face was to be covered. The hijab had an inextricable relationship with power.

The veil was not just a cover. It allowed for thousands of ways of establishing distance, symbolic gestures, blending in, differentiating oneself, and giving or gaining benefits. I too had to learn how to use the veil in the aristocratic hierarchy of power of the clergy. I had to learn how to use it as an instrument of power and impose it on others. I had to learn how to use the cues to become a prominent person among other prominent people, to become recognized, to become seen, to gain benefits. I proved not talented at this task.

Wearing the headscarf or the overcoat was not enough. Thus, the first time I surreptitiously tried wearing an overcoat and a headscarf, I felt naked. Now I know that more than any feeling of physical nakedness, what made me distressed and confused was the loss of the consequences [of wearing the veil], all the symbols, the benefits and distinction and prominence, the aristocracy. Nevertheless, wearing the overcoat and the headscarf had an adventurous and awesome benefit despite the fear and the dangers. Along with many other consequences, losing the social and political benefits that accompanied the hijab and the veil forced me to step in a different direction. By wearing the overcoat and headscard I became empty and lost my identity. Now I needed to build a new identity.

When I asked a very famous clergyman whether the hijab was based on Sharia law, he said something along the lines of the following: “There in no such hijab in Sharia law. The question concerns the civil code.” Another who was a famous clergyman of his time and taught at the Hawzah [Reference to the Assmbly of Seminary Scholars and Researchers in the city of Qum, the largest center of Shia scholarship in the world] and at a university, revealed that in Sharia law, the hijab does not even mean covering one’s head. He surprised me by inviting me to reconsider my own manner of covering my body. Nevertheless, neither of these clergymen ever openly expressed his viewpoint in public. Similarly many others do not. We know that the few who have had the courage to express their views have been defrocked and punished in other ways.

For those who have experienced these times, the works of Mr. Mottahari and his likes cannot answer the above simple questions, even if they are published thousands more times thanks to the large budgets of the Ministry of Culture and the Organization of Islamic Propaganda. Mottahari himself was well aware of the fact that the viewpoint of the reactionary clergy can no longer answer the questions of the new generation. That is why he named his book, “The Question of the Hijab” and tried to adopt a so called scientific attitude toward this momentous subject.

Everyone knows well that there is only one solution to the question of the hijab: Covering oneself should be left to women’s individual choice. If the institution of the family, society and Islamic government depends on the hijab, then the problem is to be found in that institution, the foundation of that family, that society and that government, all of which require bold but necessary revision. But in reality this will not happen, at least not in the near future. Today, the attitude of the Islamic regime or at least important parts of it are more confrontational toward women than ever. Such a confrontational attitude toward women is unprecedented among incumbent administrations since the beginning of the revolution . One has to ask what is causing this brutality of which the attitude toward the hijab is only one of many dimensions.

Hijab and the Mission of the Holy Government

Perhaps no government in the world except the American neo-conservatives or former Communist regimes, is like ours in the following sense: The hold on power and the control over the masses either through luck or through severe repression of dissidents and through the use of force, is considered holy. It is so holy that they dare to take any action against citizens without being concerned about the consequences.

Occurrences such as the invasion of Iraq and Afghanistan, the Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq, Guantanamo and others which are intended to export so-called democracy to the world stem from the illusion of a holy mission similar to that which is promoted by the discourse of the rulers of the Islamic regime concerning global justice and the so-called salvation of the world. Clearly this discourse is in fact an instrument for mending the crisis of political legitimacy pertaining to governments which face it internally and externally.

The rhetoric of a holy mission is openly associated with violence because it is deeply connected to the crisis of legitimacy. At a time when our country is on the verge of many kinds of social and economic crises, it is no accident that new plans for social policing arise in new forms and promote violence anew. Of course no one answers the simple question of how this holy mission will be performed given the depth of the internal dissatisfaction.

Why We Say “No” to the Compulsory Hijab

As women we have been critiquing and will critique the varieties of the compulsory hijab for years. We have done so in implicit and explicit ways, with irony, protest, argumentation, civil resistance and in many other forms. Today, given the confrontational attitude of the Islamic regime, it seems that we need to speak about this issue again. We have to say “no” to it. We have to start a new discourse. They cannot put an end to this matter simply and with an order from this or that commander and the arrests of many women on the streets and private companies, and the firing of women office workers. I believe that a major confrontation is on the way. This is a confrontation that the perpetrators of the “social safety plans” and “the elevation of public decency” have initiated. . .

Speech by Mansour Osanloo of Tehran Bus Workers Syndicate

2009-07-04T13:41:00.000-07:00

Excerpts from a speech made by Mansour Osanloo, the leader of the Tehran Bus Workers Syndicate, to the International Trade Union Confederation in Brussels, Belgium in June 2007. Upon his return to Iran, he was abducted and imprisoned. He has been in prison since then.

Excerpts from a speech made by Mansour Osanloo, the leader of the Tehran Bus Workers Syndicate, to the International Trade Union Confederation in Brussels, Belgium in June 2007. The Persian original was posted on the Syndicate’s website www.syndicavahed.info/.

Translated by Frieda Afary

Translator’s Note:
On July 10, Mansour Osanloo, the leader of the Tehran Bus Workers’ Syndicate was abducted by plainclothes Iranian government agents and later found at the notorious Evin Prison in Tehran. Despite severe health problems he has been held in prison since that date.

In 2004, Tehran’s bus workers attempted to reactivate their union which had been disbanded after the 1979 revolution. This was the first effort by Iranian workers to launch an independent trade union after the Islamic Republic had banned workers’ independent trade unions created during the 1979 revolution and had replaced them with state sponsored “Islamic Labor Councils” and the “House of Labor.”

In December 2005, 3000 members of the officially unrecognized Syndicate went on strike to demand better pay. Since then Osanloo and other Syndicate members as well as their families have been viciously beaten, intermittently arrested and continually harassed by the Iranian government.

Sisters and Brothers:

It is my pleasure to address the ITUC congress today as a representative of Iranian workers and the Syndicate of the Workers of the United Bus Company in particular.

According to article 26 of the Iranian Constitution our union is legitimate. However, our government has not recognized our union since its reactivation in 2005. We are grateful for the recognition granted to our union by the International Federation of Transport Workers and also for the support of union associated with ITUC and global unions.

As I am speaking to you today, 40 members of our Syndicate have been unjustly fired by the company’s administration for their union activities in defense of workers’ rights. Therefore, we ask for your support in demanding that they be given back their jobs and assisted in overcoming this pain and suffering.

It took us seven years to build the foundation of our Syndicate. We regularly held Syndicate classes on weekends and discussed International Labor Union (ILU) documents about workers’ rights. We discussed working conditions based on the situation of the workers. Some cases concerned health and safety, long working hours and the administration’s corruption. This struggle may not be unlike climbing a mountain. If you rush, you run out of breath but if you do not proceed with strength and discipline, you will never achieve the goal.

I could not have spoken in Brussels at a better time. I welcome the report prepared by the Free Association Cmte. Of the ILU . . . .In this report, it has been stressed that the “House of Labor” could not follow through on the demands of the bus drives. This is not surprising considering that the “House of Labor” and Islamic Labor Councils had been created by the government for the principal role of watching workers at the workers, and not defending them!

It is not only the Bus Company workers and their families in Tehran who suffer from this system. The government is now discussing the plan to privatize over 80% of industrial companies, including banks, the media, transporation and mines. These are currently managed by the government. This is a revision of the economic “principles” that are clearly stated in the Constitution. This will increase the gap between poor and rich. The poor will get poorer and the rich will get richer.

That is why we have witnessed protests in the oil industry, among teachers, in the textile industry, food industry, construction and transportation. Even the unemployed workes and women have joned the protesters.

Worst of all are the revisions in the labor laws that will legitimize firing workers and paying lower wages to temporary workers. This revision will leave the door open for firing permanent workers and replacing them with temporary workers. Workers hired by companies that employ fewer than 10, will no longer be covered by the labor law.

Even now, many workers have lost their jobs. The unemployment rate is very high. Some unemployed workers have resorted to becoming street vendors, smuggling drugs or selling their children to human traffickers for $150 U.S. dollars out of desperation or because of drug addiction. I know that this is unbelievable. But I myself have seen such a case.

That is why our aim is to rebuild a wider workers’ movement in Iran and not only a movement of the Bus Company workers of Tehran. We hope to start a nationwide federation of unions. As I am speaking to you now, I can say that in different sectors such as construction, painting, baking and even some sectors of large industry, workers are in the process of creating free and independent organizations of their own. Thanks to the support you have given our labor movement, Iranian workers have learned how to organize free and democratic associations, and realize how international labor solidarity will make them stronger and immune to violations. In reality we attempted to start this struggle without basic preconditions such as a meeting place and other material and technical-organizational preconditions. We lost our meeting place and have paid a price for it. In order to expand our union activities, we need your support to obtain computers, other technical instruments, a union office and educational and instructional materials.

In this path, some of us have gone to prison. The imprisoned comrades and their families need any kind of humanitarian and financial and technical support. In fact, we are asking you not to deprive us of your support and solidarity as workers in this struggle against suppression. This support will give us greater strength to withstand to reach our goal. We will be grateful for your support.

I want to thank the secretary general of the ITU. If you had not so quickly acted during the December 2005 Christmas holiday when I was arrested for the first time, our situation would not have received the international support that it has received up to now.

We look forward to your continuing solidarity with our struggles as we step forward in this path. . . I feel confident and strong because I know that the international labor union movement is behind me. Iranian authorities know this as well. Instead, we will remain an inspiration as part of the international labor union movement for global peace and justice.

Statement by Tehran Bus Workers Syndicate

2009-07-04T13:30:00.000-07:00

It is clear to all that the demands of the majority of Iranian society goes far beyond economic demands. During the past few years, we have emphasized that so long as the principle of freedom of organization and choice is not realized, any talk of social freedom and economic rights is more a joke as opposed to reality.

Excerpts from Statement by Tehran and Suburbs Bus Workers Syndicate
Published in http://www.ettehadeh.com/
Translated by Frieda Afary

Translator’s note: The Tehran Bus Workers’ Syndicate has been in the forefront of Iranian labor struggles since 2005. Their leader Mansour Osanloo has has been languishing in prison since the Summer of 2007. Other members of the organization have been under attack and in and out of prison.

“We Condemn the Suppression and Intimidation of Civil Institutions”

During the past few days we have witnessed the passionate struggle and presence of millions of women, men, old and young, ethnic and religious minorities in Iran . They demand that the government recognize their most basic rights, that is, their right to choose freely, independently and without fraud. This right has been recognized in most parts of the world where every effort is made to protect it. In the midst of this situation, we have witnessed intimidation, arrests, murders and an egregious crackdown which is about to expand and lead to the deaths of many innocent human beings. This crackdown will only lead to more protests among the people, and not their retreat.

The Vahed Bus Workers Syndicate had said the following in a statement that it had issued prior to the June 12 presidential election. “In the absence of freedom of organization, our organization is naturally deprived of a social institution that would protect it. The Vahed Bus Workers Syndicate considers political activity to be the definite right of each member of society. If the presidential candidates present their labor charter and give us practical guarantees on their election promises in relation to labor, workers have the choice to participate or not participate in this election.”

It is clear to all that the demands of the majority of Iranian society goes far beyond economic demands. During the past few years, we have emphasized that so long as the principle of freedom of organization and choice is not realized, any talk of social freedom and economic rights is more a joke as opposed to reality.

On the basis of this reality, the Vahed Bus Workers Syndicate supports those who are giving their all to build a free and independent civil institution. We condemn any kind of suppression and intimidation.

In order to recognize economic and social rights in Iran, Friday June 25 has been declared an international day of support for imprisoned workers and trade unions in Iran. We are calling on everyone to consider this day to be more than a defense of economic rights. Let’s transform this day into a commemoration of human rights in Iran and ask our fellow workers around the world to take actions in defense of the pummeled rights of the majority of Iranians.

For the Expansion of Justice and Freedom
Vahed Workers Syndicate
June 2009

New Persian Translation of Marx's Capital (Translator's Preface)

2009-07-04T12:25:00.000-07:00

A year after its publication, the new Persian translation of Marx's Capital has sold out in Iran and is undergoing a reprint. Translator Hassan Mortazavi explains why he felt compelled to translate Capital anew, years after the publication of Iraj Eskandari's translation in 1973.

Hassan Mortazavi’s Preface to the new Persian translation of Marx’s Capital, Vol. I.
Tehran: Agah Publishing, 2008
Preface translated by Frieda Afary

Any reader of this work will no doubt ask why volume one of Capital has been translated anew. It has been 33 years since the first Persian translation was made by Iraj Eskandari in 1973. Clearly, he was the first to take on the monumental task of translating this work. As such, he has played a worthy role in introducing Marx’s greatest theoretic work. However, during the past three decades, the Persian language, Iranian society and the international situation have undergone great developments. The translation of works written in a variety of languages by thinkers in the field of humanities, the prevalence of critique and examination among Iranian intellectuals inside Iran and abroad, and the relatively common usage of more integral terms for the articulation of economic and somewhat philosophical categories foreign to our history and culture, have created the basis for a development that is unprecedented when compared to the last three decades.

On the other hand, we have seen important transformations on the political geographic and international governmental scenes and hence in the dominant discourse in thought. These have created massive changes in previously held perspectives. Thirty three years ago, during the era of the Cold War, the purpose of translating and publishing Capital was in Eskandari’s words: “To fill the large void in Iranian Marxist literature” (Capital, Vol. I, Eskandari, 1973, p. 16) “A hundred years after the publication of Capital, today, Marxist theories are the sharpest weapons of the toilers of the earth, not only in countries that have broken the yoke of capitalism to make the building of socialist and Communist societies their goal, but also in the entire world, from the most backward places to the most advanced countries.” (Ibid.)

But now we live in an epoch when utopian perspectives, revolutionary theories and Marxist theory itself are facing difficult challenges that demand deep examination and deep thinking. Obviously, one of the means for this examination consists of primary Marxist sources. Clearly, Capital is the most primary source. However, these means have been subjected to different interpretations ranging from structuralist and economistic to humanist ones. More importantly, our knowledge of the creation of Capital itself has undergone important changes which cannot be compared to the time when this work was first translated. In addition to changes in our knowledge, the categories that articulate this knowledge have also been going through constant change.

There is no doubt that the author, and less so the translator of any important economic, philosophic and social work, senses all these tensions and discontinuities, is influenced by the times and its changing categories, and clearly leaves her or his own mark on a work or translation as a result of the knowledge that she or he gains from the process of its creation. Just as Eskandari’s translation was in his own style, a reflection of the spirit of his time, the present translation exhibits the tension-ridden and inquisitive spirit of the present epoch.

Contemporary Marx scholars’ grasp and understanding of the process of creation of Capital have undergone great changes in the last few decades. These changes have been the results of great transformations in the international and social scene. The death of Stalin, the division within the Socialist camp, and the crises of the 1960s and 1970s led to a resurgent interest in Marx and the translation of many of his unknown works. Among these, were the translation of the Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844 (First published in the original language in 1933 in Berlin) which exploded the myth that there was a contradiction between the young Hegelian Marx who was not very familiar with material and economic realities, and the old economist Marx who was freed from Hegelian dialectics. The economic language of the young Marx’s 1844 Manuscripts and the philosophic language of the old Marx’s Capital, are not two separate stages but one process of development. Based on this fact, we can see the mechanical understanding of a structuralist philosopher like Althusser who condemns chapter one of Capital for the abundance of its Hegelian expressions and asks readers to start with chapter two which has a “more realistic and economic” language. Unfortunately as Herbert Marcuse argues, Marx adopts a completely philosophic direction in his most economic work and an economic direction in his most philosophical work!

Later, the Grundrisse(first published in the original language during the years 1939-1941 in Moscow) was published in English and French. This product of the mature Marx “destroys the fetishism of historians, and traces instead the movement of history, thereby disclosing people as part of the 'absolute movement of becoming,"as shapers of history." (Dunayevskaya.Philosophy &Revolution.Lexington Press, 2003, p. 63) The two axes of the Grundrisse , that is, “pre-capitalist economic formations” and “Machinery” manifest the integral unity of philosophy and economics. “The failure to come to grips with the Grundrisse has little to do with ‘Hegelianism’ and everything to do with the Marxism of Marx ‘refusing’ to become either a dogmatism or a discipline, be it economic or historic, philosophic or sociological.”(Ibid.)

The next important development was the publication of a new edition of the Collected Works of Marx and Engels (MEGA) in 1991, which in separate volumes included all the other versions of volume one of Capital as edited by Marx or Engels. In this way we can see which important parts of the 1872-75 French edition have not been included in the final version, i.e. the fourth German edition published in 1890 (the edition that Engels considered “final” and which Eskandari used).

The important aspect of the 1872-75 French edition is that it “was no mere translation. Not only did Marx, in editing it himself, make more precise many basic formulations but he greatly expanded some sections, especially the crucial section on Accumulation of Capital, as well as the most discussed section on the fetishism of commodities.” (Kevin Anderson, “The ‘Unknown’ Marx’s Capital, Volume I: The French Edition of 1872-75, 100 Years Later” in Review of Radical Political Economics, V. 15:4 p. 72) Marx himself thought that this translation possessed a scientific value independent of the original and even recommended its reading to readers completely familiar with German. “Marx left with Engels the task of incorporating the changes from the French into a new German edition on which he was working at the time of his death.”(Op.Cit., p. 73) In the fourth or 1890 German edition of Capital, Engels declared that he had “scrupulously followed Marx, and it was so accepted by the post-Marx Marxists and Marx scholars. But Engels was not only hampered in this task by his own earlier attitude and preference for the earlier German edition of 1867, but he did not in fact, incorporate all of Marx’s changes.”(Ibid.)

Here, I do not intend to examine the importance of the French edition in great detail because I have included an article by Kevin Anderson which allows readers to comprehend the value and importance of this edition. I would only point out that for reasons mentioned earlier, Eskandari’s translation is incomplete because it does not include many of Marx’s later additions in the writing of the French edition.

In his preface, Eskandari writes that he first started his translation from the French translation by Joseph Roy (The translator of the 1872-75 French edition). He even points out that “Joseph Roy’s translation is distinctive in that Karl Marx was personally involved in its arrangement and even corrected and composed parts of it in French. . . However, during the course of comparing it with the German text [the 1890 edition by Engels] it became clear that Joseph Roy had engaged in a free style of translation and hence in many cases, phrases in the German text have been either deleted or changed according to the translator’s style.”(Capital, Vol. I, Iraj Eskandari, 1352[1973], p. 16). And this [decision by Eskandari] took place even though Marx, in his response to Engels’ unwelcoming attitude toward the French text, had written that many parts in the French edition were “better than in German.”(Ibid.). Nevertheless, Eskandari felt obliged to compare his translation of the French text with the German text [1890] “sentence by sentence” in order to “remove the previously mentioned defects.”(Eskandari, p. 16) In effect, the fourth German edition became the main source of the Persian translation, without including many of the changes which Marx had introduced in the French edition.

Even worse, based on Eskandari’s translation, it is impossible to tell in what part, Marx’s revision in the French edition has been included, in what part the text of the German edition has changed, and in what part it has remained untouched. It is impossible to tell what constitutes Engels’s additions and finally, where the translators of the English edition (Samuel Moore and Edward Aveling) have introduced changes in Marx’s text. In the end one wonders if this is really a translation of what Marx finally had in mind or a synthesis of various editions of Capital and Engels’s views.

From the vantage point of the ideologues of the Second and Third Internationals and later Russian theoreticians and naturally Eskandari who was following them (and to be more exact, from the vantage point of a generation of Marxists, be they past or present) Marx and Engels have been a single and indivisible body. Consequently, whatever Engels said is what Marx had in mind. It is based on this logic that Eskandari does not doubt that Engels’s edition is the final version even though he can see and read otherwise. And even where he quotes from the French edition, he does not neglect to mention that “following the German edition of Capital which has been published by the Marx-Engels-Lenin Institute, we include the translation of the aforementioned paragraphs as footnotes.” (Capital, Vol I, Eskandari, 1352(1973), p. 564)

The best way to compare and contrast the various editions of Capital is to follow what has been done in the new edition of MEGA (Marx-Engels Complete Writings). They have published the various editions of Capital and Marx’s own manuscripts and have analyzed the changes and additions in separate volumes. Unfortunately we do not have the capability to translate all the various editions of volume I. However, to the extent possible, we have tried to reexamine this work as it has been published in different editions. In reality, we have attempted to reveal that for Marx, Capital was not a final text with minor changes in subsequent editions. Viewing the text as final is absolutely not compatible with the reality of the creation of the text. So long as Marx lived, he continued to rewrite the text of volume I and even planned to completely review it. (See the Dec. 13, 1881 letter from Marx to Danielson).

And finally, Marx felt the need for a breakthrough in the realm of human thought and further developed that breakthrough. The creation of such a breakthrough (reason or new logic) inevitably transcended the existing language (the inherited product of old reason) and in Hegel’s language was a process of “becoming.” Why? Because it was an untrodden path (language). It was a way to create a compass without having a compass in hand! This compass could only be reached after trodding this path.

Taking this path via the power of “abstraction” is necessary for creating a language that is capable of articulating the new heights of the new reason. This new language will most likely empty the paradigms of the current language of their content in order to partially replace them with new concepts, and to create new paradigms! This task is impossible when pragmatism and the politics of the day are dominant, and theoretically guided action is belittled and denigrated. At best this task is “arduous.”

The new Persian translation of Capital is based on four sources:

1. Capital, Volume 1. London: Penguin and New York: Vintage, 1976. This is Ben Fowkes’s English translation which includes a long introduction by Ernest Mandel that is essentially based on the 1890 German edition.

2. Le Capital, Livre I, Paris: Messidor/Editions Sociales, 1983. This is Jean-Pierre Lefebvre’s very precise and excellent translation which includes his comprehensive introduction. This translation is also based on the 1890 German edition.

3. Das Kapital, Kritik der politischen Okonomie. Erster Band, Hamburg, Berlin: Dietz Verlag, 1991 in volume II/10 of the new MEGA which includes a long appendix that compares all the additions and defects of the previous editions and the latest edition of Capital as well as the differences of the 1872-75 French edition. This volume has been published by a group of scholars at the Berlin Labor Institute, headed by Ronald Nietzold.

4. Le Capital, Paris 1872-75 (Berlin, Dietz Verlag, 1989) in volume II/7 of the new MEGA which includes a long appendix.
First, the entire text of the Ben Fowkes translation was translated into Persian. In the process of this translation many differences between the Fowkes translation and the 1890 German edition were found. Once again, the entire Persian text was compared with Jean Pierre Lefebvre’s translation. This time, the Persian translation was based on Lefebvre’s edition. At this stage, the text was compared with the 1890 German edition.

In the meantime, my friend and colleague, K. Buyeri, compared the Persian text with Joseph Roy’s French translation which had been fully reexamined by Marx. We singled out the changes one by one. Subsequently, these changes were once again compared with Apparat II/7 and Apparat II/10 which are the appendices to volumes II/ 7 and II/10 of MEGA and specify the differences between the French edition and the 1890 edition. Then, to the extent possible, we specified the additions and changes in the second, third, fourth editions and Engels’s additions in the various editions, as well as differences between the Moore/Aveling translation and the Ben Fowkes translation, especially concerning quotations from original English sources. Our text has also been compared with Eskandari’s translation. In cases where Eskandari has better articulated a point or offered illuminating explanations in his footnotes, those points have been preserved.

In order to make it easier for readers, the additions to the French edition that have not been included in the 1890 German edition, have been specified in the margins of the present edtion. In this way, the reader can easily see the differences between the 1872-75 French and the 1890 German edition. These changes fall into two categories: Either whole passages have been added to the French edition, or a passage or sentence has been expressed differently in the French text. In the text and the footnotes, explanations by the English translator, Ben Fowkes, the French translator, Lefebvre, and the Persian translator have been specified with the initials e.t., f.t., p.t. and marked with an asterisk. All other explanations in the footnotes are from Marx and in some cases from Engels which have been identified as such. Explanations within the text offered by the Persian translator, by the French and German translators and by Marx himself have been separately identified respectively. In order to avoid confusion, all the translators’ explanations which concern individuals, events and subjects, have been transferred to the end of the book. On this basis, four indexes have been provided: A Persian-English- French-German glossary, a name index, a subject index, a general index. The book ends with a bibliography of works used by Marx. To the extent possible, all the non-German words, have been provided both in Persian and in Latin letters.

The organization of the fourth (1890) German edition is similar to that of Roy’s French translation and different from the original (1867) German edition or Lefebvre’s later translation. Both English translations have followed Engels fourth German edition. For the Persian edition, we have used the organization of the fourth German edition.

First I need to thank K. Boveiri more than anyone else. He assisted me during the long process of translating Capital. In my opinion, the importance of his work is such that he should be called the second translator. I would also like to thank Mr. Kamal Khosravi who carefully examined the first chapter and made important suggestions. He is the one who translated section 4 of chapter 1, known as “The Fetishism of the Commodity and its Secret” by using the German text. . . .

March 2007